WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

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Volume XXI, Number 3 April 1969

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $7.50 per year; $12.50 for two years; foreign postage, 25 cents additional per year; single issue, $2.50.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *Social Sciences & Humanities Index* and the *Book Review Index*. Abstracts of its articles appear in *Historical Abstracts* and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1969. Vol. XXI, No. 3. Second-Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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ISRAEL: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

By DAN AVNI-SEGRE*

I

THE purpose of this paper is to show some political consequences of the impact of industrialism on Israeli society, and the influence of some of the original trends of agrarian Zionism on Israel, a state increasingly relying on industrial power and institutions.

Many aspects of the history of the Jewish national movement in Palestine could be described in terms of the fight of an underdeveloped colonial territory and society for independence. What is perhaps unusual in the Zionist struggle is that the will for the development of a "just society" preceded the will for political independence; and that the effort of industrialization was undertaken more as a result of unforeseen internal and external pressures than as an expression of national self-assertion or as the outcome of a specific ideology.[1]

This peculiar attitude of Jewish nationalism towards industrialism has its roots in both Jewish and European history of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the absorption of ideas of the Jewish and non-Jewish Enlightenment.

Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) is a much-studied phenomenon whose sociological and economic aspects are to this day less clear than are its historical and cultural implications. It contained many Jewish biblical and post-biblical ideals, such as the equality of man, messianic harmony of nations, humanistic rationalism, which could easily fit into the thinking of the non-Jewish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. At the same time, Judaism had always proclaimed the supreme duty of the Jews to resettle their ancestral land. Well before the rise of the Zionist movement, the idea of the return of the Jew to the land—not only the distant and for many almost mythical land of Israel but to the land as an honorable source of livelihood—was popular in the still compact and very traditional Jewish society of Eastern Europe. By

* This paper is based on a lecture delivered for the Program in Near Eastern Studies, at Princeton University in March, 1968. I am grateful to Professor Morroe Berger of Princeton University; to Professor Joseph Agassi and Professor Robert S. Cohen of Boston University for their suggestions during the preparation of the original text; and to Dr. Meir Vereté of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for reading and generously helping me when rewriting the final draft.

[1] The very special conceptions of Zionist sovereignty have been forcefully analysed by Ben Halpern in *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 20-43.

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the nineteenth century the settlement of Jews on the land was considered a noble way to regenerate the pauper nation. It fitted well with the Russian idealization of agrarian values that had developed in the wake of and in reaction to the westernizing trend of Russian society, at that time shaken by the Napoleonic invasion.

These ideas of the Jewish Enlightenment had direct or indirect connections with the social ideals that the French soldiers had brought into the Jewish society of Eastern Europe. Central to them was the concept of the equality of man and of the emancipation of individuals and oppressed nations. It polarized the hopes and passions of both Jews and gentiles and contributed to the dephasing of the Jewish national movement in time and space. Zionism is a movement of emancipation born on European soil, nourished by the ideals of the Enlightenment, and, finally, realized in Asia in the middle of the twentieth century.

The consequences of its involuntary stretching in time and space are still traceable in contemporary Israeli society, most particularly in the ideological postures of some of its political elites.

II

As a political *movement*, Zionism was born after the Russian pogroms of 1881, which shattered whatever faith Jewish intelligentsia might have had in the capacity for liberalization of Tsarist society.[2] As a political *program*, Zionism was born fourteen years later, in 1895, when the Dreyfus trial shattered the faith of an Austrian Jewish journalist, Theodor Herzl,[3] in the civilizing mission of France.

The outcome of the first crisis was the organization of the settlement of Jewish pioneers in Turkish Palestine following the example of those "Lovers of Zion"[4] who had already left Eastern Europe to

[2] The most important Zionist reaction at the time was L. S. Pinsker's pamphlet, *Autoemancipation*, published in Odessa in September 1882 under the *nom de plume* "A Russian Jew"; reprinted in Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader* (New York 1959), 182.

[3] Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, was born in Budapest in 1860 and died in Austria in 1904. For a detailed biography see Alex Bein's definitive *Theodor Herzl: A Biography*, M. Samuel, trans. (London 1956). For a concise and penetrating assessment of his ideas see Hertzberg, 45-51.

[4] The "Lovers of Zion" movement originated in Rumania as a reaction to the anti-Semitic policy followed by the Rumanian government especially after 1867. The movement quickly spread to the Jewish communities of Russia. For a critical discussion of the movement's aim and methods, see Ahad Ha-Am (A. Ginsberg), *Al Parashat Derakim* [At the Parting of the Ways], (4 vols., Berlin 1921) II, 247 and 267. Ahad Ha-Am was the leader of "spiritual Zionism," a movement that, contrary to Herzl's "political Zionism," held that Palestine could and should become a center not only of Jewish political revival but also of a Jewish spiritual revival. For a concise critical assessment of the views of Herzl and Ahad Ha-Am, see Hertzberg, 45-80, and also Leo Simon, *Ahad Ha-Am: A Biography* (London 1960).

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settle in the land of Israel, where they were generously helped by Baron Edmond de Rothschild.[5] The outcome of the second crisis was the appearance of Herzl's political pamphlet, "The Jewish State," which changed the course of Jewish national history.[6] This pamphlet became a public political Jewish manifesto almost by chance. Originally meant to serve a very small audience, it was written as a reasoned argument in favor of Jewish immigration to Palestine, to be presented by Herzl to the Jewish philanthropist Baron Maurice de Hirsch and to the Rothschild family—who took little notice of the Austrian journalist's proposal. Thus Zionism in its practical aspects was born at the end of the nineteenth century. But although it realized its aim, the creation of a Jewish state, only in the middle of the twentieth century, its intellectual origins go back to the eighteenth century and are firmly rooted in the conception of society, before the industrial revolution, in the minds of Europeans generally and of Jews in Eastern Europe.

Martin Buber has shown better than anybody else the French utopian origins of the Zionist collective settlement—the kibbutz—in his *Paths in Utopia*.[7] In general, it can safely be argued that Zionism got into trouble because its original belief in final human harmony—harmony within a Jewish people torn between traditionalism and assimilationist reform; harmony between the Jews and other peoples in a society torn between liberalism and anti-Semitism—clashed with the strife and competition of the modern world.

Zionism could have preserved some of its ideological logic if it had shared the minority view of Adam Smith, who believed that competition leads to harmony. But it did not, because its nineteenth-century leaders were already obsessed with Marxian and Hegelian belittlement of the idea of utopia. So from the very beginning Zionism suffered from the straitjacket of its own beliefs: It built in Palestine a society whose many symbols and institutions were founded on a utopian idea of harmony and whose daily life was carried out in Hegelian struggle.

[5] See Israël Margalith, *Le Baron Edmond de Rothschild et la colonisation Juive en Palestine, 1882-1899* (Paris 1957)

[6] The implications of the application by Herzl of an old solution of the Jewish problem to its modern situation have been discussed by Joseph Agassi in "The Novelty of Popper's Philosophy of Science," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, VIII (September 1968), 446-49; see also Hertzberg, 202-03.

[7] Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (London 1949) especially 143-49, and Ben Halpern, 58-94; for the relations between Zionist socialism and other Jewish Socialist parties, especially the Bund, see Bernard K. Johnpoll, *The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers' Bund of Poland, 1917-1943* (New York 1967), 18.

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Ideologically, it was a difficult situation, and it produced some remarkable theoretical twistings, especially for the Zionist-Marxists. Typical of them is the justification that Ber Borochov, a leading Zionist labor ideologist, gave for the return of the Jews to their homeland. Palestine, he said, was so poor that it was bypassed by big capitalism and thus gave the Jews the opportunity to develop it and build in it a better, more just society.[8]

In practice, however, the dichotomy between harmony and strife did not hinder the development of the Jewish community in Palestine. The ideological "monasteries" of the Jewish settlement—that is to say, the kibbutzim, the collective settlements—were utopian communities activated by continuous external military and economic strife. The ideological "church" of Jewish labor—the Histadrut, the Federation of Labor—went a long way toward the realization of a classless Jewish community in which the workers controlled labor, capital markets, social services, and culture and education.[9] Both were kept together and in movement less by utopian harmony than by continuous external struggle against the British Administration and the Arab labor competition. They were also to have a lasting moral and material effect on the rest of the Jewish society of Palestine, and later on the Jewish state.

Things might have turned out differently if orthodox Jews had come to Palestine *en masse* but, in spite of the religious commandment to return and settle the land of Israel, they did not do so. This was the case for reasons that we shall not discuss here, ranging from social inertia of a traditional society to ideological opposition to Enlightenment. Enlightenment was after all an anti-religious movement and Zionism was Enlightenment, though it was Romanticism as well.[10]

[8] The views of Ber Borochov (1881-1917) are discussed in Hertzberg, 365-66. For more detail, see Alex Bein, *The Return to the Soil* (Jerusalem 1952), and W. Preuss, *Die Jüdische Arbeiterbewegung in Palästina* (2 vols.; Berlin 1932-33). However, most of the statements and opinions of the Jewish socialist leaders are scattered in periodical literature such as *Hapoel Ha Zair*, Hebrew weekly labor organ which appeared from 1908 to 1914 in Jerusalem; *Davar*, Tel Aviv, since 1937, Hebrew daily organ of the General Federation of Jewish Labor; and *Kuntress*, Hebrew weekly labor organ, which appeared in Tel Aviv from 1919 to 1929. See also Samuel Halperin, *The Political World of American Zionism* (Detroit 1961), 157-75 for a concise description of Zionist Socialism and American labor.

[9] There is a large literature on the Zionist collective and cooperative movement, the most exhaustive work being Harry Viteles, *History of the Cooperative Movement in Israel: A Source Book in 7 Volumes*. The first 4 volumes are published thus far in London. They are *The Evolution of the Cooperative Movement in Israel* (1966), *The Evolution of the Kibbutz in Israel* (1967), *An Analysis of the Sectors of the Kibbutz Movement* (1968), and *Cooperative Smallholders Settlements (The Moshav Movement)* (1968). See also S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (London 1967).

[10] Emil Marmorstein, an orthodox Jewish scholar, has prepared an interesting study of the conflict between Zionism and Jewish orthodox nationalism, mainly from

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Things might have been different also if Western European and American Jews had come in greater numbers to Palestine. They could have turned out differently if the masses of Arabized Jews had answered the call of Zionism. But they did not hear the call because Zionism as a political movement developed in Europe and was less interested in the "Jews of the colonies," partly because of ignorance but mostly out of necessity. The Jewish problem for which Zionism had to provide an immediate solution was the problem of the persecution and the assimilation of the Jew in Western European society, not in Asia or Africa where Jews were not persecuted nor in danger of losing their national religious identity through assimilation into Moslem theocratic society.

Thus only a tiny minority of forward-looking and revolution-minded East European Jews rose and went to rebuild Palestine. It was, naturally, a very select group and for many years this selectness, born of common decision, provided a feeling of unity that was stronger than the already divided Zionist ideology. In this society, power and status became the affair of an even more select elite, the "collective aristocracy" of the land and the "cooperative aristocracy" of labor, who with great personal sacrifice upheld the belief in the possibility of a "perfect society" and in the regeneration of man through manual work. It was a very special and closely knit group that may best be referred to as the Zionist plantocracy, to use the term employed by W. H. Armytage[11] to distinguish the pre-industrial modernizing elite of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from the industrial elite of the nineteenth and twentieth.

Not all the Zionists who went to live in the land of Palestine believed in the mystical regenerative force of manual labor.[12] Under other conditions the early settlers might have turned into an agrarian society based on a conservative man-to-land relationship or into a

religious sources, to be published shortly in London. A typical and interesting anti-Zionist statement by the Rabbi of Zichover, in 1900, is to be found in E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London 1962), 75-76. See also B. Halpern, 16-18, 81-88, who also gives the text of press release issued by the "Protest Rabbis"—all of them from Germany—against the first Zionist congress in July 1892, 144.

[11] W.H.G. Armytage, *The Rise of the Technocrats* (London 1965). See also David Patterson's penetrating analysis of the sociological and psychological evolution of the kibbutz in "The First Fifty Years of Collective Settlement in Israel," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, II (1960), 42-55, where the social image of the kibbutz in Israel is discussed with rare insight.

[12] The best known prophet of the "religion of the land and work" was A. D. Gordon (1856-1912), a Russian-born Jew strongly influenced by Tolstoian ideas, who emigrated to Palestine in 1903. His philosophy is reflected in a short essay, "People and Labour," 1911, reprinted in Hertzberg, 372-74.

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"colon" society. And briefly, in the colonies financed by Baron de Rothschild and run with Arab labor, they did.[13] But soon the course changed under the growing pressure of Zionist socialism, of the kibbutz, of the cooperative workers' movement, of the labor federation, of the increased immigration, especially from Germany, and of the defensive situation in which the Jewish settlement found itself cornered because of divided British and solid Arab opposition to the establishment of a Jewish national "home" in Palestine.

This opposition—particularly to acquisition of land by Jews—combined with the necessities of immigration and military defense brought about some industrialization even in those very centers of agricultural purity that were the kibbutzim.[14] There were many objective reasons for this: mechanization of agriculture, need for autonomy in the maintenance of machinery, production of light weapons, etc. Private industrial enterprises in Palestine also often failed for lack of capital, lack of experience, lack of protected markets, and to a certain extent because of the British policy of laissez-faire, which in the colonies essentially meant laissez-faire to British firms. The collective and cooperative socialist groups of Palestine, being by their nature and structure the more secure and stable economic elements in a generally very poor colonial society, attracted and accepted the collaboration in capital and know-how of private investors. In spite of possible ideological divergence of opinions, both sides were also brought together by the common feeling of working for a superior Jewish national cause.

In terms of production these efforts of agrarian and often joint private and socialist industrialization may have not meant much, and the cities remained the main centers[15] of industrial production in Palestine and in Israel. But in terms of national leadership, they permitted the collective and cooperative landed Zionist gentry to share and to keep abreast of all aspects of national economic development,

[13] At the turn of the century, in the 12 villages established with the help of Baron de Rothschild, the number of Jewish laborers was only 673. See David Ben Gurion, *First Ones: Israel Year Book 1962-1963* (Jerusalem 1963).

[14] See Haim Darin, *The Other Society* (New York 1962), 78-82, for the early industrialization of the kibbutz, and 115 ff. for the impact of the 1935-39 German immigration on the mechanization of collective agriculture. According to a recent report, *Haaretz*, 25 October 1968, on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the beginning of the German Jewish immigration in Palestine, more than 13 million pounds were transferred from Germany into Palestine from 1933 to 1939 and 5 million invested in industry.

[15] In 1948 the ratio, in market value, between agricultural and industrial production in Israel was 1:3. It was reduced to 1:2 in 1959 because of the big agriculture expansion due to Israel's acquisition of Palestine government land and Arab-abandoned properties after the war of Independence. It jumped to 1:4 in 1965 and has continued to increase. See Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel: 1966*, 373-423.

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thus extending to the whole community, agricultural and industrial alike, the social symbols and the code of behavior of its own select group. This certainly did not avert clashes of vested interests. But it helped to strengthen and make acceptable in all parts of the Jewish society those socialist agrarian values of puritanism and frugality that later proved vital to the economic development of the state of Israel. Puritanism allowed the industrial infrastructure to be established in Israel before the impact of rising expectations was felt. In this respect, the puritanism of the Zionist plantocracy played a role similar to that of Protestant and Communist puritanism in the industrialization of the Western, Russian, and Chinese economies, and is also reminiscent of the military patriotic puritanism of the Meiji restoration, in the analysis of Masao Maruyama.[16]

The puritan contribution of Zionist plantocracy to Israel was the greatest moral achievement of the golden age of Zionism. Can it also be called a success? It probably cannot, for it is to the very weakness of Zionism as a utopian ideology that Israel owes its survival and its development.

III

The shortcomings of Zionism as a viable modern political ideology came to be felt as early as 1947. At that time the first Israeli war was being waged on two different levels—against the Arabs and against the British. For the British, it was a typical colonial struggle fought by Jewish settlers to obtain a measure of autonomy not very different from that which the American settlers had earlier claimed from Britain. It should be added parenthetically that the descriptive phrase "Jewish settlement" is seldom used in the literature. Its Hebrew equivalent, "Yishuv," makes it almost certain that no one will compare the Jewish and Kenyan settlers, Arab critics notwithstanding. In the colonial struggle against the British, the Jewish community of Palestine fought both for its own sake and for the sake of the Jews generally. Because of this dualism it went a long way in compromise before resorting to violence.

In 1937 the Jews of Palestine had been deeply divided on the acceptance of a plan of partition—the Peel partition plan—that allotted to them the control of a very limited area around Tel Aviv and Haifa quite unsuitable for the establishment of a state whose national task was also to provide a home for the persecuted Jews of Europe.

[16] Masao Maruyama, *Thoughts on Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (London 1963), 11-13 and 134-53.

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In 1947 the Yishuv was ready to accept another plan for a partition of Palestine that would have allotted to the Jews a larger share of the country but would also have created a Jewish state economically dependent on its Arab neighbors and thus unfit to provide a solution to the Jewish problem.[17]

As to the Arabs of Palestine, the conflict between Arabism and Zionism remained for a long time as much a local, communal struggle as a nationalist confrontation, the Arab states and governments being considered by Arab opinion to be more capable of organizing the opposition to Zionism than were the Palestinians.

The solution was finally left by the British and the Arab governments to war. The outcome was the state of Israel controlling three-fifths of Palestine, the Kingdom of Jordan controlling the West Bank, Egypt controlling the Gaza strip, UN armistice agreements controlling nothing, and an Arab nation of refugees emerging as the most pressing political problem in the Middle East.

The emergence of a population of Jewish refugees in the heart of the Middle East as a consequence of European anti-Semitism and of the Palestine conflict is probably the most momentous event of this century in that part of the world. It has had many consequences, some of them so recent that there are practically no documented studies of this phenomenon.[18] For twenty years, the two nations of refugees—Arabs and Jews—have been kept apart by the armistice frontiers established in 1948. The two sides have followed their own lines of development, in two opposing directions. The Jewish refugees have been speedily integrated into the Israeli state and have mobilized for the future. The Arab refugees have remained, for political and economic reasons, turned toward the past, and only partly integrated into Arab society.

The 1967 war broke down the physical barriers between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, reconstructed the geographic unity of the country and of its historical capital, Jerusalem, and created, *de facto*, a bi-national Arab-Jewish society under Jewish control. This is an entirely new

[17] Cecil Hourani, "The Moment of Truth: Towards a Middle East Dialogue," *Encounter*, XXIX (November 1967), 3-14.

[18] The idea of an Arab-Jewish community in Palestine is as old as the idea of the Jewish state. Jewish-Arab coexistence and cooperation was one of the topics in Herzl's futurist Zionist novel, *Altneuland*. For more recent Israeli opinions on the subject, see Aaron Amir, "Levant des Patries: Le Dépassement du Sionisme et du Pan-Arabisme" (mimeographed 1967). And Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism, a Plea for Peace in the Middle East* (London 1968), as well as Uri Avnery, "Une Guerre Fratricide entre Semites," *Le conflit Israélo-Arabe*, special issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, XXII, rev. 253 bis (July 1967), 702-31.

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situation, never envisaged even by those Jewish political groups like Mapam and the Israel Communist Party which advocated a bi-national state in Palestine. It is a very confused, tense situation that nobody in Israel had ever anticipated and for which nobody has so far put forward any clear plan. The result has been a very fluid coexistence of political hostility and practical day-to-day cooperation between the two nations of Palestine.

The Jewish side of the present population of the Holy Land is composed of a minority of Jewish immigrant refugees from Europe and a majority of Jewish immigrant refugees from the Arab states. The European refugees have of course had an extraordinary effect on the whole Palestine question. The atrocities of the Nazis, combined with the Hamlet-like policy of the British makers of Palestine immigration laws, were responsible for the anguish that burst into terror and illegal immigration. They led also to the near-rebellion of the whole Jewish population against Britain, whom most of the Zionist leaders had deeply trusted and admired, and finally to the rise of the state of Israel and its passing of the Law of the Return as its first law. This law allows any Jew to enter the state of Israel as a citizen. It has become one of the main symbols of what the Arabs declare to be a European Jewish invasion of Palestine. In fact it has brought to Israel since 1948 only a limited number of European immigrants—about half a million, probably 100,000 of whom have since left the country permanently.[19] The Arab fears of a neo-colonialist Western Zionist invasion[20]—reasonable as they may have been—have not yet materialized. In spite of the appeals of Zionist leaders, the reluctance of Western Jews to migrate to Israel seems to indicate that the feared Zionist invasion will not materialize, at least for some time to come.

[19] According to *The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1963*, published by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem), 15-18, the Jewish population of Israel was composed in 1948 of 54.5 percent European-born Jews, 8.8 percent Middle-East-born Jews, and 35.4 percent locally born Jews. In 1962 the percentages were respectively 33.5; 28; and 38.5. The last figure includes a vast majority of locally born Israelis of Oriental parentage, the birthrate of the Middle Eastern Jews outnumbering that of the Western Jews by three to one. According to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Information Division, *Facts about Israel 1967* (Jerusalem), out of a total of 168,126 immigrants who entered Israel between 1961 and 1963, only 56,386 were of Western origin. However, out of a total of 1,336,678 immigrants who entered the state between 1948 and 1965, 498,677 were of European origin and 618,763 of Asian and African (Arabized) origin.

[20] Some of these typical views are aired by Arab authors writing for *Le conflit Israélo-Arabe*, such as: Sami Hadawi, "Les revendications 'bibliques' et 'historiques' des sionistes sur la Palestine," 91-105; Mounthir Anabtawi, "Le sionisme: un mouvement colonialiste, chauvin et militariste," 106-26; Loffallah Soliman, "Un transfer de culpabilité," 266-80; and Tahar Benziane "Le problème palestinien et la question juive," 317-44.

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There has been, on the contrary, a massive Jewish immigration into Israel from the Arab states rather than from the West. Islamized Jews came in their myriads, from Yemen and Morocco, from Kurdistan and Lybia, without knowing who Theodor Herzl was and without ever having heard much about Zionism. They came spurred by fear of Arab violence and by the ancient traditional Jewish messianic hope of national redemption. They came without being called and without being indoctrinated in any ideology. They could not all be absorbed in agriculture, but instead found their place in industry. They were integrated not in harmony, but in strife. They were not impressed by the Western social and political ideas brought by Jewish immigrants from Europe, but were exalted by a still very religious form of Jewish patriotism. At the same time they suffered from the sudden disruption of their patriarchic society. They did not put an end to any "Jewish problem" in the world from which they came; in fact, they brought new and acute tension to the Arab world and into the new society to which they immigrated. The immigration of the Islamized Jews represented a development quite contrary to the expectations of political and utopian Zionism.

The difficulties of economic adaptation and the ethnic sensitiveness of the Middle Eastern Jews created the problem of internal confrontation between the old Jewish residents and refugees of European extraction and the new Jewish refugees of Islamic background, currently known as the conflict between the "first" and the "second" Israel.

This conflict has been one of the major preoccupations of the state of Israel in the second decade of its existence. It is also one of the most widely analyzed problems in the Jewish state, since scores of specialists —Israeli and foreigners—have devoted very detailed studies to it.[21]

The Arabs—and many Communist or leftist specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs—have equated the fight between the first and the second Israel with the stereotyped dichotomy of a Western, white, colonialist society against an Oriental, colored society. In doing so they were certainly led astray by some vociferous representations of ethnic strife in Israel and by the statements of usually self-appointed spokesmen[22] of the "Oriental Jews." It is possible that this inaccurate analysis of the

[21] See in particular Georges Friedman, *Fin du Peuple Juif?* (Paris 1966), ch. 8; Judith T. Shuval, *Immigrants on the Threshold* (New York 1943), and "Emerging Patterns of Ethnic Strain in Israel," *Social Forces*, XL (May 1962, 323-30; Alex Weingrod, "The Two Israels," *Commentary*, XXXIII (April 1962), 313-19; Raphael Patai, *Israel Between East and West: A Study in Human Relations* (Philadelphia 1953); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants* (London 1954) and *Israeli Society* (New York 1967), especially ch. 7.

[22] Such as the one of Michael Selzer, *The Organization of the Jewish State: A Polemic* (New York 1967).

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internal situation in Israel contributed to the Russian and Arab miscalculation over the Jewish war potential in the 1967 war.[23]

On the Jewish side, also, the misunderstanding of the interplay of ideological and economic forces between the first and second Israel brought about some serious mishandling of the process of integration of the Jewish refugees from Arab countries into a society rapidly passing from an agrarian into an industrial stage. Two other factors may also be mentioned in this connection. One is the role played by the German personal compensations paid to the Jews who had been persecuted by the Nazis. The second is the social tension caused by the resumed immigration of European Jews into Israel from Communist countries in the years 1960-64.

It must be admitted that the Israeli authorities could do very little to control the effects on Israeli society of the German personal restitutions. In contrast to the German reparation payments paid to the state,[24] the restitutions were paid mainly by the German *Länder* to individual Jews or their legal heirs as compensation for the treatment suffered under the Nazis. In terms of Israeli society, this meant that only a part of the population, probably some 500,000 persons out of 3 million, benefited from such payments, which by 1962 were already larger[25] than the total amount paid by Germany to the state of Israel, 750 million dollars. But although not all the Jews of European origin received such economic restitutions, this fact did not diminish the feeling of economic discrimination of many Oriental Jews, who were in any case in a less advantageous economic and social situation than were the European-born Israelis. That they provided much of the labor force required by the practical implementation of the enjoyment of the German restitutions by many European Jews—the building of new luxury apartments, the maintenance of cars, the supply of domestic service—did not make the situation any better but added to the Middle Eastern Jews' resentment of their lack of personal financial ability to provide for equal advantages for their usually larger families. At the same time, because of intensive government aid and increased salaries

[23] An interesting summary of Arab broadcasts against Israel during the June crisis can be found in "The Arab Call to War," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, XXI (Summer 1967), 2-19.

[24] The treaty for German Reparations to Israel was signed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharet in September, 1952.

[25] According to Walter Laqueur, "Bonn, Cairo, Jerusalem: The Triple Crisis," *Commentary*, XXXIX (May 1965), 29-38, the total amount of restitution money paid to individual Jews all over the world is $4.5 billions. The real amount paid to Israeli Jews is not available because the statistics concerning restitution funds transferred to Israel cover only a part of the amount, the rest being spent or kept in Europe. It was certainly not less than 1.3 billion dollars by 1969.

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resulting from the rising investments (especially in the building sector), of the European-born Jews in Israel—themselves a direct result of German personal restitutions—the Middle Eastern Jews considerably improved their economic position without, however, bridging the social and economic gap that separated them from "old" Israel. Thus, better conditions also contributed to increasing frustrations and demands for greater equality.

It was at this delicate moment, in 1962, that the immigration of European Jews from Eastern Europe was resumed. Details of this immigration from the Communist countries[26] are not available because of the censorship imposed on the whole subject by the Israeli government for fear of Arab pressure on the East European countries. But the numbers, however important, are really not very relevant to some of the psychological reasons for social and ethnic tension between the first and the second Israel.

One reason was that the new immigrants from Communist countries—because of their family relations with old-time Israeli settlers, because they were eligible for German personal compensations, and because they were usually highly trained in industrial, administrative, and academic skills—were almost immediately absorbed into the middle and upper social classes, thus filling many non-manual jobs made available by the country's development.

Another reason for resentment was the emphasis placed by Israeli leaders on the importance of receiving more "educated" immigrants from Europe and America as a means of strengthening and accelerating the cultural and economic development of the state. They were of course right, because only the Jewish Western Diaspora, and possibly the Russian one, could offer the highly skilled manpower needed for rapid development.

However, the resentment created by this implied distinction between "more useful" and "less useful" Jews infuriated many leaders of the second Israel, who were conscious that they, more than the Western Jews, had responded *en masse* to the state of Israel's appeal for the Return.[27]

[26] According to a detailed document published by Georges Friedmann and Marie-Thérèse Basse, "Problèmes d'Israël en statistiques," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, VI (Juillet-Septembre 1965), 349-77, the majority of the 225,000 Jews who entered Israel in 1961-64 were East European. See Tableau VIII, "Les differentes vagues d'immigration juive en Palestine (1882-1948) et en Israël (1948-1964)," 358.

[27] See *Israel's Oriental Problem, A Monthly Bulletin of News and Comments Distributed to Opinion Leaders by the Council of the Sephardi Community* (Jerusalem), November 1966 and March-April 1966.

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IV

It was against the background of this renewed social and ethnic pressure for rapid change of social structures that the third and main stage of the "Lavon affair" was fought in Israel. Its violence shook the very political foundation of the state and brought about the most dramatic political crisis in the history of modern Israel—the secession of Ben Gurion from his own party, the Mapai.

The Lavon affair[28] is a very complicated problem of Israeli internal politics that can be briefly summarized as follows. Originally it consisted merely of a controversy over the responsibility for an "intelligence mishap" in the high echelons of the Army and the Ministry of Defense. As such, the matter could be quickly forgotten, and in fact Pinhas Lavon, who was forced to hand in his resignation as Defense Minister in February, 1955, made a quick recovery and became Secretary General of the Powerful Federation of Labor—a post he occupied from 1957 to 1961. In the first stage of the affair, while Lavon—a powerful and controversial politician of exceptional intellectual abilities—was in control of the most powerful ministry in the government, strong animosity crystallized not only between opposing personalities but among politically still unarticulated bureaucratic and economic groups with growing vested interests in power.

The second phase of the Lavon affair began when Lavon, on the basis of newly discovered evidence, asked that his name be cleared of responsibility for the "intelligence mishap." What brought him into direct conflict with Ben Gurion was the fact that while the former Israeli Premier insisted that the whole affair be handled by a judicial court of inquiry, the cabinet favored a government inquiry, which eventually cleared Lavon of all responsibility. The struggle over procedure was the "tip of the iceberg" of a much deeper battle for the succession to power between the old socialist guard and a new generation of leaders characterized less by age or ideology than by the fact that many of them had been formed outside the parties or outside the old bureaucracies. Overruled by his colleagues in the question of the court of enquiry, Ben Gurion had Lavon removed from the Histadrut leadership. For this he was openly accused of undemocratic methods.[29]

[28] For the "Lavon affair" see Michel Bar Zohar, 249-58, 365-68, and 373 ff; Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism* (New York 1968), chap. 7; "1954: A Spy Story"; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, 329-32.

[29] An analysis of the hostile atmosphere that surrounded Ben Gurion at the time of his resignation and of the psychological change brought about by his successor, Levi Eshkol, can be found in Ze'ev Katz, "Eshkol's Winds of Change," *New Outlook*, VII (July-August 1964), 16-19.

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The growing opposition he met inside and outside the cabinet on the affair and on other problems, such as relations with Germany, induced him to abandon power in 1964.

At the time, his retreat was considered by many as a tactical step meant to prepare, if not his own return to power, at least his succession by the "new guard" of technocrats after an interim period of government by Ben Gurion's trusted colleague, Levi Eshkol. But the confrontation between the old guard and the new one had by then gone too far to be patched up by a compromise.

The third phase of the Lavon affair thus exploded into an open conflict between "Bengurionists" and "Anti-Bengurionists," fought with verbal political ferocity in the general election of 1965.

We know the phases and outcome of this conflict. It caused the secession of Ben Gurion from his old party, Mapai; the formation of a "Bengurionist" party, RAFI,[30] which fought (and lost) the elections; the return of the parliamentary leader of RAFI, General Dayan, to power as a consequence of the war of June, 1967; the subsequent reunion of the secessionist parties with Mapai,[31] under the leadership of Premier Levi Eshkol; and the disappearance of Lavon and Ben-Gurion from the Israeli political scene.

This curious dénouement of the Lavon affair is confusing for those who forget that both Ben Gurion and Lavon, in spite of their personal and political opposition, were in fact the product of the same old Zionist plantocracy that had found itself overcome by the industrialization of Israel. The real battle in the Lavon affair seems to have been waged not between two men nor between clear-cut ideological positions and factions. Because of the difficulties in the adaptation of the old Zionist elite and institutions to the needs of a new industrializing society, increasingly led by a new political technocratic elite, the Lavon affair became also the expression of the deep changes brought about by modernization and industrialization. Officially it was restricted to the Mapai party and some powerful groups in Israeli labor society. In fact, it was the expression of a tension that cut through all the parties and all the institutions of the state, irrespective of age-groups or of political or ideological affiliations.

[30] The initials for the Hebrew words meaning "List of Israeli Workers."

[31] Like the "Bengurionist" party RAFI—which seceded in 1965 from Mapai (the majority workers' party of Israel)—its bitter opponent Achdut Avodah had also seceded from Mapai twenty-five years earlier. Both splinter parties returned to their "parent" organization in January, 1968, when the new Israel Labor Party was officially launched after more than a year of bitter negotiations for unity. By the end of 1968 also Mapam, the leftist section of the labor movement in Israel, rejoined Mapai, from which it originally split in 1944.

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Pinhas Lavon, in an article[32] published in 1962, asserted that the traditional Zionist Socialist elite formed by "the pioneers, the laborers, and the disinterested civil service" had to retain its position at the top of the Israeli social pyramid if Israel was to remain a "chosen society." He said that it should also oppose the attempt of the parvenus to dislodge it, the parvenus being the "successful men" who had made their way up "without efforts" through the "opportunities offered by the military victories, by the development funds, or by the state apparatus" —in other words, the technocrats and bureaucrats, who believed that Israel must become a society like other societies in economic productivity instead of by ideological example. "I believe," wrote Lavon, "that the state of Israel requires additional dimensions, not in technology and not in numbers. . . . It is clear [that this dimension] cannot be expressed in the economic field. . . . If there is no serious about-turn . . . we shall be a completely normal society without any special attraction. We shall then be, in the last analysis, a *Levantine country*."

Nothing could be more revealing than such a statement in connection with both the battle between the old and new elites and the contempt with which Lavon (but also Ben-Gurion) regarded Middle-Eastern–Levantine culture. The contradiction between him and the "successful men" becomes clearer, however, when we confront Lavon's ideological credo with that of Shimon Peres,[33] the Secretary General of the short-lived "Bengurionist" party, the RAFI.

V

Peres and his group want not a "chosen society," but an open and competitive one based on industry and science. They value the immense contribution of past Zionism and its utopian beliefs to the building of the state, but reject all types of "nostalgia." They want not

[32] See Pinhas Lavon, "A Chosen People and a Normal Society," *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv) v (February 1962), 3-8 (italics added). It is interesting to compare Lavon's view of the Israeli "chosen" labor society with some of those currently expressed by Maoist partisans in favor of a perfect society in which people should be "encouraged not to consider work as a way of earning one's life, but as the prime necessity of life"; see W. U. Jiang, "UN Partisan de la théorie de la révolution permanente doit nécessairement être un materialiste dialectique conséquent," in *Zhexue Yanjiu* 8, 1958, 23-29, quoted by R. S. Schram, *La révolution permanente en Chine* (Paris 1963), 19-31.

[33] Shimon Peres is considered the creator of the Israeli Defense Establishment and the architect of the military alliance between Israel and France in 1956. He was Director General of the Ministry of Defense when the Lavon Affair first broke out in 1954. He is known to have clashed often later with Lavon, then Secretary General of the Histadrut, over the role and organization of the military industry, and especially over the establishment of Bedek, the Israeli center for the repair and maintenance of the military and civil aircraft that became one of the important technological factors of the Israeli air superiority over the Arabs.

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promotion through ideology, but a meritocracy, with a minimum fair standard of living for all and equal opportunities for all to become meritocrats; they stress equal opportunity for education (the great demand of the Middle Eastern Jews) and an equal share in collective amenities: better and cleaner streets, shorter hours of more efficient work, more motor vehicles, less political rhetoric. Productivity, a higher standard of living, scientific challenges—these are their answer to the Western Jews' lack of enthusiasm for emigration to Israel. And productivity, not vague ideology, is obviously to be the remedy for the economic difficulties that developed in Israel in 1965 and made it a country of emigration.[34]

This last development could have been a critical one for the state. But then the six days' war came. In its wake, emigration has almost stopped and the recession has been overcome. More permanent is one of its lessons. For the first time the cure for economic troubles was sought and found not in inflation, but in deflation combined with rationalization of productivity, leading the trade-union movement to accept the inevitable outcome: dismissal of inefficient or redundant labor, in spite of the sacred principle of seniority.

This was but one indirect result of industrialization. Others were perhaps less dramatic but much more durable and important.

Because of necessities of defense and nation-building, the Israeli army had been from the start the greatest educational organization in the country. One of Ben Gurion's services to the nation had been the suppression of all political and ideological trends in the army, so that it became a neutral, national body of civic education, deeply involved in the process of social integration of the Middle Eastern Jews who formed the largest mass of the enlisted soldiers. Ben Gurion also increased the efficiency and internal mobility in the army by allowing generals to retire at the age of forty-five—especially victorious ones. But the army also needed to face Arab pressure on the borders and the permanent danger of political embargo on its weapons by the great powers, and therefore requested and obtained a strong military industry, established in the quickest possible time. This industry became a major catalyst and accelerator for the industrialization of the

[34] See "Making a Modern Israel: A 'Young Mapai' View of Planning," *The Jerusalem Post* (12 February 1965), and "What Ben Gurion Group Stands For," *The Jerusalem Post* (14 July 1965). Significantly, in 1967 Shimon Peres originated the idea of a detailed study of Israeli society by the end of the century, and wanted to include among the tasks of the RAFI party the preparation of plans for Israeli "post-industrial" society.

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country. For reasons of security it set very high standards of production; it created a whole generation of technocrats and transformed thousands of unskilled Middle Eastern Jews into sophisticated technicians, much as the United States armed forces have been doing with Negro soldiers. More important, it pressed for industrial independence in fields like electronics, aviation, and nuclear energy. The men connected with military industrialization and organization were thus to be found in almost every important administration—public or private —of the state, probably equally divided between partisans of the old and the new guards in the Lavon crisis.[35]

Because of industrialization, the Middle Eastern Jews received special education through crash programs, and because of these crash programs they became conscious of their positions and pressed for more education, more integration, and more responsibility. They were not the only ones. The Arab non-Jewish minority of Israel, 250,000 strong, followed close on the heels of the Middle Eastern Jews. It is significant that the first Arab mass public protest against what was defined as "political and social discrimination" took place in Nazareth, on the first of May, 1959,[36] two months before the first mass protest of Middle Eastern Jews in Haifa and other development towns of the country.[37] The motivations of the two groups were certainly different. But both public demonstrations were part of the new pattern of social tensions brought about by the transformation of Israeli society from an agrarian into an industrial one. It is interesting to note the change in the accusations of the Arab minority in Israel against the government in the course of the last twenty years. In the first ten years the Arabs fought mainly to resist what they called "the unlawful expropriation of their

[35] No detailed study has so far been made of the effect on the civilian economic sector of the transfer of young, early-pensioned Israeli military leaders. The Israeli economy is already run today, both in the Socialist-controlled sector and in the private one—to say nothing of the government agencies—by an increasing number of administrators recruited from among retired army officers. For example, the Dead Sea mineral complex has been run for the last 13 years by a former Chief of Staff, and another heads the Israeli port authority. A former Chief of Intelligence runs one of the largest mechanical concerns of the Histadrut, while the tourist-amenities center of Eilat is run by a former Navy Commodore. See Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in Politics: The Persistence of the Civilian Over the Military," *World Politics*, xx (July 1968).

[36] The shock of the Nazareth riots was great, especially among the Jewish labor organizations. It was best expressed by a poem by Nathan Alterman, a leading poet and political figure, published by the Histadrut paper *Davar*, translated into English by *New Outlook*, 1 (July-August 1958), 48-49, under the title "After the Riots in Nazareth."

[37] The Wadi Salib (a very poor quarter of Haifa) where riots broke out in July, 1959, shortly before general election; they spread to Beersheba in the south and to Migdal Emek in the east.

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remaining lands." After 1963, their hostility was directed against social and educational discrimination by the government.[38]

Land was no longer of primary importance, because an increasing number of Arabs now earned their living in industry and had broken away from the authority of their traditional agrarian society. Equality, then, became the persistent new demand. The Arab intellectual, even if he disliked the Jewish society and the Jewish state, wanted a place equal to that occupied by the Jewish intellectual in the administration and elsewhere. The Arab worker wanted—and the Histadrut encouraged him to ask for—social advantages and status equal to those of the Jewish worker in urban society, into which the Arab worker now commuted or which he had even begun to join. And here again, it was modernization and industrialization, not ideology, that brought tensions, changes, and solutions. The most significant step was perhaps the abolition, in 1965, of military government. Military government had been established for security reasons, which were as valid as ever in 1965, but the demands by growing industry for manpower called for greater mobility and greater integration of the Arab worker into urban (Jewish) society. The point was therefore reached at which economic considerations balanced those of security.

There was another even more striking indirect result of industrialization: An official Israeli source stated in 1967 that thousands of mixed marriages had taken place—usually between Arab men and Jewish women. Their offspring, according to the present Israeli ruling on nationhood, will technically be Jewish. Thus while we may question the stability of these unions, which are difficult to make official in a country in which civil marriage does not exist, we may one day discover a quite unplanned and rather non-Zionist "internal" Jewish immigration in Israel, due to the social attraction of the Jewish majority in Israel's population.

On the other hand, the war in 1967 solidified the new privileged position of industry and caused Israel to move even further away from the social structure of the old agrarian Zionism.

The war served, first of all, to provide a new framework of unity

[38] One of the most outspoken supporters of the economic and social integration of the Arab minority into the Jewish majority is Rustum Bastuni, an Arab engineer and former member of the Israeli Parliament. See Rustum Bastuni, "Arab Society in Israel," *Hamizrach He'Hadash* (Jerusalem), XV (1965), 1-2. It is interesting to note that the riots in Ramleh in August, 1965, and in Nathanial in March, 1966, between Arabs and Jews were caused not by political tension, but by rivalry between young workers of the two communities over the favors of the same Jewish girls. See also "Integrating Israel's Arabs," *The Jerusalem Post*, 25 September 1964.

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centered on a community of interests, and on a more Jewish than Zionist national symbolism.[39] Contrary to their practice during the two previous wars, this time even the most anti-Zionist religious zealots volunteered to fight, sharing with the rest of the Israeli population the feeling that this was a Jewish war, fought for Jewish survival (at least in the Middle East) and for Jewish traditional symbols: the Temple, the tombs of the Patriarchs, etc.

Together with renewing a general feeling of sympathy for religion and of solidarity with the Diaspora, the June war also consolidated the supremacy of industry over agriculture. It was the Air Force and advanced technology that won the war in the first three hours of conflict. It was industry and technology that proved they could assure the economic and political future of the state. Productivism has thus become a widespread new idea in Israel, brought about through a greater economic involvement of the Jewish Diaspora in the development of the state. The hope is that it will provide for the integration of Israeli society through higher standards of living; that it will furnish the necessary financial and technical means for the quick solution of the problem of the Arab refugees under Israeli control; and that it will supply the necessary influence over the occupied areas for political neutrality, possibly even for cooperation.

Mobility, the vital condition for industrialization, is now encouraged whenever possible: mobility of goods among Israel, the West Bank, and Transjordan at a rate of exchange intentionally favorable to the Arabs; mobility of men; Israeli mass tourism into Arab zones; and free Arab movement from Gaza into the West Bank, Israel, and Transjordan. An economic entity, stretching from the Mediterranean to Iraq, is thus taking shape. Whether it will be followed by political cooperation or by renewed disruption and war, is of course an open question.

VI

Because of the inability of the ideals of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to be adapted to nineteenth- and twentieth-century realities, Jewish national ideology, at least as expressed by the old agrarian Zionism, has become increasingly irrelevant to the situation today in the state of Israel. In the course of the realization of Jewish national aspirations, the Jewish settlement in the Holy Land has undergone an almost total transformation, in spite of the continuity of its social and political symbolism and of its institutions. An agrarian elite society

[39] See Amos Eilon, "Letter from Jerusalem," *Encounter*, XXIX (February 1967).

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directed by a westernized plantocracy has found itself changed into a non-European industrialized society increasingly run by a non-ideological technocracy that after a long internal political and social struggle has, through the 1967 military victory, asserted its preeminent role.

The June war has brought together in an already realized territorial unity of economic exchange two nations of refugees, deeply hostile to one another but very close in the common cultural Islamic background of many of their members and in the recent experience of social uprooting.

The Palestinian refugees as individuals are powerless economically, socially, and politically. As individuals, one of the main psychological differences between them and the Jewish refugees is that their outlook is turned toward the past while the outlook of the Jews is directed toward the future, although in the case of some of them the pull of the past was strong enough to make them return even to Germany.

The communities of the Palestinian refugees, however, are very different from the rest of the Middle Eastern Arab communities in such matters as internal structure, town-and-village relations, and social and political identity. The Palestinian refugees or residents have become one of the most articulate, well educated, and socially and politically most engaged group in the Arab world. They are, curiously enough, the only crystallized modern Moslem Arab Diaspora in the Arab world, which extends from Kuwait to Algeria. As such, they have become the community in the Middle East most open to innovation. They have become a new factor in Middle Eastern politics—a powerful social and economic force for acceleration in the Palestine complex. They now add their needs and pressures, in a conflicting way, to the needs and pressures the Jewish refugees and the Arab minority already exert on the Israeli state.

The consequences of such a momentous change are felt in the trend of negotiations for a settlement of the Middle East crisis. While the Jordanians, in the persons both of King Hussein and of some Palestinian leaders, do not reject the idea of a settlement, and in fact have already accepted economic cooperation with Israel, Egypt is much more inclined to be rigid in rejecting all forms of contact. National pride, internal instability, and possibly Russian influence are responsible for such a rigid position. But behind the Egyptian political decision there seem to be deeper social and economic considerations linked with the competing industrial evolution of the Israeli and Egyptian societies. In terms of future development, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Trans-

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jordanians can be complementary; an industrial Jewish society would be dependent for its economic development and security on the good will and cooperation of its agrarian neighbors, although more for labor than for goods since Israel is self-sufficient in agricultural production.

With Egypt, the picture is totally different. Here Israel is confronted with an ambitious, still agrarian but rapidly industrializing society, which considers the Jewish state a dangerous competitor for economic expansion within, and industrial development of, an agricultural area conceived of as a zone of natural Egyptian influence.[40] It is understandable that from the Egyptian point of view all agreement with Israel should be conditioned by the return of Israel to the *status quo ante*, a situation of economic as well as military and political vulnerability that would be a guarantee against the industrial development of the Jewish state and an obstacle to possible cooperation between the two segments of the Palestinian population, the Arabs and the Israelis.

But the Israeli industrial society and the emergence of the Palestinians as a distinct national group in the Middle East[41] are two realities that can no longer be dismissed. Whether they will eventually develop some form of stable cooperation or will continue their struggle is, of course, an open question. But whichever the case, it is by and around them, more than elsewhere in the Middle East, that the course of events in the region is going to be determined.

[40] See Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo 1952).

[41] For the struggle of the Palestinians to maintain their own autonomous institutions against Jordanian and Egyptian control, see Marcel Colombe, "Le problème de l'Entité Palestinienne dans les relations arabes," *Orient*, XXIX (1964), 57-87; and Joseph B. Schecterman, *The Mufti and the Fuehrer: The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin el Hussein* (London 1965), 200-280. Also Rony E. Gabay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem* (Geneva 1959), 202-71; and Musa Alami, *Ibrat Palestin* [The Lesson of Palestine] (Beirut 1949), condensed in "The Lesson of Palestine," *Middle East Journal*, III (October 1949), 373-405.

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THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE OF MODERNIZATION

By BERNARD E. BROWN*

FEW theorists today admit to a belief in the "idea of progress." But, if the literature in comparative politics in the past several years is any guide, virtually all political scientists now believe in the concept of "modernization." Modernization theory is being invoked to compare traditional and modern societies, to analyze the evolution of individual political systems, and to appraise the effectiveness of political institutions in one or several political systems. All of the problems and subjects of political science are now being reexamined in terms of some concept of modernization.

It is generally argued that the enormous development of science and technology since the early nineteenth century has brought about a fundamental transformation of all political systems. Most recent studies present a polar contrast between "traditional" and "modern" societies in terms of four major elements of any social system: the economy, social structure, political institutions, and the values that permeate the whole and justify coercion. The kind of change that involves modernization of each of these elements may be briefly summarized: (1) In traditional *economies* the overwhelming mass of the population is engaged in various forms of subsistence agriculture or husbandry. Modern economies are characterized by the use of science and technology in the production of the means of existence. (2) Traditional *social structures* are relatively simple. The family is the dominant social unit, and face-to-face relations (through the tribe, clan, or feudal order) characterize the entire society. Modern social structure is complex, bureaucratized, and highly differentiated. An individual belongs to any number of specialized associations, such as trade unions, business groups, sporting societies, religious organizations, and the like. (3) Traditional *states* resemble large families, while modern states resemble specialized associations. In modern states political functions, like social functions, are assigned to different categories of people. A civil service is created, with a logical structure, hierarchy of command, and power based on knowledge rather than on family connections. (4) Traditional

* This article is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., September, 1968. I am happy to acknowledge invaluable assistance from the Research Center in Comparative Politics at Brooklyn College.

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values are those of the family, emphasizing personal and filial loyalty. Attempts to view and understand the universe are in terms of mysticism, religion, and unprovable speculation; these constitute useful myths that hold together the social system and bring about acceptance of its structures and rules. Modern values are those of science. Political rule is justified by rational principles, not by invocation of divine right or heredity.

Modernization implies a particular kind of change in at least one of the above factors, bringing about corresponding changes in the other categories. A social system has an internal logic in that its various parts bear a *necessary* relationship to one another. Thus, a society imbued with ancestor-spirit, and in which authoritative decisions are made by witch doctors, is not capable of sustaining a massive industrial economy. Conversely, once an advanced industrial economy comes into being, the habits of thought and of science and the discipline of the machine are incompatible with a feudal social structure. Such assertions are broad; as Thorstein Veblen pointed out in a seminal work rather neglected by students of modernization, changes in the level of technology do not immediately bring about corresponding social changes. New social classes emulate the values and life styles of their "betters," a propensity that introduces a note of dissonance.[1] Correlations among the economic, social, political, and cultural factors are loose, but they exist; if they did not there would be no point in discussing modernization as a process.

One problem is evident from any survey of the literature. In order to sharpen the contrast between the two types, the "traditional" model is made so primitive that it is relevant only to tribal societies and prehistoric Europe. The kind of traditional society that preceded the modern form in Western Europe and North America, for example, was quite complex by any standard, and probably closer to "modernity" than to the ideal type of traditionalism. These extreme typologies also blur the significant differences among traditional societies—the kind of differences so brilliantly illuminated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his works on France, England, and the United States. Ideal types based on polar contrasts may be analytically useful as a check-list for observers or as a means of directing attention to the relationships among

[1] *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899). Veblen's essay on the "discipline of the machine," in *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (1904) is an excellent statement of the influence of technology upon social and political values. One major exception to the general view that the above defined factors are correlated in any social system is Wilbert S. Moore, *Social Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), in which the looseness of social structure is stressed.

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factors in any social system. The disadvantage is that the typology may take on a life of its own. Instead of seeking to grasp the internal logic of a political system with the aid of typological schemes, the observer may spend all his energy working out the abstract logic of a typology that has no relation to reality.

Whatever the mathematical and logical beauty of typologies, political scientists presumably are interested in the payoff for research. Does modernization theory deepen our understanding of political life? What difference does it make in the organization of research and study? Does it have explanatory power? One way of answering these questions—perhaps the best way, in fact—is to apply modernization theory to an individual political system. In this paper we shall take as a case study the French political system. Surely no argument is needed to demonstrate the importance of France in the development of modern Europe, or the contribution of the French to the industrial and scientific revolutions of the nineteenth century. We shall first examine the specific application of modernization theory to France by three highly imaginative and skilled observers: C. E. Black, Samuel P. Huntington, and Stanley Hoffmann.[2] Taken together, their writings offer a comprehensive view of the French experience of modernization from nation-building through late industrialization. We shall then return to the larger question of the utility and relevance of modernization theory in comparative politics.

Three Views of French Modernization

C. E. Black's *The Dynamics of Modernization* is probably the best single book on the subject yet to appear. Professor Black moves fluently and surely from theory to practice and back again. He identifies four stages of political modernization:

> (1) *the challenge of modernity*—the initial confrontation of a society, within its traditional framework of knowledge, with modern ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates of modernity; (2) *the consolidation of modernizing leadership*—the transfer of power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course of a normally bitter revolutionary struggle often lasting several generations; (3) *economic and social transformation*—the devel-

[2] C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *World Politics* XVII (April 1966), 378-414; and Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in Hoffmann, ed., *In Search of France* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963), 1-117.

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opment of economic growth and social change to a point where a society is transformed from a predominantly rural and agrarian way of life to one predominantly urban and industrial; and (4) *the integration of society*—the phase in which economic and social transformation produces a fundamental reorganization of the social structure throughout the society.[3]

Black's typology of political modernization is based on the timing of the consolidation of modern political leadership (whether early or late in relation to other countries), the nature of the challenge of modernity to traditional institutions (whether internal or external), the continuity of territory and population in the modern era, the independent or dependent status of the nation, and the solidity of political institutions when the nation entered the modern era. The first of seven patterns that make up the typology is formed by the experience of Great Britain and France. In both countries the revolution that consolidated political leadership came early as compared to that of other countries (1649-1832 in Britain and 1789-1848 in France), the major challenge of modernity was primarily internal, there was an unusual continuity of both territory and population in the modern era, and the political institutions were fairly stable as the country entered the modern era. Professor Black then cites 1832-1945 as the period of economic and social transformation in Britain, 1848-1945 in France; and since 1945 as the phase of social integration in both countries.

In this analysis the similarities between British and French modernization are emphasized. The major differences between the two nations are thus the earlier rise to power of a modern leadership and the somewhat earlier industrialization in Britain. Black recognizes that the French never achieved the same degree of political consensus as did the British. But he suggests that the basis for orderly development in France was laid by the modern institutional framework established by the Napoleonic Code in 1802. In spite of the apparent political instability, he concludes that "France has nevertheless undergone at the administrative level a relatively gradual and stable transformation under many generations of skilled civil servants trained in the *grandes écoles*."[4]

Professor Black's typology of seven patterns is a stimulating way of comparing and evaluating the general process of political modernization in the world. But its specific application to France raises several questions. Was modern leadership in France first consolidated in 1789?

[3] Black, 67-68.

[4] *Ibid.*, 109.

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The implication in Black's analysis is that this stage occurred in Britain more than a century earlier. No one would deny the importance of the English Civil War or the French Revolution as decisive turning points in British and French political history, especially as regards the shaping of political institutions and the evolution of consensus. But that Britain and France, so closely related in all things, were a century apart in political modernization is implausible. Britain and France were both presented with the same kind of challenge in the course of the seventeenth century—basically the inability or unwillingness of the country as a whole to sustain the burden of a greatly expanded monarchical apparatus. The French monarchy proved somewhat more flexible and adaptable at the time; it was thus able to weather the storm. In spite of the political turmoil in seventeenth-century Britain, and the success of reformers in France, it would appear that similar developments were taking place in the two societies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. De Tocqueville pointed out, for example, in his classic study, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, that the entire political, administrative, and social structure of the nation was being transformed well before the Revolution. In a famous passage, he wrote, "Chance played no part whatever in the outbreak of the Revolution; though it took the world by surprise, it was the inevitable outcome of a long period of gestation, the abrupt and violent conclusion of a process in which six generations had played an intermittent part. Even if it had not taken place, the old social structure would nonetheless have been shattered everywhere sooner or later."[5] Undoubtedly, a new political leadership emerged in 1789. But new social forces came to the fore, and began to participate in the political system, long before that date.

On the other hand, Professor Black may be overstating the similarities between Britain and France when he argues that in both countries there was "a relatively orderly and peaceful adaptation of traditional institutions to modern functions." In one sense this was certainly the case; France today is roughly as "modern" as Britain, and presumably her traditional institutions (at least those dating from the Revolution and the Napoleonic Code) have proved adaptable. But how useful is this approach for an understanding of French development? Modernization there has been, yes; but its pace, the way in which new social groups created by modernization have entered into

[5] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y. 1955), 20.

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the political system, and the role played by the State in furthering modernization have all been quite distinctive in France.

The contention that the *grands corps* really run France, despite the political bickering on the surface, is a venerable thesis. Studies of decision-making suggest that in France, as in all complex parliamentary systems, the civil service is itself divided politically. Major interest groups develop special channels of access to the civil service as well as to parliament, thus creating "whirlpools" of influence and power throughout the political system. For example, with regard to the issue of state subsidies to beetgrowers and other producers of alcohol there is a split within the French civil service; the Ministry of Agriculture is generally in favor of subsidies and the Treasury is generally opposed. Alliances are thus formed that include civil servants, interest groups, deputies, and party leaders on both sides of issues. The French civil service has been fortunate in the past in recruiting exceptional talent; but it has not been a unified political force, nor has it been able to resolve the problem of political legitimacy. In this sense, the French experience provides us with a contrast to that of Britain and other nations where there is general agreement on fundamental political values and institutions.[6]

Our attention is directed especially to the period preceding the Revolution by Samuel P. Huntington, in his study of political modernization in America and Europe. He argues that modernization involves three things: rationalization of authority (replacement of traditional political authority by a single, secular, national authority), the development of specialized political structures to perform specialized functions, and mass participation in the political system. "On the Continent," comments Huntington, "the rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structures were the dominant trends of the seventeenth century," and he cites Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV, Colbert, and Louvois as "great simplifiers, centralizers, and modernizers."[7] In addition, the seventeenth century saw the growth and rationalization of state bureaucracies and standing armies. Thus, in two

[6] For example, Jean Meynaud describes the governmental universe in France as a system of power centers negotiating and bargaining with one another, *Nouvelles études sur les groupes de pression en France* (Paris 1962), 249-50, 279. Among the case studies that point up the pluralistic nature of decision-making in France: Aline Coutrot, "La loi scolaire de décembre 1959," *Revue française de science politique* (June 1963), 352-88; and Gaston Rimareix and Yves Tavernier, "L'élaboration et le vote de la loi complémentaire à la loi d'orientation agricole," *ibid.*, 389-425. Also B. E. Brown, "France," in J. B. Christoph, ed., *Cases in Comparative Politics* (Boston 1965), 129-206.

[7] Huntington, 379.

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important respects, the process of modernization took place on the Continent by 1700. A new political leadership rose to power in 1789; yet the way had been prepared over a long period of time.

It seems strange that divine right and hereditary monarchy should be considered forces for modernization. But Huntington explains that a prime requisite of modernization is the belief that men can act purposefully and effect change. Traditional society is permeated by a belief in unchanging custom and fundamental law. The modernization that began in the sixteenth century on the Continent required a new concept of authority, namely, that there was a sovereign who could make decisions. "One formulation of this idea was the new theory, which developed in Europe in the late sixteenth century, of the divine right of kings. Here, in effect, religious and, in that sense, traditional forms were used for modern purposes." Since mass participation in politics was a later phenomenon, modernization in the seventeenth century meant the rise of the absolute monarchy. "In terms of modernization, the seventeenth century's absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the twentieth century's monolithic party."[8]

Huntington's analysis of Continental developments is a useful and necessary corrective. Most observers are fascinated by the Revolution, and have neglected the modernizing reforms of the Old Regime. But to consider monarchy the spearhead of modernization is an oversimplification of the situation in France. The absolute monarchy both furthered the trend to modernization and slowed it. It contributed to modernization by breaking the power of the local lords; it slowed modernization by glorifying irrational values, sustaining an archaic social structure, and imposing a terrible financial load upon the people. The modernizers in France before the Revolution also included the social critics, some who demanded parliamentary control of the executive, and some who greeted the American Revolution as the harbinger of a new era in history.

Nor were the advocates of fundamental law all opponents of modernization. It is true that some traditionalists invoked fundamental law to protect the privileges of the corporations. On the other hand, some modernizers tried to secure popular participation in the political system by appealing to fundamental law above the will of the monarch. In France as in colonial America, the doctrine of higher law was used for several political purposes, among which was the promulgation of rational principles of legitimacy.

[8] *Ibid.*, 384, 386.

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Stanley Hoffmann deals with the later stages of modernization in France in his essay, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community." He begins with the two familiar models of feudal-agrarian society and industrial society, and then places France on the continuum. He suggests that a "Republican synthesis" gradually emerged in the century after the French Revolution and flourished in the period 1878-1914. The basis of the Republican synthesis was a unique mixture of the two models, neither one nor the other, but rather a "halfway house between the old rural society and industrialization." The French economy was both static and modern at the same time. Industrialization took place, but without an industrial revolution. The business class adopted many of the attitudes of the aristocracy that it had replaced, particularly that of emphasizing family continuity and social prominence rather than efficient production. The agricultural sector remained massive and largely traditional in orientation. Slow industrial growth in turn made it difficult to grant concessions to the working class, which was consigned to a "social ghetto." Comments Hoffmann, "For more than a century the political problem of France was to devise a political system adapted to the stalemate society."[9]

The basic solution to this problem under the Third Republic was the combination of a centralized and efficient bureaucracy with a strictly limited state. Politics became a kind of game in which a divided parliament prevented the formation of effective political executives. "But this game, played in isolation from the nation-at-large by a self-perpetuating political class, saw to it that the fundamental equilibrium of society would not be changed by the state."[10] However, the foundations of the Republican synthesis were undermined by the crises of the 1930's. The depression and the rise of Nazi Germany produced tensions in French society that the regime could not overcome. The assailants of the Republic converged and overwhelmed it. Writing in 1962, Hoffmann concluded that "the stalemate society is dead"—though many of the old tensions remained. It was killed by the transformation of French society during and after World War II—by the emergence of fully industrial attitudes, the more active role of the state in planning economic development, a reorientation of the French business class, and structural changes in the working class.

But the use of ideal types as literary devices makes French society appear to be far more static than was the case under the Third and Fourth Republics, and more dynamic than it actually was under the Fifth Republic. For example, there was a period of very rapid and

[9] Hoffmann, 12. [10] *Ibid.*, 16.

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impressive economic growth from 1896 to 1914, with important social and political consequences. The Third Republic created conditions in which the whole infrastructure of the modern economy was perfected —including the railroad network, canals, and modern communications. Its greatest contribution perhaps was to lay the foundation of a universal, free, and secular educational system. This may not be the most desirable way to bring about modernization, but it surely is one way to do so. The balance among social forces and economic sectors was shifting, more or less rapidly, under both the Third and Fourth Republics. French society was, and still is, a mix of traditional and modern elements; but this is hardly unique. All industrial societies are characterized by tension between traditional and modern sectors. Nor is the French political system the only one alleged by critics to be "incoherent." If there is a distinctive French experience of modernization it will be found in the timing of the crises of modernization and in the persistent alienation of large groups at all stages of modernization, up to and including the present.

Modernization theory obviously is not a magic wand that eliminates the need for research or produces universal agreement among observers. But it is a fruitful way of organizing study, and permits significant comparison among political systems. In order to further comparative study of modernization, we offer the following generalizations concerning the French experience.

1. The traditional phase in France that preceded modern society was feudalism. But feudal society in France was relatively advanced compared to, say, tribal societies. Feudalism contained important elements of "modernity." The process of modernization in France, therefore, has been long and complex, dating at least from the eleventh century, and perhaps from as far back as the Roman conquest.

2. In the century before the Revolution, the social structure of France was gradually transformed. A system in which privilege derived from heredity was at least partly replaced by a system based on wealth and individual effort. The Revolution was the culmination of a long period of social change, whose pace then was greatly accelerated.

3. The values justifying feudalism and absolute monarchy lost their popular base under the Old Regime. The trend toward rationalization of political authority, brought to a logical conclusion by the Revolution, was a development of centuries.

4. In spite of continuing political turmoil the economic and social foundations of modernity were laid during the nineteenth century.

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Far from being a stalemate society, France under both the Third and Fourth Republics took on the characteristics of all modern societies.

We shall now discuss each of these generalizations at length.

1. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

Feudalism was a highly personal political relationship between man and man, between subordinate and superior. As one historian has put it: "It is the possession of rights of government by feudal lords and the performance of most functions of government through feudal lords which clearly distinguishes feudalism from other types of organization."[11] Feudalism was a "model" traditional society in every respect. The mass of the population was engaged in subsistence agriculture or animal husbandry, the primary social unit was the family, the basic values of the society were those of personal loyalty, fealty, and courage, and the state (in so far as it continued to exist) was a larger version of family organization and power. The feudal system reposed on mutual duties and rights of people in a direct personal relationship, with the enjoyment of land rights as the foundation of the structure.

If typological analysis is a checklist of characteristics, the contrast between feudalism and contemporary society in France is virtually total. But historical processes are too complex to be reduced to these terms. When placed in the context of French historical development, it may be seen that feudalism departed from the traditional model in a number of ways. First, feudalism throughout Western Europe was a response to the decay of the highly organized Roman Empire. Until the tenth century, the Roman way of life prevailed in Gaul. Citizens owned land and slaves, subject to restrictions imposed upon them by the state. But the state then disintegrated. No central authority was able to protect the inhabitants of Western Europe from the incessant incursions of Saracens and Scandinavians. Under these new circumstances the Roman notion of a centralized state became obsolete. Defense and security inevitably became local responsibilities. Thus, feudalism was not comparable to primitive tribal societies; it rather should be viewed as a civilized society in decline or decay. The difference is important. Under feudalism the memory of the centralized authority of the past always remained alive. One leading French his-

[11] Joseph R. Strayer, "Feudalism in Western Europe," in Rushton Coulborn, ed., *Feudalism in History* (Princeton 1956), 16. On feudalism in France see also Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (Chicago 1961); A. Tilley, ed., *Medieval France* (New York 1964); and for an excellent synthesis, J. Touchard et al., *Histoire des idées politiques* (Paris 1959), 1, 155-63.

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torian contends that in the Middle Ages in France there were, strictly speaking, no feudal institutions. Only the monarchy was legitimate; the functions of administering justice, raising armies, and levying taxes were generally recognized as attributes of monarchy, conceded to or usurped by feudal powers.[12] When conditions and the technology of warfare changed, it was possible for the Capetian kings to revive the spirit of social and national unity. The reconstruction of authority that has fallen into decay is quite different as a political process from the creation of central authority where none has ever existed.

Most important, the rise of feudalism in the eleventh century coincided with a resurgence of the cities, a development that eventually sapped the feudal system. The period in France that most closely approximates the model traditional economy was the five centuries that preceded feudalism, rather than feudalism itself. It was from the sixth through the eleventh centuries, apparently, that the Franks became an almost wholly rural people engaged in subsistence agriculture. Artisans during this period abandoned the towns and retired to the countryside. Commerce declined abruptly, the cities were largely deserted, and municipal administration ceased to exist. By the eleventh century the process of urbanization resumed. The renaissance of town life was the result of many factors: a deliberate desire to create the conditions of a peaceful and secure existence within the confines of a commune; technological innovations in transport and manufacturing that made it economically feasible for merchants and artisans to congregate in towns; and a general desire on the part of merchants to terminate their nomadic existence and degrading dependence upon the goodwill of the local lords.

Everywhere, the city people sought to free themselves from the domination of feudal lords. This became easier as the cities prospered and could afford to recruit mercenaries. Nobles then found it necessary, in some cases profitable, to grant special charters to the towns, in effect exempting them from feudal obligations. Many communes were based on a clearly modern rather than traditional theory of governance. They were created by "common oath" on the part of the inhabitants, that is, an agreement among equals rather than between a superior and his subordinates. The "consular cities" enjoyed complete municipal

[12] See the seminal work by Ferdinand Lot with the collaboration of Robert Fawtier, *Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge* (Paris 1957), I, viii; and II, p. 9 for the comment, "the only political regime France had in the Middle Ages was the monarchy." Vol. II is an extraordinarily complete analysis of the rise of the royal power.

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liberty, with citizens electing representative councils invested with large financial and executive powers.

The inhabitants of the *bourgs* (or bourgeois) did not fit into the feudal structure. Merchants and artisans worked on their own, handled money, had no obligations to the lords, and were receptive to new ideas. The bourgeois became likewise a firm support for the royal power, which alone could integrate the resources of large domains and provide adequate security for the towns. The medieval towns were breeding grounds of new values and ideologies that challenged the traditional notions of religion, cultivated skepticism concerning the established order, and glorified the qualities of intelligence, liberty, and work.[13]

There was no steady, ineluctable progression from traditional to modern. The balance among the rival forces shifted frequently—particularly during the period of economic stagnation in the fourteenth century which brought about a decline of the middle class and a corresponding increase in the power and prestige of the clergy and lords. The secular trend, however, was to transform military vassalage into nobility in the service of the crown, and to transfer the idea of contract to the level of people and monarch. In brief, the social structure, economy, political institutions, and cultural values of medieval France by the thirteenth century already contained major elements of "modernity."

2. THE BREAKUP OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

The dramatic events of the Revolution have tended to draw the attention of observers away from the rapid pace of social change in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In each of the social orders of the Old Regime—the clergy, aristocracy, and third estate—structural transformations took place that eventually undermined the whole delicate balance of feudal privilege.[14]

As is natural in any pre-industrial society, religious values permeated

[13] On urbanization in the Middle Ages: Roland Mousnier, *Les XVI et XVII siècles* (Paris 1965), especially chap. 3; H. Van Werveke, "The Rise of Towns," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, III, edited by M. M. Postan, E. E. Rich, and E. Miller (Cambridge 1963), 3-40; L. Halphen, "Industry and Commerce," in A. Tilley, ed., *Medieval France*, 183-92; and J. Touchard and others, I, 169-79. On the bourgeois support for monarchy, Robert Fawtier, *The Capetian Kings of France* (London 1964), 199-215.

[14] For an excellent social and political analysis of this period, see Georges Dupeux, *La société française, 1789-1960* (Paris 1964), 59-102, and Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times* (Chicago 1960), chaps. 1 and 2.

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medieval France. The clergy propagated and popularized the values that sustained the feudal regime, and enjoyed a privileged position as the "first estate." Church revenue from the tithe and other levies amounted to about 13 percent of the gross national income, to which must be added income from vast church-held lands. The church performed a number of vital functions within the society, including the maintenance of a network of welfare and educational institutions.

Yet the clergy's grip on power was shaken. The priestly life was subjected to serious criticism and satire by the intellectuals. That respect so necessary to the maintenance of any priestly class began to evaporate, and concern became general over the waste and irrationality of a system of tithes. Furthermore, the clergy was itself divided sharply into a small group of high-living and wealthy archbishops, and a mass of impoverished priests. When the great explosion took place, a divided priestly class was unable to rally mass support for the old regime.

The position of the nobility likewise was transformed in the century preceding the Revolution. It, too, was affected by the process of modernization. The very composition of the nobility underwent a change. It was not a completely closed caste, since new elements were admitted to noble rank by a variety of methods. The king had the right of conferring nobility upon deserving commoners (usually men of great wealth, civil servants, and military officers). Whatever their origins, the nobles enjoyed extensive feudal privileges, which they sought desperately to maintain against pressures from the peasantry, the rising middle classes, and from the king. After 1750 the power of the aristocracy increased along with that of the middle classes. As Gordon Wright has put it: "The eighteenth century nobility was increasingly inclined to attack and destroy the *status quo*. The revolutionary goal of the discontented nobles was a return to a semi-mythical medieval system, to an unwritten constitution that had allegedly been torn up by the absolutist kings and their bourgeois ministers."[15]

All the rest of the population—some 98 percent—was the third estate. In the course of the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie rose in spectacular fashion within the social structure. Considerable fortunes were made in industry (by such entrepreneurs as Decretot, Van Robais, Oberkampf, Réveillon, and Dietrich), in trade (especially by the shipping interests of Havre, Bordeaux, and Marseilles) and in

[15] Gordon Wright, 18.

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finance. Perhaps 10 percent of the bourgeoisie was enabled, through investments and loans, to live entirely on dividends, without engaging in any kind of work. As the bourgeois acquired wealth, he tended to buy up land and cultivate it, thereby reestablishing a link between the middle class and agriculture. It has been estimated that perhaps 25 to 30 percent of all arable land in France by 1789 was in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Most of the *petite bourgeoisie* were engaged in trade or skilled work, and usually were organized in corporations.

There were stirrings within the peasantry, too. In 1779, serfdom was legally abolished in the last few places where it had survived. The peasants were juridically free, and altogether owned perhaps 40 to 45 percent of the land. However, the individual holdings were small, and relatively few peasants were well off. The number of landless peasants and seasonal workers in rural areas probably was greater than the number of individual landholders.[16]

The implications of these social trends were very great. First, they contradicted the assumption on which the Old Regime was based—that society was a pyramid, with peasants and middle classes at the base, with aristocracy above them and a king above all. Says Cobban: "The division of the nation into *noblesse*, *noblesse de robe*, clergy, bourgeois and peasants was a simplification which concealed the real complexity of French society. Each class had in fact its own internal divisions, which prevented it from being a coherent unit." Basically, it was impossible for the old feudal political system to survive in this kind of society. The new standards of performance related to wealth, ability, talent, and occupational role; considerations of noble birth were less relevant, and in the long run, if taken seriously would have led to an impairment of the efficiency of the society. As R. R. Palmer has pointed out, "Western Europe in the eighteenth century was already a complicated society, with elaborate mechanisms operating in the fields of government, production, trade, finance, scientific research, church affairs, and education. The allocation of personnel to these enterprises on the basis of birth and social standing could not but hamper, and even pervert (one thinks of the established churches, some of the universities, and many branches of government), the achievement of the purposes for which such institutions were designed. The old feudal days were over. It was no longer enough for a lord to look locally after the needs of his people. The persistence and even the accentuation of an aristocratic outlook derived from earlier and

[16] Georges Dupeux, 72-73.

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simpler conditions presented problems for European society itself, as well as for the individuals and classes that made it up."[17]

The rise of the bourgeoisie did not have to mean a fight to the death between the middle class and the nobility. Several different solutions were conceivable: The middle class could have disdained aristocratic values altogether, in which case the nobility might have ceased to be a political power; or the nobility could have opened its ranks to the newcomers and gradually absorbed its leading elements, thereby creating a greatly expanded new ruling class. But time ran out for peaceful solutions. Relations among aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and peasantry became increasingly bitter. The nobility resisted the pretensions of the middle classes and tried to block the development of embryonic capitalism. Eighteenth-century France had all the characteristics of a political system unsettled by the process of modernization.

3. REASON AND REVOLUTION

One of the basic assumptions of modernization theory is that as a society becomes more complex, the values serving to legitimize political authority become more rational. Or, rather than imply any causal relationship, rationalization of authority proceeds along with industrialization and increasing complexity of social structure. This assumption is borne out in a striking manner by the French experience, because of the great divide marked by the Revolution of 1789. The pattern of legitimacy clearly underwent a radical transformation, and took a form of greater rationality. But closer examination makes it apparent that the rationalization of authority was accentuated, not created, by the Revolution. It was part and parcel of the secular trend of modernization in all spheres of French society under the Old Regime.

Huntington has emphasized the modernizing role of the monarchy in breaking up feudal society. Hence, the theory of divine right of kings was more rational, or more modern, than feudalism itself. He comments, "The modernization that began in the sixteenth century on the Continent and in the seventeenth century in England required new concepts of authority, the most significant of which was the simple idea of a sovereignty itself, the idea that there is, in the words of Bodin, a 'supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law.' One formulation of this idea was the new theory, which

[17] Citations are from Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Divine Right Monarchy in France," *New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge 1957), VII, 235, and R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton 1959), 68.

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developed in Europe in the late sixteenth century, of the divine right of kings. Here, in effect, religious and, in that sense, traditional forms were used for modern purposes."[18]

Huntington's view is a useful reminder that ideal types make little sense outside historical context. The notion that a ruler receives a mandate from a divine source is characteristic of traditional societies; yet in the Europe of the seventeenth century it was part of the breakthrough to modernity. But even here we must beware of historical oversimplification. Divine right of kings was not a new theory. The Franks, before the conquest, combined hereditary right with election; an Assembly of Warriors elected a king from among members of the Merovingian family, which presumably had divine connections. After the Frankish conquest, the Merovingians tried to free themselves of this dependence upon the assemblies, but were only partially successful. The rise of the Carolingian and Capetian dynasties brought a renewed emphasis upon election, since heredity could not be invoked as the overriding principle of legitimacy in an era of dynastic rivalries. Once their grip on power seemed secure, the Capetians sought to reestablish the principle of divine right, which gradually became accepted by the thirteenth century—though even in the fourteenth century there were several occasions when an Assembly of Barons played at least a subsidiary role in choosing a king. Divine right and religious consecration was the ancient theory of governance, was weakened under feudalism, and then revived as the centralizing forces in French society triumphed over feudalism. Under Louis XIV an absolute monarchy replaced a weak feudal monarchy; in a sense the monarchy reverted to the pre-feudal principle of divine right.[19]

The thesis that the absolute monarch was the agent of modernization can also be reversed, with perhaps even more validity. H. R. Trevor-Roper has argued cogently that the general European crisis of the seventeenth century had its origins in the rise of absolute monarchy. The Renaissance state, he contends, grew up in the sixteenth century at the expense of the cities. One by one, the great cities fell under the control of assorted princes and kings, whose military and administrative machines were irresistible. Monarchy helped bring about national unity, but once the Renaissance court was created, it became a wholly uneconomic and parasitic agency. The tested principles of commerce

[18] Huntington, 384.

[19] On the principle of election and religious consecration in the feudal period, see Ch. Petit Dutaillis, *The Feudal Monarchy in France and England* (London 1936), 28; Robert Fawtier, *The Capetian Kings of France*, 48-49; and Maurice Duverger, *Les constitutions de la France* (Paris 1950), 11-17.

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and industry were replaced by ostentation and deliberate waste. The burden of monarchy became too great to be borne; the sensible course was to eliminate the whole parasitic crew and return to the productive way of life that had made the medieval cities great. In England the royal power resisted and was swept away; in France the king, perhaps out of luck and apathy, allowed Richelieu to reduce royal expenses and enforce a mercantilist policy. The old regime was given a reprieve. According to Trevor-Roper, "By the seventeenth century the Renaissance courts had grown so great, had consumed so much in 'waste,' and had sent their multiplying suckers so deep in the body of society, that they could only flourish for a limited time, and in a time, too, of expanding general prosperity. When that prosperity failed, the monstrous parasite was bound to falter."[20]

This is not to deny the importance of the monarchy, and especially of the royal administrations, as a channel for innovative practices. But the medieval monarchy cannot be understood through the simple use of ideal types, nor can it be considered the sole agency of modernization. The rise of absolute monarchy in France coincided with the general modernization of French society, but so did the rise of opposition to absolutism.

It is also misleading to contrast divine right of kings with the concept of fundamental law, as if the latter characterized static traditional societies and the former embodied the principle of change. In France the situation was more confused. There were actually two different trends in theorizing about the fundamental laws of the kingdom. One view can properly be called "traditional," in that the fundamental laws were considered the creation of history and of God, beyond the competence even of the king to change. But a second view also developed, according to which fundamental laws were made by the people, and could be modified by the people through the Estates General. This conception, derived from the doctrine of social contract, was clearly more compatible with the process of modernization than were theories of divine right and hereditary monarchy. As Rushton Coulborn put it, the theory of divine right was a "clumsy idea," an

[20] H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in T. Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660* (New York 1965), 95. See also the dissent by Roland Mousnier, arguing that the monarchy was a progressive force, *ibid.*, 102. The thesis that modernization of French society took place through the crown is also presented by Barrington Moore, Jr., in *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1967). But note the strong statement by Alfred Cobban on the inherent incapacity of the French monarchy, as early as the reign of Louis XIV, to deal with changing conditions, in "The Decline of Divine Right Monarchy in France," 239.

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"interim notion," and a "slogan, not an argument." And he concludes, "the return to serious thought about the relations between rulers and ruled is marked by the extraordinary doctrine of Original Compact, or Contract."[21]

The social contract is in one sense an extension of the doctrine of "fundamental laws" under the Old Regime. The political struggles of the eighteenth century revolved around the question of whether fundamental laws restrained the powers of the monarch. It was generally accepted under the Old Regime that the monarch could not change the rules concerning succession to the throne, or alienate the public domain, or be anything but a Catholic. An effort was made by a number of Estates General to establish the principle of parliamentary approval of all new taxes as a fundamental law, but the monarchy managed to defeat these efforts. This view of fundamental law led ultimately to the notion that the people originally possessed sovereign powers, and then delegated these powers to their governors.

Once again it is necessary to emphasize the length and complexity of the process of modernization. By the eighteenth century the view was general that man was a creature of unlimited possibilities, that he was basically rational, and that the major purpose of political institutions was to permit him to develop his creative abilities to the fullest. As Gordon Wright has commented: "Enlightenment concepts were far more subversive than its proponents knew; they could scarcely be reconciled with the dominant ideas on which the old regime rested. The institutions of eighteenth-century France were still based on authority and tradition, not on any rational or utilitarian test; the old ideal of an organic society could not be harmonized with the new concept of an atomistic one made up of autonomous individuals."[22]

The ideas of the Enlightenment undermined the positions of both of the main contenders for power in the two decades that preceded the Revolution. The *Parlements* tried, with some success, to check the monarch, basically in the interest of the hereditary aristocracy. The king replied by affirming that full sovereignty resided in his person only. "Public order in its entirety," Louis XV proclaimed in the *séance de la flagellation*, in 1766, "emanates from me, and the rights and interests of the Nation, which some dare to set up as a body distinct from the Monarch, are necessarily joined with mine, and rest only in

[21] Rushton Coulborn, ed., 311-12. On the fundamental laws under the Old Regime and social contract theory, see M. Duverger, 31-37.
[22] Gordon Wright, 31.

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my hands." Neither the claims of absolute monarchy nor the proposals to restore aristocratic privilege were consonant with the intellectual mood of the time. By the standards of reason and the Enlightenment, the assertion that all sovereignty reposed in the king was absurd; and the contention that hereditary officeholders of the *Parlements* represented the nation only a little less so. When the showdown came, both protagonists found themselves without popular support.[23]

The new principles of political authority were rational in essence; they were compatible with either constitutional monarchy or a parliamentary republic, but marked an irrevocable break with both absolutism and feudalism. The Tennis Court Oath, the August decrees abolishing feudalism, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen signalled the emergence of a wholly new principle of political legitimacy. Contrast, for example, Louis XV's pronouncement at the *séance de la flagellation*, the remonstrance of the *Parlement* of Paris in March, 1776, (glorifying the inequalities of feudalism) with the clear, forceful language of 1789. The Declaration was drawn up, in its own terms, "so that this Declaration, constantly present before all members of the social body, shall recall to them ever their rights and their duties; so that the acts of the legislative and executive Powers, being compared at every instant with the goal of all political institutions, shall be more respected. . . ." And the Constitution of 3 September, 1791, "abolishes universally the institutions that infringe upon liberty and the equality of rights—there is no longer any nobility, nor peerage, nor hereditary distinctions, nor distinctions among orders, nor feudal regime. . . . There is no longer, for any part of the Nation, nor for any individual, any privilege, nor any exception to the common law of all Frenchmen."

The revolutionary principle of political legitimacy was not accepted by conservatives, and the revolutionaries were themselves divided; the result was a long period of constitutional instability. Although France was converted almost overnight into a modern state as regards the official principle of legitimacy, it did not thereby achieve a large popular consensus on its basic institutions. The transformation of French society continued. But the way in which the successive crises of modernization were surmounted was drastically affected by endemic constitutional instability. In turn, the nature of controversy over the regime evolved in response to the pressures of modernization.

[23] On the clash between the king and the Parlements, see Palmer, 86-99, and René Rémond, *La vie politique en France, 1789-1848* (Paris 1965), 31-40. On the Enlightenment, see notably Gordon Wright, 28-39; and the fine synthesis in Jean Touchard and others, II, 383-449.

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4. MODERNIZATION AND CONSENSUS

Science and technology shape the politics of all modern societies. The development of industry necessarily brings about a redistribution of the active population within the economy. The percentage of the population engaged in agriculture decreases, those remaining on farms are able greatly to expand production in spite of their reduced numbers, and the percentage of the population engaged in industry, services, and administration increases. New social groups form and make claims upon the political system. In terms of historical sequence, these groups are the capitalists and businessmen in general, the managerial class, and the working class. At a later stage of industrialization the scientists and intellectuals become so numerous and important in the society that they also become a distinct force. In France, as in all other nations that have gone or are going through the process of industrialization, the entry of each of these social groups into the political system has posed an acute problem.

The first task is to gain an overall view of the extent to which French society has been reshaped. In French census statistics the active population is classified on the basis of participation in three large sectors of the economy: the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing), the secondary (industry, mining, construction, production of energy), and the tertiary (all other activities, including distribution, administration, and personal services). One century ago the agricultural sector was more important than the other two combined; there were slightly more than two farmers for one worker and one person in the tertiary sector. In 1964 the agricultural sector was the least important of the three; the number of persons engaged in farming had been reduced by almost two-thirds, with corresponding increases in the other two sectors. The following table summarizes these trends.[24]

YEARS	*1851*	*1881*	*1901*	*1921*	*1931*	*1936*	*1954*	*1962*	*1964*
Primary sector (%)	53	48	42	43	37	37	28	21	18
Secondary sector (%)	25	27	31	29	33	30	36	38	42
Tertiary sector (%)	22	25	27	28	30	33	36	41	40

One striking feature of contemporary France is the swift pace of social change. In the ten-year period from 1954 to 1964 the number of people engaged in agriculture declined by almost 40 percent, while the number of those in the secondary and tertiary sectors increased by about 15 percent. The political implications of these trends are obvious. The peasantry is now the smallest of the major social groups. Given

[24] Table based on Georges Dupeux, 33 and *Tableaux de l'économie française* (Paris 1966), 48a; and *Atlas historique de la France contemporaine* (Paris 1966), 45.

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their minority position, the peasants must make their claims upon the political system mainly through interest groups rather than through political parties seeking to form a political majority. Although the industrial workers have become more numerous, they still do not constitute a majority by themselves. Only through alliance with either the peasantry or elements of the middle classes can they form a majority. Not only are the middle classes—business, proprietary, managerial, and professional groups—important because of the functions they perform, they are also a massive political force, about as numerous as all workers engaged in industrial production.

France now resembles the other industrial nations of the world, with roughly the same kind of balance among the three major sectors of the economy. In 1964 the number of people in the agricultural sector in France amounted to 18 percent of the total—smaller than in Italy (25 percent), or Japan (26 percent) or the Soviet Union (34 percent), but larger than in Germany (12 percent), the United States (8 percent), or Britain (4 percent). The number of people engaged in the tertiary sector in France was about 41 percent of the total, as compared to 58 percent in the United States, 48 percent in Britain, 42 percent in Japan, 38 percent in Germany, 33 percent in Italy, and 32 percent in the Soviet Union.[25]

In all other respects as well, French society is displaying the general characteristics of modernization. The movement of population toward urban centers has been massive, as is normal. In 1846 the number of people living in communes of two thousand inhabitants or more amounted to 24 percent of the population, and those living in communes of five thousand inhabitants or more to about 17 percent; the comparable figures in 1962 were 62 percent and 55 percent. Particularly striking has been the growth of the Paris metropolitan area as an industrial and administrative center. Almost 20 percent of the nation's population now lives and works in the Paris region, as compared to only about 3 percent a century ago.[26]

Although the outlines of French social structure are like those of most other industrialized nations, the manner in which that social structure evolved was quite distinctive. Industrialization in France up to 1815 was slow, and generally a result of the application of English methods in the field of textile manufacture. The way to industrialization had been prepared by the Revolution, which eliminated feudal barriers and created a vast market. But French energies were

[25] All figures are from *Tableaux*, 48a.
[26] Figures on urbanization from Dupeux, 20-21, 23-26.

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then directed mainly toward defense of the Republic and the creation of the far-flung Napoleonic empire. The industrial revolution did not begin until about 1815, and even then development was sluggish.

Protected by high tariffs, French businessmen were more interested in financial speculation than in creating mass industries. Aristocratic values were amazingly resilient in France after the Revolution, when the successful bourgeois sought to adopt the life-style of the class that had been virtually wiped out as an economic force. David S. Landes has emphasized the contrast between the British and French entrepreneurial classes throughout the eighteenth century: "What distinguished the British economy . . . was an exceptional sensitivity and responsiveness to pecuniary opportunity. This was a people fascinated by wealth and commerce." The French business class was handicapped by its greater attentiveness to what was considered gracious living. Landes speaks of the development within the French body social of "psychological and institutional antibodies to the virus of modernization."[27]

French industrialization was delayed, not prevented. Production increased regularly in the period from 1815 to 1848. Coal production and pig iron output went up dramatically, and a start was made in the metallurgical and chemical industries and in the building of railways. In all spheres, economic development followed the English pattern, but at a slower pace and less energetically.

Another phase of economic development began under the Second Empire, when industrial production roughly doubled between 1852 and 1870. The government of Louis Napoleon tried deliberately to create favorable conditions for capitalist development, and succeeded rather well. The banking system was adapted to the needs of an industrializing economy, providing a channel from the public and its savings to the entrepreneurs. This was also a period of adventurous experimentation by French businessmen, who introduced many innovations in the merchandising field (including the department store) and thoroughly modernized the metallurgical and textile industries. In addition, an extensive railway network was constructed. After a slow start, France seemed well on the way to catching up to and surpassing Great Britain. By 1870 France's industrial production exceeded the

[27] Citations from David S. Landes, "Technological Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750-1914," in H. J. Habakkuk and M. Postan, *The Industrial Revolution and After*, IV of *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, 298, 463. On early industrialization in France, see J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914* (Cambridge 1955); Georges Dupeux, 35-48; and Gordon Wright, 196-209, 343-53.

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value of its agricultural production, and its economic growth in the preceding fifty years had been second only to that of Britain.

After the defeat by Prussia in 1870 and the establishment of the Third Republic, there was a period of relatively slow economic growth that lasted until the 1890's. In a sense this was an understandable consequence of losing the war. As J. H. Clapham has remarked, "But the war of 1870, even more the Parisian turmoil of 1871 and the long years of national gloom and self-distrust which followed, chilled the confident ardor without which no nation ever did great work—even in factory building. France was doubting the value of her government and her Republican institutions, and doubting of her own destiny, for the best part of a generation after 1870. Contrast the self-confident, not to say self-satisfied, frame of mind in the England of 1860, in the Germany of 1875, in the United States of always."[28]

There followed, from 1895 to World War I, a period of economic development comparable to that under the Second Empire. From 1870 to 1914 industrial production tripled and real wages went up by some 50 percent. The discovery and exploitation of vast iron ore deposits in Lorraine gave a new impetus to French industrialization. At the same time, a protectionist agricultural policy largely shielded the peasants from the challenge of competition. It was during this period that the contrast between the "two Frances"—one modern and dynamic and the other pre-industrial and static—became significantly sharp. From 1924 to 1930 there was a brief period of rapid economic growth, averaging about 4 percent a year, and then the general decline of the depression. After the destruction of World War II, it took several years simply to regain the pre-war level. But beginning in 1950 there began a new era of rapid growth—about 6 percent a year, far larger than in any other period of French history. Between 1949 and 1965, for example, annual production of steel increased from 9 million tons to 20 million; of automobiles from 286,000 to 1.6 million; of agricultural tractors from 17,000 to 90,000; of housing units from 51,000 to 412,000. National revenue in this period more than doubled, and industrial production as a whole almost tripled.[29]

From this brief survey, several points stand out. (1) Rapid economic growth took place from 1815 to 1848 (Restoration and July Monarchy), from 1851 to 1870 (Second Empire), from 1895 to 1914, from

[28] Clapham, 233.

[29] On late industrialization in France, Gordon Wright, 453-63, 548-67. Also, Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Growth in France and Britain* (Cambridge, Mass. 1964). Kindleberger identifies the periods of economic expansion as 1851-68, 1879-82, 1896-1913, 1919-29, and since 1949.

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1924 to 1930 (Third Republic), and from 1950 to the present (Fourth and Fifth Republics). There were thus periods of relative stagnation and of vitality under both monarchies and republics. (2) Until recently the size of the nonindustrial and even pre-industrial sector in the French economy was large compared to that of countries like Britain, Germany, and the United States. (3) Since 1950 there has been a real breakthrough in the attitude of businessmen and intellectuals toward modernization. The pre-industrial mentality glorified individuality and family enterprise ("mon verre est petit, mais je bois dans mon verre," etc.). This has largely given way to an affirmative view of science, technology, and industrial progress. But the political consequences of these developments are still obscure. The Fourth Republic was overthrown after eight years of impressive economic progress. The Fifth Republic has been beset periodically by grave crises, and its constitution has been under challenge by opposition parties from the day of its promulgation. Rapid modernization since 1950 has brought no discernible consensus concerning the basic values and institutions of the political system.

The French experience of modernization calls attention to the importance of the timing of crises, and the manner in which new social groups have entered upon the political scene. The brutal change of the Revolution produced a series of shock waves in public opinion that made it exceedingly difficult to establish solid political institutions. The aristocracy refused to accept the Republic, and the beneficiaries of the Revolution were restive under monarchy. Even after the establishment of a durable compromise in the form of the Third Republic, the rival forces continued to promulgate incompatible views concerning the way in which the Republic ought to be structured. In short, the French by an accident of timing had to confront the staggering problems of industrialization without the benefit of a stable political system. Industrialization took place anyway, and a series of regimes was able to help the process along.

Fitful industrialization created special problems for the leaders of the emergent social groups. In France, as elsewhere, the first great political crisis of modernization involved the relationship between the rising capitalist and managerial classes on the one hand, and the landed aristocracy on the other. These relations were marked by hostility on the part of the aristocracy and lack of firm purpose on the part of the business elements. Instead of fusing, the two social groups tended to distrust one another, even though the middle class emulated

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the life-style of their social "betters." The same pattern was repeated in the second great political crisis of modernization—the relationship between the established business class and the increasingly articulate and politically conscious proletariat. Once again there was hostility on the one side and distrust on the other. There was established a tradition, then, of alienation rather than participation, of rejection rather than acceptance.[30]

France is now going through a period of rapid change comparable to that under the Second Empire and Third Republic. One novel aspect of this change is the spectacular rise of the intellectuals, managers, and highly skilled workers as a new kind of professional elite. Will the latest phase of modernization bring about a new spirit in politics, or will the rising social groups perpetuate the tradition of alienation, rejection, and hostility inherited from the earlier confrontations? It has long been the hope of Gaullists that politics would become more pragmatic and less ideological as modernization proceeds. But the Gaullist regime has not been able to provide for meaningful participation in the political system by the major social groups. Instead of being readily and willingly absorbed into the new industrial society, large numbers of university students and intellectuals have repudiated the regime, the educational system, and even the society itself. Modernization in France has always provoked movements of anarchistic and nihilistic protest. Like the Republic itself, modernization has enemies on both the Left and the Right. Whether a modern Republic can survive and advance in a divided society has been, and remains, the chief interest and potential tragedy of French politics.

The democratic or liberal prototype for modernization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America may prove to be France, rather than Britain or the United States. In most developing countries that aspire to parliamentary democracy today, as in France in the past, there is an absence of consensus over the basic institutions of the nation. At the same time there is a determination on the part of the political elites to modernize their nations as quickly as possible. But pre-industrial attitudes permeate the society; the business class is lacking in entrepreneurial vigor; the civil service and military are relatively well organized and are disposed to direct national purposes, and strong Communist and other

[30] The entry of major social groups into the political system is dealt with by Gordon Wright, 210-26, 354-65; and in especially suggestive fashion by Georges Dupeux, 104-64, 171-218, 240-78. Shepard B. Clough stresses the importance of the timing of political and social conflict in "Social Structure, Social Values and Economic Growth," E. M. Acomb and M. L. Brown, Jr., eds., *French Society and Culture Since the Old Regime* (New York 1966), 66-84.

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revolutionary movements signal alienation of workers and intellectuals from the national community. Industrialization is now taking place under conditions of bitter social antagonism and unstable parliamentary institutions in many countries of the "third world." For purposes of comparative analysis the most relevant model among the democratic industrial societies may well be the French experience of modernization.

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NAZIS AND CHRISTIANS

By BEATE RUHM VON OPPEN

THE publication of John Conway's book, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-45*[1] may be a suitable moment for a comprehensive look at the wider subject of Nazism and Christianity and the recent literature about it. Ever since Rolf Hochhuth's *Deputy*[2] with its travesty of the tragedy of the Jews of Europe, the world has resounded with clamor about the silence of the Deputy of Christ at the time when the blood brothers of the founder of the faith were being slaughtered. A suitable scapegoat having at last been found, everybody was free to talk of roused consciences. Nor did the clergy escape censure. While Saul Friedländer[3] dealt with the Supreme Pontiff, Guenter Lewy[4] devoted his attention to the German Catholic episcopate, and came to devastating conclusions: collaboration with the Nazi regime virtually all along the line.

After this wave of indignation about the unrighteousness of the allegedly righteous, has the time come for a counter-wave? Perhaps. Perhaps not. On the whole two things speak against it: the doctrine of Marx and the doctrine of Freud. They have a powerful hold on contemporary opinion. They dismiss religion as the opium of the people, monotheism as an illusion, and its institutions as instruments of material interest or expressions of neurosis. Two things can, however, be taken to speak for it: experience and witness. But experience tends to be confined to those who lived through the period inside the area dominated by the Nazis. The witnesses are mostly dead. Yet enough evidence survives to shake the current assumption that there was natural collaboration between the churches and the Nazis. The emphasis in what follows will be on the Catholics, because they have been more in the limelight of public attention—certainly in the (predominantly non-Catholic) English-speaking world.[5]

[1] J. S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-45* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968; and New York: Basic Books, 1969).

[2] Rolf Hochhuth, *The Deputy*, trans. by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964).

[3] Saul Friedländer, *Pie XII et le IIIe Reich. Documents* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1964).

Saul Friedländer, *Pius XII. und das Dritte Reich. Eine Dokumentation* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1965).

Saul Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich. A Documentation*, translated from the French and German by Charles Fullman (New York: Knopf, 1966).

[4] Guenter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

[5] In Germany, too, the limelight was somewhat more on the Catholics, helped by

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What about the sources? The basic division is into those of the churches and those of the regime. Church sources—certainly to someone unversed in the codeword dialectics of the period—often sound like collaboration. The sources of the regime, on the other hand, register resistance. Unless they are used together and used with a discriminating ear for tone and inflection, background noises, and harmonics, a balanced judgment is unlikely to result.

The watchdogs of the regime watched the churches and their following extremely carefully. Among the surviving evidence, Gestapo or Security Service reports or proceedings of Nazi courts have an important place. If the regime regarded an institution or a person as potentially or actually hostile, it is reasonable to assume that there were reasons. It is less reasonable to accept this probability only for the purpose of arguing that it shows the power the church had and did not use when it could have done, to counteract or to remove the regime. This argument—of the Pope's numerous but idle divisions—disregards the totalitarian character of the regime and mistakes the nature of the church.

The revelation of the total claims of National Socialism came *pari passu* with the consolidation of its total power. Hindsighted wisdom about what should have been known and could have been done by those involved in the drama does not help to increase knowledge and understanding of those past events. In some important respects they

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Hochhuth's play and the serialization in *Der Spiegel* of Lewy's book, helped also by an articulate body of Catholic liberal intellectuals. And perhaps another reason is that Catholicism and the papacy are more picturesque and therefore more subject to publicity.

But the German literature about Protestantism is, if anything, more extensive. Despite some very basic differences in their history, there are certain parallels in the historiography of the two denominations. On the Protestant side, too, there was a phase of martyrology and eyewitness-accounting and documentation, in which Wilhelm Niemöller, the brother of Martin, was particularly active; then "legend-mongering" was attacked—notably in Friedrich Baumgärtel's *Wider die Kirchenkampflegenden* (Neuendettelsau 1958); for some years now there has been a steady scholarly output, some of it sponsored by a commission for research into the history of the church struggle. So far there are eighteen volumes and three supplements in the series *Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes* (Göttingen: 1958——) a number of them being regional studies.

Among the basic differences on the Protestant side as compared with the Catholic are the diversity of Protestant church structure, the Nazi attempt to make the so-called "German Christians" into a State Church, and the crystallization of the Confessing Church (*Bekennende Kirche*) in reaction to the government's interference and demands.

An up-to-date, comprehensive, and critical review of the literature on the Protestants can be found in Jürgen Schmidt, *Die Erforschung des Kirchenkampfes. Die Entwicklung der Literatur und der gegenwärtige Stand der Erkenntnis,* published as No. 149 of *Theologische Existenz heute* by Christian Kaiser Verlag (München 1968).

Bethge's *Bonhoeffer* (see no. 69) is a landmark in this vast but rather esoteric field. The book combines biography with a picture of the period, including some of its theological and ecumenical developments.

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were unprecedented. Apart from the injustice of such judgments and the uselessness of retrospective advice, there is a danger in it too. It fosters the illusion that we could not make such mistakes now. Those precise mistakes we probably could not make, because the precise preconditions for them no longer exist. But the same type of mistake we are still capable of making and do indeed make.

On the nature of the church it is still useful to quote Ernst Troeltsch and to quote him a bit more coherently than Guenter Lewy did. He misses the main point by which Troeltsch distinguished church from sect: the *sacraments*. They are the crux. And about them Troeltsch said:

> The vitally important thing is that every individual should come within the range of the influence of these saving energies of grace; hence the church is forced to dominate society, compelling all the members of society to come under its sphere and influence; but, on the other hand, her stability is entirely unaffected by the fact of the extent to which her influence over all individuals is actually attained. The church is the great educator of the nations, and like all educators she knows how to allow for various degrees of capacity and maturity, and how to attain her end only by a process of adaptation and compromise.[6]

But in Lewy all we read is, "To use the sociological categories of Ernst Troeltsch, Catholicism is a church rather than a sect. It is an example of 'that type of organization which is overwhelmingly conservative, . . . becomes an integral part of the existing order, . . . [and which knows to attain her end] by a process of adaptation and compromise.' "[7] The dots and brackets are all his. He was evidently concerned to get those last seven words in. The dots before them bridge a leap of eight pages in Troeltsch's work. That the adaptation and compromise might, at least in the sincere view of the church and its faithful, be for the sake of salvation, might be to keep the sacraments and other priestly ministrations accessible to the faithful, whatever the nature of the political regime under which they live their lives, does not enter. The church is conservative and ready to compromise, and that is that.

If one rejects the very notion of sacraments, one can go on to argue, as Lewy does, that "The Catholic Church, as a church, has usually been unable to separate her ideal aims from her interest in survival and

[6] Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. by Olive Wyon (New York 1960), 338-39.
[7] Lewy, 336.

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she has often found her own gospel a liability rather than a source of strength. She has therefore from time to time retreated behind the cloister walls, and instead of being the salt of the earth has become a force tragically upholding injustice and tyranny."[8] But one cannot use Troeltsch for that argument.

To a Catholic the sacraments *are* vitally important, essential for salvation. The intrepid Bernhard Lichtenberg, provost of the cathedral of St. Hedwig in Berlin, who was imprisoned for praying for the Jews, was driven to panic only once—when he thought he would die in jail without a priest. All other indignities and sufferings and even his death on the way to Dachau he bore with fortitude and serenity.

The hero of Gordon Zahn's *In Solitary Witness: The Life and Death of Franz Jägerstätter*,[9] a simple but thinking Austrian peasant, saw and deplored the "process of adaptation and compromise" as much as Lewy, as much as Zahn. "However," he said,

> let us not on this account cast stones at our bishops or priests. They, too, are men like us, made of flesh and blood, and can weaken. They are probably much more sorely tempted by the evil enemy than the rest of us. Maybe they have been too poorly prepared to take up this struggle and to make a choice between life and death. . . . Perhaps, too, our bishops thought it would only be a short time before everything would come apart at the seams again [after the *Anschluss*] and that, by their compliance, they would spare the faithful many agonies and martyrs. Unfortunately, things turned out to be quite different: years have passed and thousands of people must now die in the grip of error every year. It is not hard to imagine, then, what a heroic decision it would require for our people to repudiate all the mistakes that have been made in recent years. This is why we should not make it harder for our spiritual leaders than it already is by making accusations against them. Let us pray for them, instead, that God may lighten the great tasks which still stand before them.[10]

For himself Jägerstätter chose earthly death and the expectation of eternal life. He refused to fight Hitler's war. His reason was that Hitler was fighting the church. The church had been instituted as the custodian of the means of grace. And Jägerstätter was emphatic on their

[8] Lewy, 336.
[9] Gordon C. Zahn, *In Solitary Witness: The Life and Death of Franz Jägerstätter* (New York 1964).
[10] *Ibid.*, 215.

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importance. "It may well be that hell holds great power over this world at the present time, but even this need not cause us Christians to fear. May the power of hell be ever so great, God's power is still greater. Naturally, though, anyone who does not arm himself strongly against the diabolical power with the weapons for fighting and defense that Christ left behind for us as His supreme legacy when He instituted the Most Blessed Sacrament of the Altar, will scarcely be able to hold out very long against these mighty enemies."[11]

It was with and because of these convictions that Franz Jägerstätter, the sexton of the church of St. Radegund, went to the guillotine. One cannot, on the one hand, say that Zahn's book about him "shows that there existed an alternative to surrender and collaboration" (as the dustcover quotes Guenter Lewy) and at the same time reject those convictions. One need not share them. But one must at least tolerate them with an open mind.

Perhaps more than an open mind is needed, perhaps one needs the experience of hell too. It was the fresh shock of that experience at least as much as the "apologetic" urge that accounted for much of the martyrological literature after the war and for its avid reception.

There had been books about the church struggle or the conflict between Christianity and the Nazi regime before the war,[12] the world's press and radio had been full of it during the war, with the West—and sometimes even Moscow—treating the Pope and German Catholic bishops as much like allies as they did Niemöller and other dissenters among the German Protestants. The reasons for this were not only tactical, stratagems of political warfare. The surprise and dismay when Count Galen, the Bishop of Münster, the thunderer against the iniquities of the Nazi regime, began to criticize Allied occupation policies were genuine. But it took nearly two decades and a young German with the gifts of a Goebbels to make much of the Western public accept the transfer of responsibility for what had happened to the man they had regarded as a champion of civilization and humanity, Pope Pius XII.

He had been silent when he should have spoken, they were now informed. He had said things that would better have been left unsaid.

[11] *Ibid.*, 231-32.

[12] George N. Shuster, *Like a Mighty Army: Hitler versus Established Religion* (New York 1935); John Brown Mason, *Hitler's First Foes: A Study in Religion and Politics* (Minneapolis 1936); A. S. Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany* (London 1938); Nathaniel Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church, Being an Account of the Conflict Between the National Socialist Government of Germany and the Roman Catholic Church 1933-1938* (London 1939).

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Those who were most strongly opposed to the papacy demanded the most miraculous performance from it. Pius was faulted as a pastor of souls and as a diplomat. The German Catholic episcopate came in for its share of guilt too.[13] The Protestants escaped—at least in the English-speaking West—relatively unscathed. Yet their record was hardly better. Indeed, as regards the question of culpable silence about the crimes of the regime, a prominent resister and Protestant, Eugen Gerstenmaier, a man who only just escaped the Nazi People's Court with his life, says it was impossible to get the Protestant church to make a statement denouncing political crimes clearly and not in combination with an expression of church claims and interests. He adds that there was a striking similarity in the conduct of the two churches in that respect.[14]

One of the interesting features of J. S. Conway's book is that he deals with both churches, the Protestant and the Catholic.[15] Another important aspect of the book is also signalled in its title: it returns to a subject that had tended to be forgotten, the persecution of the churches. Like Lewy, Conway proceeds chronologically. He brings out more clearly the different phases of the conflict—and that indeed it *was* a conflict. He shows something of the multiplicity and variety of the persons, agencies, and views involved. He takes the reader from the initial confusion in 1933 to the Concordat with the Holy See on the Roman Catholic side and the rigged and resounding victory of the "German Christians" on the Protestant side (almost simultaneous events in July 1933), the establishment and gyrations of the Ministry of Church Affairs, the ideological contest and administrative manipulation and terror right up to the official truce between the regime and the churches after the outbreak of war; he deals with the continuing unofficial struggle, the Party's plans for a final settlement of the church problem after the war, and the dress rehearsal for it in a part of Poland that had been resettled with Germans and where the policy of de-Christianization was pursued openly and relentlessly.

Conway himself comments on the historiography of his subject and

[13] Gordon C. Zahn, *German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control* (New York 1962); and Lewy.

[14] Eugen Gerstenmaier, "Der Kreisauer Kreis; zu dem Buch Gerrit van Roons 'Neuordnung im Widerstand,'" *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, xv (July 1967), 243.

[15] Shuster had done it in 1935, Duncan-Jones in 1938 (see n. 12), and Zipfel (see n. 58) in 1965.

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on its noticeable periodization. He enumerates five motives for the first lot of—"positive"—post-war literature about the church struggle: historical, hagiographical, apologetic, political, and theological (though they merge at times). He gives two for the revisionist wave: the desire for historical accuracy and the desire to affect politics;[16] and one for the "remarkable omission in all of this literature . . . the lack of any thorough analysis of the policies advanced and adopted in the ranks of the Nazi hierarchy on the future place of the churches in the Third Reich."[17] He quite rightly finds this omission "all the more remarkable in view of the fact that throughout the whole Third Reich the initiative lay with the Nazis. Their determination to enforce their will on all aspects of German life was decisive."[18] In other words: The Nazi regime *was* totalitarian. And this fact *has*, strangely enough, tended to be overlooked by the revisionists of the 1960's.

The reason Conway gives for this does not fully explain such forgetfulness—forgetfulness concurrent with a continuing and flourishing literature on the Nazis and their wickedness. But actually the whole concept of totalitarianism as applied to the Nazis began to be called into doubt—explicitly sometimes, more often implicitly. For one thing, it kept being coupled with authoritarianism and was often treated as a synonym of it. For another it was undermined by the belated discovery that the Nazis were not operating in a void, that there *were* other participants in the drama they dominated, and that these other participants were not *mere* victims: that it was not a *simple* story of black and white, and that the Nazi villains and their victims did not really measure up to the mythological grandeur attributed to them—that, indeed, both were only human. Yet the term totalitarianism is still useful and applicable.

The reason Conway gives for the ignoring of the Nazi initiative in the matter of church policy or persecution is the inaccessibility of the Nazi records that reveal it. There is something in that. They were for the most part in American or other Allied custody and have been released to German archives only in recent years. Until released—and simultaneously made available on microfilm—the documents of the SS, for instance, were not as accessible as they are now.

But what about the Nuremberg trials? The documents assembled for them included a vast and convincing amount on the Nazi persecution of the churches. The trials took place in the 1940's. Much of the docu-

[16] That is, to counteract the influence of the clergy, to curb the Christian Democrats, to turn voters away from them. Whom these would turn *to* seemed less clear.

[17] Conway, xvii. [18] *Ibid.*, xxix.

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mentation was published—but much was not. In the passages of his book that are specifically concerned with persecution—despite its title the book does not deal only with that—Conway draws heavily on the Nuremberg documents, the published and the unpublished ones. His charge against Friedländer is that he did not use and in some cases deliberately overlooked Nuremberg documents that do not fit his indictment of Pius XII. "These documents," Conway writes, "can be easily found in the microfilms. . . . In his discussion of German-Vatican relations, Friedländer has omitted the vast majority of these representations [i.e., by the Vatican to the German government] and has referred only to certain unsuccessful gestures by the Nuncio—an omission which conceals the range and extent of the interventions made by the Vatican throughout the years of Nazi persecution. He has also chosen to overlook the most significant of the papal protests, which, despite his contention, are to be found in the sources he used. This arbitrariness in selection is matched by a bias in interpretation which extends even to the various editions of this book."[19]

Selection, interpretation, translation—these operations are interrelated, but can be discussed separately. It will be found that interpretation often comes first and influences both selection and translation.

Lest this last problem, that of translation, be underestimated, it may as well be taken first. We are dealing with a situation in which virtually all the source material is in German or some other non-English language. The scholarly practice of giving quotations in the original, though perhaps in translation as well, seems to have been abandoned for these books that are aimed at the general educated reader or even at the student or the specialist who is not a linguist.[20] This puts a great responsibility on the translator. The reader rarely has a means of checking; he is apt just to read. Friedländer bases himself largely on the German diplomatic documents, of some of which a government-sponsored Anglo-American translation exists—but, then, even government-sponsored translators are not infallible.[21] His book appeared first

[19] *Ibid.*, 449-50.

[20] Zahn, in his earlier book (see n. 13) made an exception by providing long footnote quotations in German. In his later book on Jägerstätter he gives only the translated texts—but then Jägerstätter's own writings form one-eighth of the book and appear as Appendix 1. There is a German translation of that book, with the documents in the original: *Er folgte seinem Gewissen. Das einsame Zeugnis des Franz Jägerstätter.* Verlag Styria (Graz-Wien-Köln 1967).

[21] In the series *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945*, published by the British and American governments in London and Washington, D.C. The publication of the Anglo-American translations preceded that of the originals, of which a number of volumes exist under the title *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik*, published in Baden-Baden and later in Bonn, 1950——.

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in French, then in German—where the documents could be reinstated in the original—then in English. The English and American editions appeared late enough to take the German edition into account and not to have to rely on the *French* text of German documents like Pius XII's letter of 30 April 1943 to the Bishop of Berlin. Yet we read, "To non-Aryan Catholics as well as those of the Jewish faith, the Holy See has acted charitably, within the limits of its responsibilities, on the material and moral plane."[22] This accords with the image, created by Hochhuth, of the pope washing his hands, Pilate-like, of the whole ghastly business, as being outside his responsibility. The French had "dans la mesure de ses responsabilités, une action charitable sur le plan matériel ou moral."[23] But the original said: "Für die katholischen Nichtarier wie auch für die Glaubensjuden hat der Heilige Stuhl caritativ getan, was nur in seinen Kräften stand, in seinen wirtschaftlichen und moralischen."[24] That means: "The Holy See did whatever was in its economic and moral power for the care of. . . ." (or "to care for. . . .") The substitution of "responsibility" for "power" happened in Friedländer's own French version; the rest of the change came with the English translation.

Pius XII wrote this letter in German. He always used that language with great, almost obsessive, precision, as is shown in the successive drafts of letters published by the Vatican in its series *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale*, notably volume II, *Lettres de Pie XII aux évêques allemands 1939-1944*. The letters to the German bishops were also published in the documentary series of the Catholic Academy in Bavaria but did not, some reviews notwithstanding, need to be translated. It is only the editorial apparatus that is French in one case, German in the other.[25]

Multi-lingual undertakings, books in which the author writes in a language other than that of his sources, make special demands on publishers, editors, or authors; it does not matter too much who bears the responsibility, but someone—author, translator, or publisher—must. It may be only a place-name that goes wrong, as in a confusion of Belzec and Belsen.[26] But even that can mislead. The importance

[22] Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich*, 141.
[23] Friedländer, *Pie XII et le IIIe Reich*, 135.
[24] Friedländer, *Pius XII. und das Dritte Reich*, 102.
[25] See below, notes 36 and 37.
[26] The Anglo-American edition of Friedländer says (126): "Gerstein was at the Belsen [Belzek] camp." The translator seems to have taken these for alternative forms of the same name. But Belsen was in Western Germany, Belzec in occupied Poland. The German edition—see n. 24, p. 93—has "Belsen," the French the correct "Belzec." See n. 23, p. 123.

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of the document now known as the Gerstein report[27] lay in the fact that it came from the East (i.e., Belzec). In order to ascertain what exactly was happening there, Kurt Gerstein, a devout Protestant and enemy of the regime, joined the SS and worked his way into an appropriate position. The secrecy surrounding the camps in the East, the main extermination centers, was far greater than that in the West. All that was known *for certain* was that people were *deported* to the East. (When Lichtenberg was interrogated by the Gestapo, he always and only spoke of the *evacuation* of the Jews and his opposition to it.)[28]

Lewy uses diocesan archives and other unpublished sources, but fortunately also a lot of published ones (for instance those published in Hans Müller's collection of documents, *Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1930-1935*).[29] Until the German versions of such books are available,[30] we are bound to wonder, quite often, what *exactly* the original quotation said, though some of the time we can guess with fair assurance. Most often it is a matter of nuances that may be at issue, but of course when they are wrong they too may mislead, especially in cumulation. This is the besetting trouble with Lewy's single-minded indictment. Sometimes more goes wrong than mere nuances.

Sometimes a translator cannot even be blamed for mistranslation because certain things are, strictly speaking, untranslatable. In the case of the Nazi period there are quite a lot of such things. Even the redoubtable Baynes could not really cope with a key sentence like that uttered by Hitler in his parliamentary speech for the Enabling Bill on 23 March 1933: "Die nationale Regierung sieht in den beiden Konfessionen wichtigste Faktoren zur Erhaltung unseres Volkstums." The sentence was frequently quoted in the subsequent struggle of the church. The very difficulty of translating it shows the inherent

[27] The "Gerstein report," as it is now known, was written on 4 May 1945. See "Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 1 (April 1953), 177-94. During the war Gerstein tried to communicate something like it, or its main contents, to people, including the papal nuncio in Berlin and a Swedish diplomat, who might, he hoped, help make the extermination program known and get it stopped. He met with no success. He is one of the heroes of Hochhuth's play, the other being a fictitious disobedient Jesuit who opposes the Pope and becomes the *real* deputy of Christ.

[28] Cf. Alfons Erb, *Bernhard Lichtenberg, Domprobst von St. Hedwig zu Berlin* (5th edition, Berlin 1968), 83ff.

[29] Hans Müller, *Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1930-1935* (München 1963).

[30] E.g., Guenter Lewy, *Die katholische Kirche und das Dritte Reich* (München 1965). It is a pity the German version does not state whether in all cases of quotation original texts were reinstated or how much retranslation there is, with its attendant risks.

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ambiguities. Baynes reproduced the "authorized English translation." Its "nationality" for *Volkstum* may be the best one can do, yet it hardly conveys the same thing. *Konfessionen* were better translated "denominations." The "authorized translation" reads thus: "The National Government regard the two Christian Confessions as the weightiest factors for the maintenance of our nationality."[31] For "weightiest factors" it might have put "most important agencies." It could not have put *Volkstum* into adequate English. But to have left it in German might have given the author or the authorizers away. What Hitler meant to *convey* was: "The new coalition government I head is *for* the churches and regards them as a good thing for the people." What he really meant was something like: "We do not want to forego the support or toleration of the churches at this stage. Let them think we have nothing against them and—who knows—perhaps we can make use of them. We certainly need the votes of the Center Party for the Enabling Bill and we do not want to alienate people, Protestant or Catholic, at home or abroad, who still like to think of Germany as a Christian country."

Overtones and echoes matter too in a text and in a translation. The American version of *The Deputy* has the Shavian motto, "Beware of the man whose god is in the skies."[32] That is quite innocuous and just like George Bernard Shaw. The German motto is "Hüte dich vor dem Menschen, dessen Gott im Himmel ist."[33] Hochhuth cannot be blamed for the ambiguity—the German word *Himmel* has to serve for both "heaven" and "sky." But in German Hochhuth got an audible overtone of a parody of the Lord's Prayer that Shaw did not have. When Hochhuth's pope finally appears, after a long buildup, in Act Four of *The Deputy*, he says, "We are filled with burning concern for Italy's factories. / Power plants, railroad terminals, dams, indeed every enterprise / Stands in imperative need of protection."[34] In German this was ". . . von brennender / Sorge um Unsere Fabriken erfüllt. Auch Kraftwerke, Bahnhöfe, / Talsperren, *jeder Betrieb*, fordern gebieterisch Schutz."[35] The difference, again, is that the English is relatively innocuous if somewhat scurrilous, but the German has a snide echo of the first words of Pius XI's famous anti-Nazi encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*. To use them to show Pius XII preoccupied with

[31] Norman H. Baynes, ed., *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, 1922–39* (Oxford 1942), I, 371.
[32] Rolf Hochhuth, *The Deputy*, 13.
[33] Rolf Hochhuth, *Der Stellvertreter. Schauspiel* (Reinbek bei Hamburg 1963), 15.
[34] Hochhuth, *The Deputy*, 195.
[35] Hochhuth, *Stellvertreter*, 155-56, italics in original.

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capitalist calculations just suits Hochhuth's cabaret. There was nothing the translators could do to keep it at that level of wit.

Excessive literalness in a translation can be a bore—but freedom, especially in such sensitive matters of motivation, morals, and conscience as are at stake in the literature about the church conflict, is apt to traduce. It is harmless for Conway to use the word "Nazi" in translated German pronouncements when the original obviously had National Socialist (i.e., the noun or adjective *Nationalsozialist* or *nationalsozialistisch*)—harmless because the reader recognizes the substitution; and yet he thereby loses the pretension to solemnity, the ideological and almost religious claim one heard—and was meant to hear—in the term National Socialist.

Often, of course, there simply is no exact English equivalent for a German term. But a rather odd, and perhaps significant, failure or refusal to use the English equivalent where it exists occurs in Zahn's book about Jägerstätter. Zahn reproduces what Jägerstätter wrote down as he tried to clear his mind about what he should do. The basic choice that emerged was that between the people's community and the communion of saints. Jägerstätter decided that the latter was infinitely more important than the former and worth dying for when they were in conflict. Again there is a German word that does not distinguish, *Gemeinschaft—Volksgemeinschaft* and *Gemeinschaft der Heiligen*—while in English one can and usually does distinguish. Yet Zahn, while believing in saints (in fact obviously out for the beatification of his hero), translates *Gemeinschaft der Heiligen* as "community of saints." This may be symptomatic. The critics of the church, both members and nonmembers, tend to disregard the significance of sacraments in the Christian and especially the Catholic scheme of things. They do not differentiate between community and communion.

The risks of translation are absent, or left to the reader, when documents are reproduced in their original language. The series of documents the Vatican began to publish from its own archives in 1965[36] avoids the risk but requires of the reader a knowledge of Latin, Italian, French, German, and a little English. In view of the excellence

[36] Pierre Blet, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider, eds., *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965——).

I. *Le Saint Siège et la guerre en Europe, mars 1939—août 1940* (1965).
II. *Lettres de Pie XII aux évêques allemands 1939–1944* (1966).
III. *Le Saint Siège et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes 1939–1945* (in two parts, 1939–1941 and 1942–1945. Both published in 1967).
IV. *Le Saint Siège et la guerre en Europe, juin 1940—juin 1941* (1967).

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of the introductions to these volumes, which, like the entire editorial apparatus, are in French, even a reader of French who has only a smattering of the other languages can derive benefit from this publication. It is a model of meticulous editorship. For a reader of German there are the *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte* of the Catholic Academy in Bavaria.[37] They come in two series, one documentary and one monographic and incorporating a great deal of original research. Unfortunately there is so far only one monograph relating to the Nazi period, or rather its prelude and first eighteen months. It is by the Jesuit Ludwig Volk, draws on Cardinal Faulhaber's papers—by no means uncritically—and a wealth of other material and impresses the serious reader by its historical application and judiciousness. These series too began in 1965, two decades after the war, two years after the Hochhuth play. There may be a connection there, not necessarily only with the play and the excitement it caused, but more probably with the somewhat earlier onset of the tide of criticism from among the faithful of the conduct of the Catholic church and its representatives in the Nazi era. The first public harbinger was an article in the Catholic monthly *Hochland*, indicting the German episcopate for selling the pass and giving aid and comfort to the regime in 1933, in the first months of consolidation of its power.[38] But neither series of publications represents a hasty incursion into the polemical battle that started then.[39]

[37] *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte bei der Katholischen Akademie in Bayern*. Herausgegeben von Konrad Repgen (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1965——). Reihe A: Quellen:

Der Notenwechsel zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und der deutschen Reichsregierung. I. *Von der Ratifizierung des Reichskonkordats bis zur Enzyklika "Mit brennender Sorge."* Bearbeitet von Dieter Albrecht (Mainz 1965).

Die kirchliche Lage in Bayern nach den Regierungspräsidentenberichten 1933–1943. I. *Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern.* Bearbeitet von Helmut Witetschek (Mainz 1966).

———. II. *Regierungsbezirk Ober- und Mittelfranken.* Bearbeitet von Helmut Witetschek (Mainz 1967).

Die Briefe Pius' XII. an die deutschen Bischöfe 1939–1944, Herausgegeben von Burkhart Schneider in Zusammenarbeit mit Pierre Blet und Angelo Martini (Mainz 1966).

Akten deutscher Bischöfe über die Lage der Kirche. I. *1933-1934.* Bearbeitet von Bernhard Stasiewski (Mainz 1968).

Reihe B: Forschungen:

vol. 1. Ludwig Volk, *Der bayerische Episkopat und der Nationalsozialismus 1930–1934* (Mainz 1965).

[38] Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933: eine kritische Betrachtung," *Hochland*, LIII (February 1961), 215-39.

[39] *Hochland* itself published a reply by Hans Buchheim, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahr 1933: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde," *ibid.* (August 1961), 497-515, and let Böckenförde have the last word in a second article, "Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933: Stellungnahme zu einer Diskussion,"

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All three series are solid, lasting stuff, adhering rigidly to scholarly practice, even in the matter of selection. The collection of Pius XII's letters to the German bishops is reproduced in full and most tellingly includes variants and amendments, so that one can even to some extent trace the mental processes of that tortured man in some detail. The same applies to other collections of documents in the Vatican series: one on the Holy See and the war, which goes from March 1939, when Pius XI died and was succeeded by Eugenio Pacelli as Pius XII, to August 1940; another one on the war in Europe, extending from June 1940 to June 1941; and one on the Holy See and the religious situation in Poland and the Baltic countries from 1939 to 1945. Where, in the documentary volumes of the Catholic Academy in Bavaria, something is missing, the reader is told and given reasons and suitable indications. The exchange of notes between the Holy See and the German government from the ratification of the Concordat to the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* (i.e., 1933-1937) is most illuminating on Pacelli as Cardinal Secretary of State, before he bore the responsibilities and restraints of the pontificate.

As Dieter Albrecht points out in his introduction, like Leo XIII before him, Pacelli did not proclaim an absolute indifference of the church toward the different forms of government, but postulated certain clear and important preconditions, namely, that not only the rights of the church, but the rights of God and the Christian conscience, must be safeguarded. He used his notes to point out the political teachings of the church as well as generally binding moral standards, and to compare and contrast German realities with these norms.[40] The notes show his sharp reactions to the German church struggle. They keep comparing what the German government was saying with what it was doing or allowing to be done. He also used them to rebut charges made by the government against the church.

In all this he was greatly helped by the information supplied by the German bishops, especially Count Preysing, bishop first of Eichstätt, then of Berlin, and the most resistant member of the German episcopate, though his opposition was attended by less publicity than was that of his cousin Count Galen, the bishop of Münster. The volume of later letters from Pius XII to the German bishops makes it clear that Preysing received far more correspondence than any of his

ibid., LIV (February 1962), 217-45. A summary of the controversy up to 1961 with references to related literature, can be found in Beate Ruhm von Oppen, "Catholics and Nazis in 1933," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, XVI (January 1962), 8.

[40] *Der Notenwechsel*, see n. 37, xxii-xxiii.

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colleagues; also, the Pope praised his outspoken stand for the rule of law and even-handed justice.

Berlin was an interesting place. It was the national capital but had only a small proportion of Catholics, part of the diaspora. On the one hand it had the most oppositional bishop—but his bishopric belonged to the archdiocese of a much more irenical older man, Cardinal Bertram of Breslau, the chairman of the Conference of German Bishops. On the other hand it was the seat of an outspokenly "collaborationist" nuncio, Cesare Orsenigo.

The German edition of the letters of Pius XII to the German bishops includes some items in its appendix that are not contained in the appendix of the original Vatican volume, and they are given in the original Italian and a German translation. The most interesting among them are extracts from Orsenigo's reports from Berlin in which he deplored the opposition of the German clergy to the Nazi regime and its failure to support the war and expressed a fear of a consequent alienation of the people from the church. This refractory attitude of the clergy, he argued, was being carefully watched by the government and was leading to measures against the church and to its rejection by the people who understood the distinction between anti-Nazi and anti-state attitudes while domestic policy was at stake, but who found it much harder to understand how one could, now that it was a matter of foreign policy, be against Hitler without being against the state, without being a traitor to the country. "I consider it my duty," he wrote on 13 April 1940, "to point out that a part of the clergy has adopted an almost openly hostile attitude towards a Germany at war which goes as far as a desire for a complete defeat. This attitude of the clergy, which unfortunately remains no secret, arouses not only the displeasure of the government, but gradually also that of the entire people, as the people are almost all of them enthusiastic for their leader; and therefore I fear that a painful reaction will follow one day which will isolate the clergy and even the church from the people."[41] It does seem, though, to have remained a secret from postwar scholars.

Despite the fact that he was a deplorable figure, a kind of clerical Nevile Henderson—which, however, does not necessarily make Pius XII a Neville Chamberlain—Orsenigo may well have been right in his

[41] *Die Briefe Pius XII*, see n. 37, 355-56. On 10 July 1940 he reported that so far scarcely a Catholic priest—in contrast to the Protestant pastors—had thought it necessary to hold a thanksgiving service for the numerous and big lightning victories of the German Wehrmacht or to hold a service for the fallen. But now this was being remedied in some places (357).

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assessment of the chances of mass apostasy *unless* the clergy appeased the regime and relieved members of the church of a conflict of conscience to which they were not equal. His assessment was certainly closer to the truth than the assumption that Germany's Roman Catholics—about one-third of the total population—were like so many divisions that the Pope could throw into battle against Hitler. The higher clergy were not in favor of another *Kulturkampf*—an open war with an opponent who would stick at nothing. Hitler was not Bismarck, nor was his Germany the same as that of the 1870's. Hitler himself was determined not to make the mistakes Bismarck had made in his fight against the Catholic church. To Rauschning he said, "Bismarck was a fool. In other words he was a Protestant. Protestants don't know what a church is."[42] He thought the Catholic clergy would be too intelligent to enter upon a hopeless struggle with his regime: "But if they do, I shall certainly not make martyrs of them. I shall brand them as ordinary criminals."[43]

Whenever it seemed opportune, this was done, particularly in waves of criminal trials for sexual offences and infringements of currency regulations, which Goebbels exploited for all their propaganda value, regardless of their outcome. They did not always end as the regime wanted them to. There were impartial and fearless judges left in Germany—a fact from which the Protestant clergy also benefited when it came into conflict with party zealots.

All this campaign of exposure and vilification was intended to destroy the loyalty felt by Catholics for their clergy and especially for the members of religious orders. The two volumes on the church situation in Bavaria[44] show something of the extent to which it was and was not possible to foment popular "indignation" by these methods, or rather, to direct it against its intended victims.

These volumes, which cover the period from 1933 to 1943, make clear in their title that they are based on the reports made by the *Regierungspräsidenten*, the provincial administrators, to the central government. These dealt with all kinds of subjects, and only the bits that are relevant to the situation of the churches have been published here. There is material on the Protestants as well as the Catholics and a useful little background sketch on the complicated structure and struggle of the Protestant church. Dots indicate omissions.

[42] Hermann Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations with Adolf Hitler on His Real Aims.* (London 1939), 59.
[43] *Ibid.*, 60.
[44] See n. 37.

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Friedländer needs no dots because his book is not a collection of documents but a "documentation," i.e., a selection of documents or parts of documents, with commentary. There has been trouble with dots in the past and a certain amount of pots calling kettles black. Lewy, for instance, demolishes Neuhäusler, the compiler of one of the first collections and the first *big* collection of documents (or documentation?) on the conflict between the Catholics and the Nazi regime:[45] "It is symptomatic of the boldness with which some Catholic writers after 1945 have falsified important documents from the Nazi period that this passage is omitted by Auxiliary Bishop Neuhäusler, without the customary indication of an ellipsis. . . ."[46] The bold bishop, be it said, had only just been liberated after four years in Dachau concentration camp and never was a scholar or historian. He had felt the urge immediately after the war to make known what the Nazis had suppressed. The passage here referred to that *he* suppressed is a sentence that reads: "Catholic Christians, to whom the voice of their church is sacred, do not require at this time a special admonition to be loyal to the lawful authorities and to fulfill conscientiously their civic duties while rejecting on principle all illegal or subversive conduct."[47]

This sentence came in the context of the pastoral letter issued by the Bishops' Conference at Fulda on 28 and 29 March 1933, a few days after the passage of the Enabling Bill and Hitler's speech promising recognition of the rights of the churches. The pastoral letter did its best to pin him to those promises, given in his dual capacity as chancellor and authoritarian[48] leader of the National Socialist movement. The whole document is shot through with caution—as shown, for instance, in the replacement of "the episcopate trusts" by "the episcopate believes it may trust"[49] and maintains a very delicate balance of trust/mistrust and loyalty/reserve as between the government (lawful authority) and the Nazi movement (no such thing).

In a way, and quite apart from the question of deliberate or inadvertent misrepresentation with or without dots, this pastoral letter[50]

[45] Johann Neuhäusler, *Kreuz und Hakenkreuz. Der Kampf des Nationalsozialismus gegen die katholische Kirche und der kirchliche Widerstand* (München 1946).

[46] Lewy, 354.

[47] *Ibid.*, 40; and Johann Neuhäusler, *Saat des Bösen: Kirchenkampf im Dritten Reich* (München 1964), 156. This book is a shorter account of the church struggle, with fewer documents.

[48] The German has *autoritär*, of which "authoritarian" seems a better translation than Lewy's "authoritative," for which there would be another German word.

[49] Hans Müller—see n. 29, p. 77.

[50] *Ibid.*, 76-78, where the draft and final version can be compared.

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is a good example of the verbal infighting that took place in the undeclared war between the Movement and the churches. Almost all the documents, of both sides, need careful examination and constant awareness of their wider and narrower context; when the context is not known, there has to be habitual watchfulness for ambiguities. The people who uttered or received the messages we now read were aware of the ambiguities, of the double or multiple meaning of a formulation as well as its primary and secondary intention. It is a feature of despotic times that things have to be said deviously and even by silence. (Zahn, comparing Jägerstätter with Thomas More, comments on the significance of More's maintaining his silence in opposition to his king.[51] Such silence can be eloquent in all seasons of tyranny.) In those times those messages *are* understood. It simply will not do for the beneficiaries of freedom to come after the event and either to disregard the ambiguities and veiled communications or to pick out one of the meanings of a deliberately ambiguous utterance and that *not* the one meant to be conveyed (with as much benefit and immunity as possible in the circumstances) at the time of the transaction, but one that fits a later case.

Much of the conflict about the church conflict has been of that kind. People have picked out not only the documents but parts of documents, even parts of meanings of single sentences or of words, that suited them. It has happened on all sides, but on the whole the critics of the church have been the greater offenders. Of course the church needs scrutiny and deserves criticism, but there is all the difference in the world between that and psychological warfare or propaganda.

Take a *very* small matter, a conjunction, the explicit or implicit presence of a "however." In his account of the same pastoral letter, after quoting the sentence about the rejection of "all illegal or subversive conduct" for whose unsignalled omission he and others have trounced Neuhäusler, Lewy goes on in paraphrase: "The admonition to all Catholics, the declaration continued, to work for the tranquility and well-being of the people. . . ." Müller had reproduced the draft and the final version of the document side by side, together with the comments and suggestions of the Bishop of Limburg. Again, as in the case of successive versions of papal pronouncements, this helps us to follow the cogitations involved. In this case the Bishop of Limburg suggested the insertion of a "however" in the first of the three paragraphs on the continuing validity of earlier admonitions and appeals.[52]

[51] Gordon Zahn, *Jägerstätter*, 177.
[52] Hans Müller—see n. 29, p. 77.

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It would have set them off against the preceding we-believe-we-may-trust-the-chancellor-and-therefore-lift-some-prohibitions clause. But collectively the bishops evidently felt or consented to the argument that it would have set them off *too* clearly. An explicit "however" would have been too clear a signal to the regime. An implicit one remained and was sufficient for the faithful, but less provocative. Lewy omits the implication and simply says "the declaration continued." In such and similar ways indictments can be built up but little light will be shed on what the struggle was about and how it was conducted.

What harm is there in a good rollicking indictment? Not much, provided it is presented as such. We could then hope for the polemical pendulum to swing this way and that indicating something like the truth somewhere in between. But questions of faith and conduct, of what men live by and will die for, do not lend themselves to clarification by polemic. Reinhold Niebuhr said that "pluralism must necessarily include the right of non-believers to convict the believers when faith is not fruitful of justice."[53] But, one must ask, convict them of what? Insufficient faith? Ineffectualness? Impotence in an unjust polity? Or incompatibility of faith with justice? As long as these convictions are kept distinct, a just appraisal is possible. The moment they are mixed, it becomes impossible.

Another small matter, to show how disregarding or ignoring the differing linguistic usage of the times takes the drama out of their exchanges. Still in his discussion of the episcopal letter of March 1933, Lewy refers to the church's renewed appeal for continued support for the Catholic organizations whose work, he paraphrases the letter, is so full of blessing for "Church, people and fatherland."[54] The point never made in his book is that the phrase he put (why?) in quotation marks was even then, and increasingly later, used in *distinction* to other terms, like the Führer and the National Socialist Movement, more dear to Nazi hearts. In the end, in the later stages of the war, dissent could even be seen in obituaries of soldiers who had died for *Volk und Vaterland*, rather than for the *Führer*.

This may sound like hairsplitting. But it was by such split hairs that friend and foe recognized each other while the conflict was on. There is a secret and still unpublished report[55] of Himmler's internal intel-

[53] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Man's Nature and His Communities: Essays on the Dynamics and Enigmas of Man's Personal and Social Existence* (New York 1966), 18.

[54] Guenter Lewy, 40.

[55] It is going to be published in a forthcoming volume in Reihe A: Quellen, of the *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte bei der Katholischen Akademie in Bayern* which will be edited by Dr. Heinz Boberach of the German Federal Archives

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ligence agency complaining—the year was 1936—of the havoc wrought among National Socialist values by the use by enemies, such as political Catholics, of cautious formulations and arguments that looked like Nazi arguments. There probably was a certain amount of reciprocal havoc-wreaking too. But on the whole the tactics of linguistic infiltration served the guerrilla opponents better than the regular Nazi battalions. It was the perennial complaint of Heydrich's watchdogs that the Catholic clergy gave them too little, legally, to bite on while all the time steadily and stealthily inciting their flocks against the regime. Clergy who endorsed the regime as fully as Lewy would lead one to believe the vast majority did, were rare enough to be referred to by Heydrich's spies as "white ravens."[56] This is not to say that with diligence one cannot assemble an aviary of white ravens. Lewy was diligent. Still—white is not the natural color of the species raven.[57]

What one finds, of course, also depends on what one is looking for. But one does not have to look far in the files of the Party and police agencies or, for that matter, in those of the Reich Chancellery, to see evidence of hostility of the Party and regime to the churches, or that the hostility was justified, and that the power to do something about it was overwhelmingly held by the regime. Conway has now brought that out quite clearly. One may wish that he had made it easier for the general reader to keep the Protestants and Catholics distinct in his mind. Conway devotes more space to the Protestants, as befits their greater number, and mostly the attentive reader can see what church is being discussed. But there are moments when transitions from one to the other may not be noticed or, to the non-specialist, may even be unnoticeable. Yet there is great benefit to be derived from having the struggle by and with both churches dealt with in one book again. It would be wrong to say that they were separately but equally persecuted. The approaches by and to them were different—for one thing,

in Koblenz. For microfilm see *Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va., No. 39, Records of the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police (Part III)*, (Washington 1963), 136: National Archives Microcopy T-175, Roll 462, frame 2980982-2981070.

[56] See *Die Kirchliche Lage*, 1,—see n. 37—174 and 282, reports of May 1937 and 1938 respectively, the first on Protestants, the second on Catholics.

[57] It is nothing short of tragic that the immense industry of which Lewy's book gives evidence should have resulted in a book so right in many details and so wrong in many of its assessments and, particularly, in its overall balance. Of course some of the points at issue *are* matters of opinion and I am aware of the possibility that sometimes I may have overemphasized an aspect that was underemphasized before. All I can say is that Lewy's picture strikes one agnostic observer as a misrepresentation of what went on in the matter of the Catholic church and Nazi Germany.

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the Catholics were doctrinally more proof against perversion than the Protestants. The Party was rightly more suspicious of the Catholics *as* Catholics.

If clergy supporting the regime were rare enough in Bavaria to be referred to as "white ravens," things were no different at the national level, as can be seen in Friedrich Zipfel's *Kirchenkampf in Deutschland 1933-1945*.[58] That book devotes about half its space to a history of the persecution and resistance or adaptation (he uses the interesting word *Selbstbehauptung*) of the churches in the Nazi era and the other half to documents, most of them previously unpublished and most of them from government or party sources. SS intelligence saw church antagonism to Nazism as the rule, acceptance as the very rare exception. A *Lagebericht* of the central security office for May/June 1934[59] reports on both churches and devotes almost eight times as much space to trouble with the Catholics as with the Protestants; it was made (though the fact is not mentioned) at a time when some leading Catholic laymen, notably the head of the Catholic Action, Erich Klausener, had just been murdered by the SS. Here again there is a lot of complaining about church camouflage.

But the camouflage of the joint episcopal letter of 26 June 1934 (reproduced by Müller),[60] for instance, was not such that it could not be penetrated by a scholar of the 1960's. Yet we fail to find in Lewy's book a fair evaluation of its attack on the substitution of racism for the "Jewish" ten commandments; nor does he seem to appreciate the significance of the bishops' strictures on the propagation of an "ethnic" morality ("that is moral which benefits the people or the race") in place of the divine commandments—engraved as natural law "on the tablets of the human heart" or revealed in holy scripture or taught by the church, the trustee of revelation, as commissioned by Christ. (There was not even a monopolistic claim: these three were given as alternatives.)[61] It is simply not true that the joint pastoral letter—and similar documents—"did not attack the Nazi party and its teachings but directed its criticism at the proponents and concepts of neopaganism."[62] The teachings of the Party—the one party in the one-party state—*were* attacked, and the attack on "neopaganism" is *not* to be dismissed so lightly as irrelevant to morality and politics or relevant

[58] Friedrich Zipfel, *Kirchenkampf in Deutschland 1933-1945. Religionsverfolgung und Selbstbehauptung der Kirchen in der nationalsozialistischen Zeit.* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965).
[59] Zipfel, 272-326.
[60] Müller, n. 29, 276-86. It was later withdrawn.
[61] *Ibid.*, 282.
[62] Lewy, 152 and elsewhere.

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only to the power politics of the papacy and the institution of the church of Rome.

Lewy may treat the issue of "neopaganism" as a private game of no great public relevance. The Gestapo thought otherwise. It is under such headings as "the fight against racialism," "denigration of Germanic-German history," or "championship of Judaism" (or Jewry: *Eintreten für das Judentum*, a term that means either or both) that the report (referred to above) of the Security Office deals with Catholicism, stating that "in the Reich [as distinct from Austria and other countries and the Vatican] the fight against the National Socialist ideology is not conducted openly. It is camouflaged as a fight against the 'neopaganism' of the *Deutschgläubige* [Germanic Believers—i.e., either the so-called German Christians or the openly *anti*-Christian *Deutsche Glaubensbewegung*]."[63] It makes it crystal clear that the regime saw "neopaganism" as a synonym for racism and attacks on it as attacks on the deification of race and the policies flowing therefrom. The report also refers to Catholic priests' outspoken disapproval of anti-Semitism.[64] All this is dealt with under section A.

Section B deals with the Catholic Action. Section C is devoted to the behavior of the clergy. Again, the report finds that the Pope (Pius XI; his successor, Pacelli, was secretary of state) expressed himself in ways that were, especially in the questions of race and youth, tantamount to an appeal to resistance against the National Socialist state. "At least," the report adds, "that is how they were understood by the Catholic public in Germany and abroad."[65] He was creating new distrust and new antagonism. Pilgrimages to Rome were increasing alarmingly and a Protestant participant in the Easter audience for three thousand Germans said that conversations showed strong opposition to National Socialism.[66] The bishops were no better, and their statements had recently become considerably sharper. Examples of individual bishops are mentioned. They include Hugo of Mainz—refusing to show the right flag and attacked for this by a roused rabble—Ehrenfried of Würzburg, Bares of Berlin, Gröber of Freiburg, Schulte of Cologne, Galen of Münster, and Faulhaber of Munich—whose occasional admonitions to the clergy to work with the state were insignificant when put against the inflammatory effect of his Advent and New Year's Eve sermons. (These sermons had already been critically referred to under the heading "Championship of Judaism" in

[63] Zipfel, 275. [64] *Ibid.*, 277-78. [65] *Ibid.*, 291.
[66] *Ibid.*, 292.

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section A. It would take too long to put beside this what Lewy has to say about these gentlemen and those sermons, but it is worth the exercise if one has the time. Of *course* there were variations. Especially Faulhaber was very variable and Gröber changed. But is *change* not to be registered and taken seriously? What matters is the truth or falseness of the general picture.)

The bishops, the report continued, showed their opposition to National Socialism especially in administrative measures often amounting to an interdict against National Socialist parishes.[67] As for the lower clergy, their opposition was so widespread in all parts of the Reich that a recital of single cases was impossible and unnecessary. A list was therefore made of the most essential and most frequent violations. Instruments of religious education were being misused for political purposes, especially sermons, confessionals, religious instruction, associations, and pastoral visits to people's homes. First in this list came attacks on Nazi ideology regarding race, anti-Semitism, and the leadership principle. Lower down came such things as attacks on the Hitler salute, the swastika, and the Horst Wessel song. All this comes in the first subsection, on "clerical opponents" (*gegnerische Geistliche*). Subsection 2, on "clerical sympathizers" (*sympathisierende Geistliche*), states that wholehearted sympathizers were exceedingly rare and were persecuted by their colleagues and superiors. The abbot Schachleitner was a case in point. (N.B.: he is one of the two smiling clerics shaking hands with Hitler, the Protestant Reich Bishop Müller being the other, with uniformed men heiling all around, on the dust cover—nicely ironical, for those who also read the title—of Conway's book.)

It may seem excessive to dwell at such length on these points of presentation and method and on what Nazi intelligence found to be the case. But it is by method and presentation that impressions have been created. How can one get beyond impressions, to the substance of the matter? The documents help—but they help only those who can and will read them. What questions are at issue? First, there is the question whether there was anything in the claim of one of the first historians of the struggle for religious freedom in Germany, A. S. Duncan-Jones, the Dean of Chichester, who saw that the Christian faith might *really* be the last defense of liberty and decency and who realized that the neopagans were not just harmless savages nor their creed and cult just a party game. In 1938 he wrote, "In the last resort, when violence had removed every political, economic, and material

[67] *Ibid.*, 292-94.

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obstacle, there would—as the racial mystics clearly perceived—be left one opponent that violence cannot subdue, because it is itself a mysticism claiming the totality of man's loyalty. That opponent is the faith that Protestants and Catholics hold in common, the faith that for two thousand years has in the cross and passion of Jesus Christ provided the ordinary man with his principal guarantee that reason, justice, and mercy ultimately prevail in a universe full of obscurity and cruelty." He countered a possible complaint that his book was "nothing but theology and ecclesiastical controversy" with the statement that "these things are the essence of the matter" and that "the fact that this is so may have a lesson for all of us."[68]

Then there is the question whether, on the political plane, the Catholic church was a force for peace or simply blessed all arms so that men would slaughter each other all the better. Or whether, if Pius XII *was*, as is now pretty generally accepted, doing all he could to maintain or restore peace, he was too ready to do it on German terms, that he was willing to settle for a *Pax Germanica*. And whether, finally, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was right when he wrote, as early as August 1933 (to his grandmother), that the question now really was Christianity or Germanism, that the sooner the conflict manifested itself openly, the better, and that its concealment (*Verschleierung*) was the most dangerous thing.[69]

It is undeniable that the church did not prevent the war or the mass murder of Jews—unarmed, captive non-combatants—during it. But what does that prove? Does it prove Lewy's thesis that the church should and could have not only recognized the diabolical nature of the Hitler regime the moment it came to power, but refused to have

[68] Duncan-Jones, see n. 12, pp. 7-8. Among "all of us" he may have wished to include the Anglican Bishop of Gloucester, who was most pronouncedly opposed to the Bishop and Dean of Chichester and their view of the German church struggle. In *his* view all the German churches needed to do to keep out of trouble was to recognize the separation of church and state as laid down by the regime—i.e., keep out of *politics*. This profound disagreement between the bishops of Chichester and Gloucester was not confined to them but put certain inhibitions on the English Primate too.

[69] Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Theologe, Christ, Zeitgenosse* (Christian Kaiser Verlag: München 1967), 354. This view was close to Duncan-Jones's, but actually went beyond it, and that in the first year of Hitler's power. Bonhoeffer was one of the Bishop of Chichester's principal sources of information on the church struggle in Germany, and probably the most important one. The parliamentary reports about proceedings in the House of Lords and the correspondence columns of *The Times* show the disagreements among the bishops of the Church of England on the subject. Cf. also Alfred Wiener, "Untersuchungen zum Widerhall des deutschen Kirchenkampfes in England (1933-38)," in Max Beloff, ed., *On the Track of Tyranny: Essays presented by the Wiener Library to Leonard G. Montefiore, O.B.E., on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday* (London 1960), 211-32.

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diplomatic dealings with it? When a concordat was offered by the new regime—which the Weimar Republic had consistently refused—should the Vatican have declined to enter into it? Admittedly it made the new regime look a bit more respectable in the international arena. But was the hope that it would *become* more respectable quite absurd in July 1933? The Vatican was not alone in misjudging the chances of that. And even assuming greater pessimism, was that sufficient reason for refusing the safeguards, the legal insurance, the diplomatic basis for subsequent conflict afforded by such an instrument? Hitler's refusal, later, in the war, to let it apply to annexed and occupied territories shows that where it did apply it did put certain restraints on his regime—or at least could prove irksome, as the published documents now bear out quite clearly.

Does it prove Lewy's even bigger thesis that the mass murder of the Jews of Europe "must be seen in the context of the still partially unresolved 2,000-year-old conflict between Church and Synagogue"[70]—with the strong implication that the context may amount to a causal connection? Certainly that context must be looked at. But within that context what is surely most relevant is the secularization, the weakening of both church and synagogue, in the decades preceding Hitler. Were Hitler's followers crusaders for the church? Were they not rather the products and proponents of secularization, of social Darwinism and biological materialism—sometimes called neopaganism? It was these post- and anti-Christian creeds or religions that set the machinery of murder in motion.

If Christians were unable to stop it, the questions are still completely open how anxious they were to do so and what they were willing to risk, what were the chances of success and what the more, what the less promising courses of action.

It was in the first half of 1938 that A. S. Duncan-Jones wrote about the faith that "provided the ordinary man with his principal guarantee that reason, justice and mercy ultimately prevail in a universe full of obscurity and cruelty."[71]

Those words were well chosen but they may lack persuasiveness on two grounds: The victory of reason, justice, and mercy looks too "ultimate"—after the summer of 1938, after Munich, things seem to have got worse, not better—and there is widespread skepticism about the Christian faith's really working *for* reason, justice, and mercy, and in particular for *reason*.

[70] Lewy, 268. [71] Duncan-Jones, 7-8.

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But if there is one thing the Nazi episode has shown, it is that people need a faith. If the Christian faith is absent or removed, another faith will take its place. That, also, is surely what the present malaise of the young is about. Absence of Christian faith plainly is no guarantee of rationality. On the contrary, that faith may, for Western man at least, provide a psychological precondition for the functioning of rationality. The Nazis were madly rational, or logical, about what they did, and as Bonhoeffer observed after ten years of Nazi rule, "The great masquerade of evil has wrought havoc with all our ethical concepts. For evil to appear disguised as light, beneficence, historical necessity, and social justice is simply bewildering to anyone brought up in the world of our traditional ethical concepts; but for the Christian who bases his life on the Bible, it precisely confirms the radical malice [*Bosheit*] of evil."[72]

The point that needs stressing here is that there *was* indeed an effective camouflage of evil—which was, to some extent and for the common run of people, disguised as benevolence and welfare. The point cannot be elaborated here. But it is valid and important. Bonhoeffer saw that ethics were not enough to resist that evil. Again, it would take too long to spell out his reasoning here.[73] It lies at the core of the question about the relevance of religion to resistance against Nazism.

If, in Duncan-Jones's words, the Christian faith "provided the ordinary man with his principal guarantee that reason, justice, and mercy ultimately prevail," did this guarantee apply only to the gentile? No. Where there was real Christianity, there was also a concentration of effort to help Jews. What the new paganism meant was that whatever sense the gentile-Christian equation ever may have made before, it certainly was obsolete now. Yet the old habit of equating persisted. It persists in Lewy who pooh-poohs neopaganism, it persists in all those who see Christianity as absurd and the churches as forces *mainly* of obscurantism, bigotry, and interest vested in the old order. That those features were and are present no one can deny. But the question surely was and is their relative importance compared with the danger threatening from the new pagans and compared with the good the

[72] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Widerstand und Ergebung. Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft.* Herausgegeben von Eberhard Bethge (München 1964), 10. My own translation. A revised English translation of this book is available as *Letters and Papers from Prison* (New York 1967). It still takes risks, occasionally, with key terms; but it is an improvement on the earlier unrevised edition. This passages comes on 2.

[73] The whole piece, "Nach zehn Jahren," ("After Ten Years") can be found on 9-25 of *Widerstand und Ergebung* and 1-17 of *Letters and Papers from Prison*, the most relevant section being the one entitled "Wer hält stand?" or "Who stands fast?" on pp. 10-12 and 2-4 respectively.

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churches did in preserving humanity when it was menaced as never before.

Some of these good works have been recounted in *Three Popes and the Jews*[74] by Pinchas Lapide, who came across samples of them while serving with the British Eighth Army in Italy. Twenty years later he was pained by the lack of recognition of the rescue activities of Catholics and the Vatican during the second World War, pained by the silence about Pius XII's help to Jews when Hochhuth had started the general clamor about his silence regarding their fate. This book is the result. It is a rather mixed book, torn between the desire to denounce anti-Semites of all epochs and the wish to vindicate those Christians who helped the Jews. Even in the case of John XXIII and the changes he introduced or accelerated, there remains a reservation because of insufficient endorsement of the state of Israel. Sometimes the objection is simply that Christians *will* be Christians, though at other times he makes it clear that it was precisely that that made them help Jews. As for Pius XII, he maintains that between 700,000 and 860,000 Jews were saved from deportation and death by his influence or intervention. Lapide deals with Hitler's Europe country by country. The nuncios were important intermediaries—and fortunately there was only one Orsenigo.

Lapide is a Jew and a journalist. The Austrian historian Friedrich Heer is a Catholic and a scholar. He has chosen to present the misery and carnage of our time as the manifestation of "ecclesiogenic neuroses" or even "metastases"—his medical metaphors escalate rather.[75] He could have taken up Lewy's question about the relevance of the two millennia of Judaeo-Christian coexistence and, with his immense learning, have helped to clarify what exactly happened in the last decades before Hitler. Medical jargon apart, there *is something* in what he says about the crisis in the relationship between the church and most people and about the place of the church in society. And if one can disregard the somewhat obtrusive sexology, he has a point that is worth discussing more seriously, about chastity and charity. But he

[74] Pinchas E. Lapide, *Three Popes and the Jews* (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1967).

[75] Friedrich Heer, *Gottes erste Liebe. 2000 Jahre Judentum und Christentum. Genesis des österreichischen Katholiken Adolf Hitler* (München 1967), 11. The first words of the first foreword—there are two, for the author felt the need to add another after the Middle Eastern war of June 1967—are "Mankind is exploding." Period. And that breathless style is kept up throughout. The second volume is called *Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler. Anatomie einer politischen Religiosität* (München: Bechtle Verlag, 1968).

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spoils it all in these two voluminous non-books[76] by ranting instead of reasoning. These two tomes on Christianity and the Jews and on the faith of Adolf Hitler produce their effect by compilation, incantation, and free—obsessively free—association. He manages to make the Jew-baiting Gauleiter Julius Streicher appear as the reincarnation of every other church father. He has as his *leitmotif* the necessary liquefaction or liquidation (whatever he may mean by these recurrent terms) of Christianity. He has set up a veritable industry to collect every instance or hint of anti-Judaism in two millennia of Christendom. He also presents a thesis of the essentially Austrian-Catholic genesis and nature of Adolf Hitler; but though he manages to sadden anyone familiar with his earlier work, he will also fail to convince anyone familiar with the historical facts he so determinedly disregards. And to what end? To bring home the horror of anti-Semitism? The truth would do that better than distortion and exaggeration. To castigate or to reform the church? To liquidate it?

It is a relief, to be sure, to see Hitler for once not treated as a Prussian or a German (after all he was naturalized only a year before he came to power). But Heer protests far too much when he finds the model of Hitler's every utterance and gesture in Austria, in Austrian Catholicism, or, if all else fails and he has to account for the dictator's anti-clericalism and anti-Christianism, in the Austrian monarch Joseph II. (Hitler himself was rather more partial to Julian the Apostate.) A much better case could be made for Hitler's spiritual genesis in Richard Wagner and for the birth of the European tragedy from the spirit of Wagnerian music-drama, a counter-religion and counter-cult to that of the church.

Although hostility to the Jews was central to Nazism, they were not the only victims of the war. Nor did the rest of the world put their rescue high on its list of war priorities. While the war was on, winning it was the Allies' first consideration. What happened inside Hitler's Europe was, with the exception of factors recognized as having a direct bearing on the enemy's war effort, of secondary interest. In all this the Vatican, watched and besieged by both sides, maintained an official neutrality while pleading for a mitigation of the horrors of the war.

According to Friedländer, the Pope's predilection for Germany "does

[76] The editor of *Der Spiegel* acclaimed the first as an "atom bomb." A third one has been announced.

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not appear to have been diminished by the nature of the Nazi regime" and "was not disavowed up to 1944."[77] That appearance is deceptive. Before Pacelli became Pope, most of his energy as secretary of state had been taken up by Germany. As Pope, he reserved to himself decisions concerning Germany, because of their importance. He paid close attention to that country and to the measures of its regime. It is hard to see how the head of a universal church could take sides with any belligerent or group of belligerents. It seems quite remarkable that he could not be brought to endorsing the war against Russia as a crusade. It is easy to see that he did indeed love Germany, where he had spent thirteen years as nuncio, and fear communism; he had witnessed the brief Soviet Republic in Bavaria and had other reasons too. But it is equally plain that he did not love the Nazis, except as a Christian must love all men. In fact so far did he depart from his neutrality during the war, that he allowed Vatican facilities to be used for contacts between anti-Nazi conspirators and the British government in an endeavor to restore peace—and a decent government in Germany—before Hitler embarked on his Western campaign and the war became a world war. This is now brought out with much substantiating detail by Harold C. Deutsch in *The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War*.[78]

The Pope's later opposition to the Allied doctrine of Unconditional Surrender was not due to a predilection for Germany but was prompted by considerations of the preconditions for a durable peace and possibly also by the fact that this Allied demand made it impossible for Hitler's revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) opponents to make proselytes among the military, who alone could remove the regime.

That, after all, was what the Protestant Dietrich Bonhoeffer's mission to Sweden in 1942 had been concerned with: to get George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, to ask the British government for a response to the group that was going to try and overthrow Hitler, the head of state and supreme commander of the German armed forces, in the middle of a war *à outrance*. Bonhoeffer was not there on church business. Nor was he out for the greater glory and aggrandizement of Germany. On the contrary, he was quite ready for a penitential foreign policy, a policy of atonement. But Hitler could not be removed

[77] Friedländer, see n. 3, p. 236.
[78] Harold C. Deutsch, *The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight War* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1968).

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from within Germany by penitence or by the substitution of Allied war aims for the will of God.

So much for the political plane. As for the spiritual and moral, it is easy enough to agree that Germanism is a bad thing. But is it true that Christianity was the only alternative? At the end it became quite clear that the Nazis thought so.

Conway is right to draw attention to the part played by Christianity —Protestant and Catholic—in the 20 July 1944 complex.[79] Both the investigations after the failure of the plot and the trials themselves stressed the religious component. The interrogation-reports on the conspirators and their associates kept coming back to headings like "confessional ties" and "political catholicism." This is a rather striking fact, strikingly de-emphasized in Lewy's slender chapter, "The Problem of Resistance."

In a last letter to his wife after he had been sentenced to death, Helmuth James von Moltke wrote, "In the final resort this emphasis on the religious area corresponds to the inner facts of the matter and shows that F. [i.e., Roland Freisler, the presiding judge of the People's Court] is a good political judge after all. This has the immense advantage that we shall be killed for something that (a) we have done and (b) is worthwhile."[80] He also found it rather funny but at the same time proper that he, the son of a staunch anti-Papist, should "die as a martyr for St. Ignatius Loyola." He had drawn Jesuits into the work of his circle. Alfred Delp, S.J., was sentenced to death with him.

At the climax of the trial Freisler had delivered himself of his famous dictum, "Christianity and we National Socialists have one thing in common, and one thing only: we claim the whole man."[81] It is very quotable. But was it true? Moltke at any rate thought so. He wrote, "So then all that is left is a single idea: how Christianity can prove a sheet anchor in time of chaos. And just for this idea five heads look like being forfeited to-morrow."[82] Was Freisler wrong? Was Moltke snatching at a comforting delusion? Freisler's consistency throughout these trials shows that at least what he said in January 1945 was no momentary flash of rhetoric. It is consistent with the "modesty" flaunted in August 1944, when he told a friend of Moltke's that the Party was perfectly willing to leave religion to the church, provided it concerned itself only with the other world, not this one. That was the position.

[79] Conway, 288-90.
[80] *A German of the Resistance: The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke* (Oxford 1948), 38.
[81] *Ibid.*, 47. [82] *Ibid.*, 40.

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But it was a position that it took most people a long time to see. Many sensed it long before they saw it clearly. They showed it in their actions, some of them "irrational," certainly imprudent by the standards of this world; and those who sensed it were by no means all active members of churches. It was this position that gave the churches a far larger and more attentive following than they had had before the Nazi challenge.

Conway deals with the responses of "churchmen" to the challenge of the time—ranging from adaptation or collaboration to resistance. But the wider congregation of the churches was perhaps just as important. Nor was it as incapable of seeing the difference between support of the regime and resistance to it as many of the recent critics of these imperfect institutions seem to be. Here Conway is far more fair. But even he sometimes applies criteria that are not entirely applicable and uses yardsticks for decimal measurements. It is not easy to provide appropriate conversion tables. The attempt must be made, however. Sometimes he makes it; but not always. For instance, he underestimates the psychological trauma of Versailles and its sequel. *Simply* to write it off as nationalism does not help in the clinical analysis of the causes of the catastrophe that ensued.

Also, in the case of Bonhoeffer, it is surely stretching a point to argue that his fate was proof of the implacable enmity of the Nazis towards the churches.[83] And that after Eberhard Bethge has, in his monumental biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, given such a wonderfully clear and detailed account of the man, his times, his actions, and his thinking, an account that is the greatest single contribution to an understanding of the struggle and what it was like and what it was about.[84] Implacable the enmity undoubtedly was—or placable only if the churches had completely abandoned their mandate. But Bonhoeffer died because he followed his own conscience—also about what that mandate was—and put his trust in God and joined the *political* conspiracy against the regime. His death may be an example of the consequences of the form the church's enmity to the regime should have taken; about the regime it proves only that it rightly called forth the enmity of such a man and such a churchman.

This is an illustration of what was said before about the larger congregation of the church. Here is Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the theologian and clergyman turned conspirator, actively engaged in the kind of

[83] Conway, 290.

[84] Bethge, *Bonhoeffer*. An English translation is in preparation. It will be an abridged version of the original, which will thus remain indispensable to specialists.

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plot aiming at tyrannicide, that Moltke, a layman and lawyer, would not join on account of Christian scruples as well as realistic reckonings. And it was Moltke who died, almost officially, for Christianity. It was in his circle that laymen and "churchmen," Protestant and Catholic, discussed the need for re-Christianizing Germany. It was Moltke who acknowledged in a letter to an English friend—Lionel Curtis, co-founder of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and author of a book called *Civitas Dei*—that he had been wrong to think he could manage politically without religious faith.[85] It was pastor Bonhoeffer who met the Bishop of Chichester in Sweden to give him a message for the British government from the German conspirators. There is surely some significance in this exchange of the usual roles of laity and clergy.

Both men died on the gallows of the regime they opposed, not long before the removal of the Hitler regime by military defeat. They were but two on a long list of casualties of resistance. The last months of the regime and of the war were more murderous than its earlier phases. Issues became clearer, though new confusions imposed themselves. But what Freisler said in the People's Court three weeks before he himself was killed by an Allied bomb was a truth or a postulate people were willing to accept then. Perhaps it was a truth as far as National Socialism was concerned: it did claim the whole man—and Jägerstätter once commented on the greater spirit of sacrifice among Nazis than among Christians. Only it had taken many years and many lives before this had become clear. And perhaps it was a postulate for those who would consider themselves Christians. Christianity, too, claims the whole man. What, then, can unbelievers convict believers of? Frivolity, perhaps—provided that they are not more frivolous themselves. It is true that the seriousness of the apocalyptic moment of 1945 was not kept up. It is true that the German catharsis remained incomplete. It is true that the credibility of Christians has waned again. But the criterion of that is not—*pace* Conway—what opponents of NATO say about "NATO bishops," or—despite Lapide—what champions of the state of Israel say about Vatican attitudes to the Middle Eastern conflict. It is not what foreign or domestic policy a Christian may consider right or least wrong. The criterion is why and how he does it.

The wave of revisionist literature about the religious struggle with and against the Nazis has helped to cloud the criteria. Conway's book may represent a beginning of a revision of revisionism. To get closer

[85] *A German of the Resistance*, 28.

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to the whole truth about the relationship of Nazis and Christians or the relevance of religion to politics in the Nazi era, it might be useful to go beyond "churchmen" and the institutions that have been studied and praised or indicted and to examine the role played in individual lives by the Judaeo-Christian faith and tradition—including their institutions—when the newest heathens vented their full fury on Western civilization. It may well be that criteria will be clarified by concentrating less on institutions and more on individuals.

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FOREIGN AID, INTERVENTION, AND INFLUENCE

By DAVID A. BALDWIN*

FOREIGN aid can be "related" to intervention in many ways. Some argue, with Senator J. W. Fulbright, that aid tends to precede intervention and to increase the probability of intervention.[1] Others would say that aid follows intervention, contending, for example, that American aid to Vietnam was evidence of a prior diplomatic commitment. Still others see aid as an alternative to intervention—if we give aid now we are less likely to have to intervene in the future. Another group would contend that the aid-giving process may *constitute* intervention.[2] It is with the views of this last group that most of this article deals. In examining them, we shall focus on three topics: (1) the links between foreign aid and influence; (2) the links between particular types of aid and what is often called intervention; and (3) the possibility of functional equivalents for aid that do not involve intervention. There are some conceptual problems, however, that we must address first.

I. The Concept of "Intervention"

Conceptual difficulties abound in thinking about the relationship of aid to intervention.[3] Although much has been written about intervention and "dollar diplomacy," most of these writings have employed a traditional concept of intervention that is too limited for use today. This traditional concept shares legalistic and military connotations with many other terms in the standard vocabulary of the student of international politics. The old definitions of intervention in terms of illegal military infringement of national sovereignty are simply inadequate at a time when non-military techniques of statecraft are be-

* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Conference on Intervention and the Developing States sponsored by the Princeton International Law Society, November 10-11, 1967. The author has benefited from comments on earlier drafts by Howard Bliss, Charles Frank, Christian Potholm, Laurence Radway, Richard Sterling, and W. Howard Wriggins.

[1] J. William Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York 1967), 232-37.

[2] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 27-92. See also Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York 1967).

[3] A thoughtful series of essays on the concept of intervention is found in the *Journal of International Affairs*, XXII, No. 2 (1968).

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coming increasingly important. Spokesmen for the developing states have found it frustrating to try to describe twentieth-century phenomena with a nineteenth-century vocabulary. They have resorted to such terms as "neo-colonialism," "economic imperialism," and the like, in an attempt to overcome some of these semantic obstacles.

How, then, should we proceed in a discussion of foreign aid and intervention? One way is to equate "intervention" with "influence."[4] This would have three advantages. First, almost everyone's definition of intervention would be included, since there is widespread agreement that intervention is a type of influence. Second, normative arguments that are unlikely to lead to agreement would be avoided. The breakdown in the consensus regarding what kinds of influence are legitimate and what kinds illegitimate often mires discussions of intervention in fruitless arguments over values. A third advantage of equating "intervention" with "influence" is that it helps us understand what the developing states are really complaining about. Reasonable and responsible leaders from developing nations have applied the label of "intervention" to almost every conceivable form of influence during the last twenty years. Only a very broad definition of intervention will allow us to discuss the matter in a way that is relevant to the concerns of these nations.

II. Foreign Aid and Influence

Although few would deny the connection between aid and influence, there is very little agreement on the precise nature of this connection or on analytical methods to be used in studying the problem. Some general questions about the aid-influence relationship need to be asked: What does it mean to say that aid is "political"? How can donors "control" their aid? Must aid be given in order to constitute intervention? Who wants this kind of intervention? Does the sword of intervention through aid cut two ways?

POLITICAL AID

Since the proposition that foreign aid is "political" is not self-explanatory, we would expect those who state it to explain it. Unfortunately, they rarely do. Lucian Pye, for example, alleges that Americans wrongly view their aid program as "inherently 'non-

[4] "Influence" is defined by Robert Dahl as "the ability of A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do." For elaboration on the use of this definition, see Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs 1963), 39-54.

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political.' "[5] He neglects to tell us precisely what this means, however.[6] Perhaps the most common meaning given to the proposition is that aid donors are motivated by self-interest, which in turn is usually equated with a desire to acquire power. Defining political aid in terms of motivation, however, can lead us to overlook important dimensions of the problem of intervention through aid. Must intervention be motivated by a desire to intervene or by other ulterior motives? The elephant who dances among the chickens may be accused of intervention regardless of his intentions. Likewise, many of the complaints of the developing states concern the effects of big powers' actions rather than the motivation for such actions. In the eyes of many developing states, the big powers intervene in their affairs simply by existing.[7]

Many of those who believe that foreign aid is political have in mind consequences rather than motivations of the donors' actions. Given the importance of wealth as a power base, it would be difficult to imagine a foreign aid transaction that did not change the distribution of influence both within and among nations with respect to several issues.

In addition to those who would focus on the motivation or consequences of foreign aid are those who define its political nature in terms of the process by which it is given. Political processes, according to Quincy Wright, involve groups of people seeking to advance their purposes against the opposition of other groups.[8] The foreign-aid transaction process clearly qualifies as "political" in this sense. Within any aid-giving nation there are groups who disagree as to the priority that should be given to foreign aid relative to alternative ways of using the resources, and who attempt to get their views accepted as government policy. Although we may not be able to name him, we may reasonably assume that Otto Passman has a Russian counterpart. More directly relevant to foreign intervention is the existence of conflicts between aid-donors and recipients. Such conflicts may concern amounts, repayment terms, fiscal policy, land reform, or myriad other issues.

[5] Lucian W. Pye, "Soviet and American Styles in Foreign Aid," *Orbis*, IV (Summer 1960), 168.

[6] For similar examples, see David A. Baldwin, "Analytical Notes on Foreign Aid and Politics," *Background*, X (May 1966), 66-90.

[7] On this point, see Scott, 23, and Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York 1967), 365.

[8] Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York 1955), 130-32.

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Foreign aid may constitute intervention in terms of motivation, consequences, process, or all three simultaneously. Fruitful discussion of foreign aid and influence, however, requires us to differentiate among these three plausible meanings of the statement that "aid is political."

CONTROLLING AID

If we are to recognize effective intervention, it helps to have some idea of how donors can control the impact of their aid. As an example of a "penetrated political system" Rosenau has suggested "the operation of any foreign aid program in which the aiding society maintains some control over the purposes and distribution of the aid in the recipient society."[9] A clear understanding of what constitutes "control" of aid is required before we can identify such a situation in the real world.

Three methods are frequently suggested as "controls" for foreign aid—auditing the books, setting up formal coordinating machinery, and furnishing aid in the form of commodities. None suffices as evidence that control is actually being exercised by the donor. Measuring effective control requires an estimate of the extent[10] to which things are different in the recipient society from what they would have been in the absence of aid. The world's most efficient auditors can go over the books of the donor nation and learn nothing about the actual impact of the donor's aid. Earmarking aid shipments for bookkeeping purposes and controlling the impact of aid are two different operations.

Likewise, elaborate, fully-staffed aid missions in the recipient nation may not exercise control. If they participate in the making of decisions that would have been made even without their participation, they are not controlling much of anything. On the other hand, to the extent that they participate in decisions that would not have been made in their absence, they are exercising some control.[11]

Similarly, providing aid in the form of particular goods fails to ensure that the donor controls the impact of his aid. Food aid does not necessarily feed people; nor does aid in the form of tanks necessarily

[9] Rosenau, 66. Rosenau defines a "penetrated political system" as one "in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals." 65.

[10] The word "extent" is somewhat misleading. We might be interested in at least three important dimensions of control: (1) scope, (2) weight, and (3) domain. Cf. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950).

[11] Cf. Dahl, 53.

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bolster military forces. If the recipient of tanks reduces its own military budget by an offsetting amount and spends the saved money on housing, the effect of the tanks has been to build houses.

The point is that some alleged "controls" on distribution of aid may not be intervention at all. Some strings constitute intervention; others do not. A string that asks the recipient to do what it would have done anyway can hardly be considered intervention. On the other hand, control may be taking place without many outward appearances. If the donor can accurately estimate how the potential recipient would allocate its resources[12] in the absence of aid, he is then in a position to exercise tight control over the use of his aid-funds without many of the formal trappings of control. In short, intervention may be real but not apparent, or apparent but not real.

"NON-AID" AS INFLUENCE

There is more to the aid-influence relationship than controlling the use of aid actually given. At least as important, in both theory and practice, is knowing how and when *not* to give aid. This is not just a matter of playing with words. Although much has been written about how to give aid, very little has been written about how not to give it. There are several possible ways to say "no"—as every woman and every political candidate knows—and there are several possible ways not to give aid. Some of the more common ways to say "no" to a request for foreign aid include: (1) "My government would like to help you, but we have no (time, money, etc.)." (2) Ignore the request or pigeonhole it. (3) Interpret the request to mean what the party saying "no" wants the request to mean. (4) "My government will study your request and let you know." (5) "Not at this time—come back next (month, year, decade, century, etc.)." (6) Say "no" in advance by establishing well-publicized policies. (7) "How dare you make such an outrageous request! Such behavior raises questions about your good sense and may affect my evaluation of your future requests." (8) No. (9) *No.* (10) NO! Although each method says "no," political influence is likely to vary from one method to another. How one says "no" does matter.

Suppose the United States wants to encourage developing states to be more hospitable to private foreign investors. Suppose, also, that American policy-makers believe that the attitudes of governments in developing states toward private foreign investors depend in part on

[12] These "resources" can be political as well as economic.

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their expectations regarding alternative sources of funds. In such a situation, the United States might adopt a tactic that game-theorists call the "commitment." "In bargaining, the commitment is a device to leave the last clear chance to decide the outcome with the other party, in a manner that he fully appreciates; it is to relinquish further initiative, having rigged the incentives so that the other party must choose in one's favor."[13] Thus, the United States government may try to commit itself not to provide an alternative source of funds for developing states, in a way that they fully appreciate, in order to leave the developing states with the last clear chance to avert disaster. The United States would thus be using "non-aid" to get developing states to do something they would not otherwise do—i.e., be nicer to private foreign investors.

It is one thing to cite a hypothetical example; it is another to show counterparts in the real world. Has non-aid ever been seriously proposed as a technique for influencing the developing states? Yes, responsible members of the governmental, business, and academic communities have all argued for non-aid as a technique for influencing these states. During the preliminary planning for the Bretton Woods institutions, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau expressed the hope that the International Bank would "*scrupulously* avoid undertaking loans that private investors are willing to make on reasonable terms."[14] Now, there is a great difference between not making loans for which private capital is available and "scrupulously avoiding" such loans. The difference, in terms of bargaining theory, is that between neglect and blackmail. Similarly, the "General Policy Statement of the Export-Import Bank of Washington" in 1945 included a special section devoted to outlining what the Bank would *not* do.[15] The Randall Commission Report in 1954 exhorted the government to make it "abundantly clear to prospective borrowers"[16] that American public lending would not be a substitute for private investment. Such abundant clarity was supposed to remove the uncertainty about American aid policies that the Commission believed affected "the willingness of foreign countries to accept private capital from abroad."[17] Using similar logic, the Clay Report in 1963 advocated "judicious withhold-

[13] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), 37.
[14] *New York Times*, November 24, 1943, 9. Italics added.
[15] *Department of State Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, 443.
[16] Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, *Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington 1954), 23.
[17] *Ibid.*, 18.

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ing of funds" in order to encourage "internal reform" in developing nations.[18]

The American business community has also advocated non-aid. Perhaps the clearest statement of this position was made in 1951 by the National Foreign Trade Convention. In bargaining terminology the following excerpt is clearly a call for the American government to try to influence foreign governments by increasing the credibility of the promise not to provide aid to foreign governments:

> It cannot be expected that economic environments conducive to the investment of American private capital will be established in these foreign lands so long as the governments concerned have reason to believe—as they do have reason to believe—that they will continue to be the beneficiaries of the hand-outs our own Government has given them for so long. They have every right to assume, on the evidence afforded, that this profligate practice will continue to be the order of the day. It is clear why this is so: our own Government, conscious of the fact that economic development abroad is highly desirable, has proceeded on the unfortunate assumption that private enterprise is unwilling or unable to undertake the task, and that, in consequence, the free provision of Government funds for the purposes in view is the only course open. This attitude has been seized upon by foreign governments as justification for their refusal to do the things they would otherwise find it necessary to do in order to attract the private capital they need. The dilemma is one which cannot be resolved until our Government brings itself to announce, as a fundamental element of our foreign economic policy, that we look upon industrial development abroad as the particular function of private enterprise, and that, until the receptive and cooperative attitudes called for are shown, no United States Government funds will be made available for *any* purpose except those of the most exigent military or humanitarian nature.[19]

Similar logic appears in a thorough and clearly reasoned study prepared by academics and presented to Congress in 1957, entitled "American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic Development, and the Aid Program."[20]

[18] Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs* (Washington 1963), 13. (Hereafter cited as the "Clay Report.")

[19] *Report of the Thirty-Eighth National Foreign Trade Convention* (New York 1952), xxxii.

[20] American Enterprise Association, "American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic

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Although strategic use of non-aid has been an important means of influencing developing states, its significance is rarely recognized. Even foreign-aid experts can look directly at this phenomenon and fail to understand it. Witness the following statement by a veteran aid administrator:

> During the 1950's, U.S. aid policy was dominated by the curious notion that aid should be denied countries that are potentially attractive to U.S. investors. Latin America was considered capable of attracting all the foreign capital it needed from private sources; aid was considered to be a palliative that discouraged countries from creating appropriate conditions to attract foreign investors.[21]

Why should this be regarded as a "curious" situation? It is precisely the kind of behavior we should expect from a nation for which avoidance of competition with private capital is one of the basic guiding principles of its aid program. After we grow accustomed to thinking of non-aid as a technique of statecraft, there is nothing at all puzzling about the situation described. It was clearly United States policy to withhold aid from certain countries in order to force (encourage?) them to rely on foreign private investment. The same author notes that since the ten states that harbor two-thirds of all U.S. private investment in developing areas have received less than 7 percent of U.S. postwar economic aid, the United States cannot be accused of allocating its aid funds so as to further the interests of its private investors.[22] Precisely the opposite conclusion can and should be drawn. For twenty years American private investors have been exhorting the government to withhold aid funds from areas where they might compete with private capital. Official policy statements have repeatedly committed the government to comply with this exhortation. The empirical evidence is consistent with an American aid policy designed to help private investors, that is, designed to use non-aid to influence foreign investment climates. If we are to understand the relationship between foreign aid and intervention in developing states, we cannot afford to overlook the significance of non-aid.

Development, and the Aid Program," *Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys*, 85th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 52 (Washington 1957), 539-618, esp. 548, 558-59.

[21] Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York 1967), 179.

[22] *Ibid.*, 179-85.

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DESIRED INTERVENTION?

Analysis of aid and intervention is further complicated by the difficulty of determining whether intervention is being resisted. Nations are not the monolithic corporate entities that we often imply they are. Within the government of an aid-recipient there are usually many groups with a variety of opposing views on policy matters. "To 'intervene,'" says Schelling, "is usually to encourage or support one part of the government rather than another, or one political force rather than another."[23]

Sometimes the intervention might be on behalf of the government vis-à-vis domestic political pressures. For example, the government might want to adopt measures to control inflation but might fear that it would thereby lose domestic popularity. Intervention by an aid donor on behalf of an anti-inflationary policy would strengthen the hand of the government by giving it a scapegoat on which to blame the unpopular measures. It is rumored that the International Monetary Fund has played the role of scapegoat on several occasions. The point here is that the desires of the donor and the recipient government may actually coincide even though they appear to conflict. Politics defined as group conflict may be more apparent than real.

TWO-WAY INTERVENTION

Karl Deutsch has pointed out that a nation can increase its autonomy in two ways. Either it can break its linkages with the outside world or it can reverse the flow of influence while maintaining the links.[24] This second possibility is rarely acknowledged in discussions of foreign aid. Although intervention of the donor in the recipient's affairs comes up often, we almost never find references to the converse situation. Even though they may not use the vocabulary of intervention, many American Negro leaders have made it quite clear that they think the plight of their people has been worsened by the activities of Marshal Ky and his countrymen.

This is not to say that Vietnam exercises more influence vis-à-vis the United States than the United States does vis-à-vis Vietnam. It is to say that Vietnam now has more influence on American affairs than it

[23] Thomas C. Schelling, "American Foreign Assistance," *World Politics*, VII (July 1955), 623. On this point, see also George Liska, *The New Statecraft* (Chicago 1960), 126-83.

[24] Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, 10-12.

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would have had if the United States were not injecting massive aid into Vietnam. We live, as one study put it, in "the era of reciprocal involvement."[25]

III. Types of Aid and Intervention

It is often suggested that particular types of foreign aid involve more intervention in the recipient's affairs than do other types. Let us examine four types that are frequently mentioned in this context: (1) loans as opposed to grant aid; (2) economic as opposed to military aid; (3) multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid; and (4) private as opposed to public capital.

GRANTS VS. LOANS

During the 1950's a frequently suggested means for eliminating intervention by aid donors in recipients' affairs was a shift from grants to loans. Loans were often described as a more "businesslike" way to provide aid. Loans allocated on the basis of "strictly economic" considerations were alleged to be politically sterile. Such a contention, however, cannot withstand even cursory analysis. In the first place, it is impossible to judge the credit-worthiness of a nation without reference to broad considerations of fiscal and monetary policy, the probability of internal civil disorders, and the overall role of the government in the economy. "In a world where governments can expropriate property, manipulate exchange rates, and control the currency supply, it is nonsense to speak of evaluating the economic soundness of a project without reference to governmental behavior."[26] Raymond Mikesell has described "political factors" as "the most fundamental consideration in the determination of credit worthiness."[27]

The implication of the necessity for taking political factors into account in evaluating loan applications is that potential borrowers may have to take politically significant steps in order to qualify as creditworthy. Controlling inflation, for example, is not a purely economic matter. Basic changes in the institutional structure of the society are involved. Joseph Schumpeter has described inflation as "one of the

[25] Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, *The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee Print, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington 1959), 17.

[26] David A. Baldwin, "The International Bank in Political Perspective," *World Politics*, XVIII (October 1965), 69.

[27] Raymond F. Mikesell, "Problems and Policies in Public Lending for Economic Development," Raymond F. Mikesell, ed., *U.S. Private and Government Investment Abroad* (Eugene, Ore. 1962), 325.

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most powerful factors that make for acceleration of social change."[28] In spite of this, neither the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank has hesitated to advise developing states to control inflation in order to qualify for loans on the basis of purely "economic considerations."

In addition to the argument that loans can be allocated by strictly economic criteria is the contention that loans provide "no excuse" for donors to interfere in the affairs of the recipient states. "So long as the payments of interest and repayments of principal are made in full on the due dates, as stipulated in the terms of the loan, the details of how it is spent are no concern of the creditor. The independence of the borrowing country remains inviolate."[29] This does not apply to grants, argues Frederic Benham. "A country which makes grants is entitled to make sure that they fulfill their purpose and are not frittered away in corruption and waste."[30]

Do loans provide no excuse for intervention by the lenders? The bank that lent me money to buy a car seems to think that it has a right to tell me how much insurance I should carry on that car. Likewise, foreign-aid lenders have often cited an outstanding debt as reason enough for them to take an extraordinary interest in the domestic affairs of a debtor. The World Bank maintains a "close relationship with its borrowers throughout the life of each loan" and claims the right to give "continuing attention throughout the life of each loan to the general economic and financial conditions in the borrowing country" in order to "ensure that the maintenance of service on Bank loans is not jeopardized by the emergence of conditions which might be prevented."[31]

It would seem that we could make a fairly good case for the proposition that loans provide more opportunity for intervention than do grants. A grant transaction is unlikely to extend over a time-span as long as a typical foreign aid loan-agreement—ten to fifty years. Thus, the apparatus for administering the repayment of the loan may provide a conduit for influence over a considerable period of time. A loan-agreement is not just an excuse for interesting oneself in another's affairs; it is an eminently respectable excuse. Also, a one-time grantor

[28] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd ed., New York 1950), 421.
[29] Frederic Benham, *Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries* (London 1961), 104.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Policies and Operations of the World Bank, IFC, and IDA* (Washington 1962), 42.

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is in a very weak position to intervene. Although he may be "entitled" to make sure that his grant is not wasted, the recipient has no incentive to allow such intervention. It is the expectation of the next grant that provides this incentive. Similarly, the hope of getting future loans acts as an incentive for a borrower to let his creditors examine his books.

During the early 1950's there was one aspect of American grant-aid that strengthened the argument for loans as a means of reducing intervention. It was customary for the United States to require a recipient of grant-aid to place an "equivalent" amount of its own currency in a "counterpart fund." This fund was owned by the recipient government but could be used only by joint agreement between the governments. "The exercise of American influence over the use of counterpart funds inevitably raised the question of interference with the internal affairs of countries in receipt of assistance."[32] Counterpart funds and grant aid were gradually replaced by soft loans repayable in inconvertible local currency during the later 1950's.[33] This resulted in a rapid build-up of enormous amounts of American-owned foreign currencies and even greater fears about intervention than had been generated by the counterpart funds.[34] Once again the advantages of loans over grants proved to be illusory.

The most obvious weakness in the argument that loans do not involve intervention is that loans are not just an "excuse" for intervention; they are a *means* of intervention and have been advocated as such. One writer speaks of the desire to place aid on a loan basis "for the benefit of superior discipline";[35] another refers to "our efforts to employ loan assistance as a means of influencing or compelling economic reforms in developing countries."[36] Perhaps the single most frequently heard argument in favor of placing the American aid program on a loan basis was that of the desirability of ensuring that the funds would be used economically.[37] Other control devices would be

[32] William Adams Brown and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance* (Washington 1953), 188.

[33] The evolution of this process is traced in David A. Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy: 1943-1962* (Chicago 1966).

[34] On this point, see Consultants on International Finance and Economic Problems, *The Problem of Excess Accumulation of U.S.-Owned Local Currencies: Findings and Recommendations Submitted to the Under Secretary of State*, April 4, 1960.

[35] Thomas C. Schelling, "American Aid and Economic Development: Some Critical Issues," *International Stability and Progress* (New York 1957), 157.

[36] Raymond F. Mikesell, "Capacity to Service Foreign Investment," *U.S. Private and Government Investment Abroad*, 406.

[37] It should be noted that the repayment requirement provides an incentive to allocate aid resources to *financially* remunerative projects, not necessarily to *socially* remunerative ones, such as feeding babies.

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unnecessary because the necessity of repayment would provide the discipline needed to prevent waste.

One final aspect of the loan-grant debate deserves attention. If loans do not involve less intervention than do grants, how do we explain the expressed preference for loans by several developing states during the 1950's? There are at least two plausible explanations that do not depend on an expected reduction of intervention. The first is that governments in developing states might not want to appear in the eyes of their domestic public as dependent on foreign charity. It might be good domestic politics to refuse grants—regardless of the real merits of grants as opposed to loans. A second explanation is in terms of Friedrich's "rule of anticipated reactions."[38] The growing preference of the American Congress for loans as opposed to grants during the 1950's was no secret. Yet, writers on foreign aid rarely consider the possibility that potential recipients decided to ask for loans not because they preferred them but simply because they thought they were more likely to get them.[39]

In sum, loan aid appears to offer at least as much opportunity for the donor to intervene in the recipient's affairs as does grant aid.

ECONOMIC VS. MILITARY AID

Those who want to limit intervention through aid often point to military aid as an especially odious type. Economic aid, on the other hand, is supposed to involve less intervention. The weakness in this line of reasoning stems from a failure to distinguish between the commodities actually financed by the aid and those to which the aid is tied in a bookkeeping sense. As we noted earlier, aid in the form of tanks does not necessarily add to military strength; it may, in fact, buy milk for babies. If the recipient nation had intended to allocate one million dollars of its own funds for tanks in the absence of aid, and if it then received the equivalent of one million dollars worth of tanks as aid, it would be free to take the one million dollars that it had intended to spend on tanks and spend it some other way. If it used the money for a school lunch program, the "military aid" would actually have financed a school lunch program. We can tell little or nothing about the net impact of aid by looking at its commodity content as described by the bookkeepers. Instead, we must

[38] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston 1941), 589-91.

[39] For some evidence that this was indeed the case, see Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy*.

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estimate how the recipient would have allocated its resources in the absence of aid and then compare this with the actual allocation after aid has been given. Only thus can we tell whether the military sector of the economy is really being strengthened by what is often called "military aid."[40]

Measuring allocation of economic resources, however, is not the only way to measure influence. It may be that there are side effects of a military aid program that could be considered intervention. The administration of the program by military men may increase their ability to influence people in the recipient nation. In addition, a donor who gives aid labeled "military" may be perceived as giving a stamp of approval to the military establishment in the recipient nation, thereby bolstering its prestige. It is easy to see how reasonable men could describe either of these side effects as intervention.

One particular type of economic aid is often alleged to be especially free from overtones of intervention—technical assistance. To suggest that technical assistance may involve as much intervention as do other types of aid is to tread on what many consider to be sacred nonpolitical ground. Without repeating the previous discussion of military aid, it should be obvious that technical assistance is merely another way of labeling the commodity-content of aid; and it is no more indicative of the actual impact of the aid than is the label of military aid.

The technical-assistance label is a very useful public-relations device. A primary source of political opposition to foreign aid had always been the business community, who had traditionally feared and resisted government intervention in the economy. Use of the technical-assistance label was supposed to reassure private foreign investors that the government did not intend to compete with them. In fact, technical assistance did compete with private investment in at least two ways. First, the services provided under technical-assistance programs could and would have been provided by private firms if the price had been high enough. Second, indirect competition was given to potential direct investors. For example, surveys of investment opportunities might provide the government with enough information to enable it to establish a public enterprise instead of relying on private enterprise. The point is that investigating investment opportunities has always been one of the services offered at a price by potential direct investors, even though we are unaccustomed to describing their activities this way. Describing this aid as "technical" was a way of making

[40] On this point, see Charles Wolf, Jr., *Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia* (Princeton 1960), 159-62, 187-89, 258, 417-19.

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it sound as if it were something other than "capital" assistance. The United Nations Special Fund's "pre-investment surveys" are merely an extreme form of the attempt to make technical aid sound noncontroversial. Using technical language to divert attention from controversial issues is an old political tactic, one that has worked well in the case of technical assistance.[41] The technical-assistance label implied a qualitative difference between this type of aid and other types. It implied that technical assistance involved services that the private investment community would be unwilling to provide *at any price*. It also benefited from the vague widespread feeling that the technical and the political are two mutually exclusive realms. Those who would understand the relationship between aid and influence, however, should not overlook technical assistance.

MULTILATERAL VS. BILATERAL AID

Perhaps the most frequently heard proposal for political sterilization of aid giving is to multilateralize it.[42] In this context it has been argued that multilateral aid is (1) non-political, (2) stringless, (3) more acceptable to recipients, and (4) insulated from the foreign policies of donor nations. These arguments will be examined in turn.

Is multilateral aid political in any of the three ways referred to earlier? It is difficult to see how the process of distributing multilateral aid could be anything but political in the sense of involving group conflict. Even if various nations could be effectively coordinated from the lending side, it is inconceivable that recipients and donors would agree on the amount of aid needed by the recipient. Given the limited amounts of aid likely to be channeled through international agencies and given the almost limitless needs of the poor nations, conflict seems inevitable. Some sort of impact on the distribution of political influence within and among nations also seems to be a necessary concomitant of multilateral aid. Thus, international aid would be political in this sense also. Whether multilateral aid would be politically motivated is more difficult to determine. Although it is doubtful that a desire for power as an end in itself would be an important motivating factor, it is highly probable that some attempt would be made to get recipients to do things that they would not otherwise do. The experi-

[41] Cf. Scott, 210, and James Patrick Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics* (Princeton 1966), 43-44.

[42] For a useful review of the arguments for multilateral aid, not all of which concern intervention, see Robert E. Asher, "Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited," *International Organization*, XVI (Autumn 1962), 697-719. On international organizations and non-intervention see Scott, 208-11.

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ence of the World Bank provides many examples of just such behavior.[43]

It is sometimes argued that multilateral aid does not carry with it the strings associated with bilateral assistance. The lending pattern of the Inter-American Development Bank gives some credence to this argument. Its funds are apparently earmarked in advance for allocation to specific countries, thus eliminating competition for funds and making it fruitless for the Bank to attach many strings. It does not follow, however, that multilateral aid necessarily involves fewer strings. It is interesting to note that some advocates of multilateral aid see it as a way of increasing the effectiveness of intervention in recipient nations. One proponent of multilateral aid, for example, sees the relevant question as "to what extent and in what ways the United Nations may provide a better channel for such intervention than bilateral programs of economic assistance."[44] International agencies, so the argument goes, are less likely to be accused of intervention and are thus freer to intervene. Multilateral aid, then, has been proposed as a means of both impeding and facilitating intervention. Channeling aid through international agencies does not guarantee fewer or weaker strings; in fact, aid through the World Bank complex is likely to involve a limited number of very strong strings—perhaps even ropes.[45] Those who want stringless aid should be wary of proposals for channeling more aid through the IBRD and its affiliates.

The argument for multilateral aid is often bolstered by the statement that such aid, with or without strings, is more acceptable to developing states.[46] There is some evidence, however, that this may not be true. John Lewis has described a pronounced shift from bilateral to multilateral operations as "one of the last things the government of India wants."[47] He notes that the existence of several bilateral aid channels permits India to fend off intervention by playing off one benefactor against another. The Indian government, according to Lewis, "is no readier to surrender to the World Bank or the United Nations than it is to the United States or the Soviet Union."[48] The

[43] See Baldwin, "The International Bank," 68-81.

[44] Benjamin Higgins, *United Nations and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Homewood, Ill. 1962), 11. For similar statements advocating multilateral aid as a means of facilitating intervention, see the following: Kaplan, 350; Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, *Foreign Aid Through Private Initiative* (Washington 1965), 12; Clay Report, 15-16; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Mutual Aid Through the United Nations," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 4, 1960, 525.

[45] For a description of the strings used by the World Bank, see Baldwin, "The International Bank," 75-79.

[46] For examples, see Benham, 105; and Lodge, "Mutual Aid," 525.

[47] John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Washington 1962), 263.

[48] *Ibid.*, 264. Jacob Kaplan contends that the "only instance of the expulsion of a

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acceptability argument usually carries an implicit assumption that multilateral aid involves no increase in the amount of intervention in the recipient's affairs. Thus, it is usually implied that, "other things being equal," multilateral aid is more acceptable. Other things, however, may not remain equal. The centralized coordination that would probably accompany a massive shift to multilateral aid would make intervention by the international donor much easier than it is now for an individual donor nation. If the World Bank, for example, were the only major source of development aid, its bargaining position vis-à-vis borrowers would be enormously strengthened.

A fourth argument for multilateral distribution of aid holds that it prevents individual donor nations from using such aid as a tool of national policy. Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, describes such programs as "obviously insulated against political manipulations" by donor states.[49] Does channeling aid through international agencies neutralize it as a tool of national policy? An influential RAND Corporation study is based on the assumption that those interested in foreign aid as an instrument of United States foreign policy need not concern themselves with the activities of the International Bank.[50] There are three reasons to doubt the wisdom of this assumption, however. First, a donor nation may choose to distribute its aid through international agencies purely on the basis of its calculations of its own national interest. The United States, for example, "may seek the comparative anonymity of multilateralism when the recipient regime or local opposition suspect 'strings' or other undue influence by the donor."[51] Such a move would not mean political neutralization, however. "To seek a measure of anonymity," Liska rightly observes, "is not to suspend the primarily political character of aid; it is merely to adopt a politically more proficient method in situations where direct involvement may be onerous for either the donor or the recipient."[52]

A second reason for skepticism about the degree to which multilateral aid is insulated from national policy is that some donors exercise extraordinary influence on the activities of international aid agencies. The United States, for example, wields over one-fourth of the voting power in the World Bank, an institution that has always had an American president. When the United States diverts some of its funds from bilateral channels to the World Bank complex, it is not giving up

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Western aid mission for pressing unwelcome advice is that of the World Bank advisor who was resident in Turkey in the early 1950's." 361.

[49] "Mutual Aid Through the United Nations," 525.

[50] Wolf, 80 n. [51] Liska, 217. [52] *Ibid.*

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as much influence over aid-distribution policies as it seems to be. Likewise, when the United States gives aid to the Inter-American Development Bank, it does not lose as much control over distribution of funds as the formal arrangements would indicate. Although Latin American nations can outvote the United States in the Inter-American Development Bank, their hope for future funds gives them an incentive not to do so. In Friedrich's terms, they are anticipating the reactions of the United States and acting accordingly. Note that the Inter-American Development Bank has never made a loan to which the United States specifically objected. Anticipated reactions are far more important as a link between aid and influence than are formal voting arrangements.

There is a third reason for rejecting the hypothesis that multilateral aid cannot be a tool of national statecraft. To the extent that any nation can predict the aid-distribution pattern of an international agency, it can use that agency as a tool of its foreign policy. That is, it can frame its foreign policy so as to allow for the activities of the international agency. Thus, if there is reason to suspect that Ruritania will be successful in getting a loan from the International Development Association to finance a dam that the United States had intended to finance, the United States may decide to take the funds it had earmarked for financing the dam and use them to promote some other foreign policy goal. Successful use of this foreign policy technique depends on one's ability to predict accurately the aid-distribution patterns of international agencies. Doing this permits one to identify those projects that will probably be financed anyway and those that are on the margin. By confining its aid to marginal projects, a nation can strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis aid recipients.[53] A former AID administrator's description of the American negotiating process indicates that the United States does try to strengthen its bargaining position in this way: "Before even a tentative program is put together, the resources available from other countries, the United Nations specialized agencies, and foreign private business must be estimated. . . . Only at this stage does it become relevant to look at the resources available from the United States."[54]

In conclusion, there are several reasons to doubt Henry Cabot Lodge's assertion that multilateral aid programs are "obviously insu-

[53] On the importance of this, see Thomas C. Schelling, *International Economics* (Boston 1958), 443-44.

[54] Frank M. Coffin, *Witness for AID* (Boston 1964), 14-15. See also Agency for International Development, *Loan Terms, Debt Burden, and Development* (April 1965), 23.

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lated against political manipulations" by individual states. Channeling aid through international agencies will not necessarily reduce the intervention in developing states; it may even increase it.

PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC CHANNELS

One of the great American myths is that the private sector of the economy is "nonpolitical." It is not surprising, therefore, to encounter the argument that private "nonpolitical" investment would involve less intervention in developing states than does "political" public foreign aid.[55] The following discussion will focus on two questions: First, is private capital "political" in the three ways mentioned earlier? Second, in what ways is private investment linked to foreign policies?

The motivation of private businessmen is usually described in terms of a desire for profit. Without denying the importance of the profit motive, we may point out that profit can be pursued in various ways by different organizations. The rationale that typically underlies a description of business as nonpolitical implies the existence of numerous small firms obedient to impersonal market forces. Such a rationale ignores one of the most important economic institutions in the world today—the giant corporation. We are only beginning to perceive the far-reaching political and economic implications of this form of social organization.[56] It is clear, however, that these firms are not the slaves of the market envisioned in the model of pure competition. Many of them own more assets than the annual GNP in several developing states. It is these giant corporations that account for most of the American direct investment abroad. Roughly one-third of this investment is in the petroleum industry, which is so well organized that it has been described as a private world government.[57] Pursuing power and pursuing profit are not necessarily mutually exclusive undertakings.

Regardless of the motivations of private foreign investors, it is difficult to deny the political impact of their actions. The provision of forty million dollars in revolving credit to South Africa by a group of

[55] For examples, see Cleona Lewis, *The United States and Foreign Investment Problems* (Washington 1948), 277; American Enterprise Association, "American Private Enterprise, Foreign Economic Development, and the Aid Programs," *Foreign Aid Program: Compilation of Studies and Surveys*, 592; Clair Wilcox, *A Charter for World Trade* (New York 1949), 145; and John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development* (New York 1967), 344.

[56] On this point see John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston 1967); Adolph A. Berle, Jr., *Power Without Property* (New York 1959); and Michael D. Reagan, *The Managed Economy* (New York 1963).

[57] Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil* (New York 1961).

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American banks has a profound effect on the distribution of influence within the recipient nation and among various nations. This same group of banks is unlikely to extend similar credit to Cuba in the near future. This is not to imply any sort of devious plan by bankers to promote racism or any other ideology. The point is that in making judgments about what constitutes a "safe" investment they tend to favor certain social systems. This link between private international capital flows and particular social institutions was identified by Eugene Staley in his classic study, *War and the Private Investor*: "Indeed, the export of capital to countries previously untouched by capitalistic industrialism necessitates the simultaneous "export" of specialized governmental forms and institutions, such as commercial law, and specialized economic institutions, such as the wage system. Out of this fact . . . a deep and inevitable conflict emerges between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries when their social institutions are radically different."[58]

Is international private investment a political process in the sense that it involves conflict among groups? There are at least two reasons to think that it is. First, many of the developing states, rightly or wrongly, associate private foreign investors with their former colonial masters. As long as these attitudes persist, friction between developing states and private foreign investors is to be expected. Second, a substantial degree of group conflict in the process of transferring capital from the developed to the developing states should be expected even if there were no colonial heritage to stigmatize foreign investors. Staley sees such conflict as inevitable: "The process of international investment establishes between a capital-importing and a capital-exporting country a relatively permanent capital-labor conflict, a creditor-debtor conflict, a conflict of vested interests with groups interested in social reform or revolution, not to speak of cultural conflicts unleashed by the industrialization which accompanies capital investment."[59]

It is quite possible for private foreign investment to be political in all three ways mentioned above and still be insulated from the foreign policies of the government in the lending country. Although we often hear allegations that foreign policy is molded to suit private investors, we rarely hear private investment described as a "tool" of foreign policy. The United States government, however, has clearly tried to use private foreign investment to promote some of its foreign policy

[58] Eugene Staley, *War and the Private Investor* (Garden City 1935), 142.
[59] *Ibid.*, 367. See, also, Leo Model, "The Politics of Private Foreign Investment," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (July 1967), 639-51.

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goals in developing states. It has used diplomacy, investment guarantees, propaganda, and non-aid to stimulate the flow of private capital to developing areas.[60] The Advisory Committee on Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid recently pointed out that "private institutions may be far more effective instruments of national policy in some situations than government institutions."[61] The committee report went on to describe private investment abroad as an effective way to exert "pressure" on the developing states to adopt the kind of pluralistic social system that the authors of the report believe exists in the United States.[62] The report made it clear that the authors viewed private capital as a means of intervening in the affairs of developing states.

After examining several types of aid, we conclude that none of them offers much hope to those who oppose any and all intervention in the recipient's affairs. Each of them can serve, and has served, as a mechanism for intervention. Although there may be types of foreign aid that cannot be used by the donor to intervene, they are not among those examined here.

IV. Trade, Not Aid: A Way Out?

A commonly suggested substitute for aid might be thought to provide a way out for those interested in preventing donors from influencing recipients. "Trade, not aid" has been a slogan heard intermittently for the last twenty years. Preferential treatment of developing countries in their trade relations with the developed ones could serve as a functional equivalent for aid, at least to some extent. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 proposed a variety of ways to cloak foreign aid in the guise of special trading arrangements.[63] If this could be done, would donors still be able to intervene? There would be no need for annual Congressional appropriations, no negotiating for each project, and no need for aid missions. It would appear that many opportunities for intervention by donors would thus be foreclosed.

Appearances can be deceiving, however. International trade can also be an instrument of national foreign policy. Implicit in all trade among nations is the potential threat of each trading partner to terminate

[60] For details on the United States use of these techniques for promoting private foreign investment, see Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy*.

[61] *Foreign Aid Through Private Initiative*, 5.

[62] *Ibid.*, 6-8.

[63] For a description and analysis of the UNCTAD proposals, see Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries* (Washington 1967).

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the trade.[64] Three potential sources of intervention are obvious: (1) actual termination of trade by a rich country, (2) threatened termination, and (3) actions by developing states anticipating potential reactions by the developed states. One cannot make an *a priori* judgment as to which nations would be in the strongest bargaining positions with regard to terminating or threatening termination of trade. Other things being equal, however, nations gaining the most from the trade would have the most to lose and would thus be more vulnerable to threats to end the trade. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that several of the Unctad proposals involve measures to increase the developing nations' gains from trade with the rich nations. We are presented with the irony of a situation in which the developing states ask the rich nations to do many of the same things that Hirschman views as ways to maximize a nation's potential influence over its trading partners.[65] The Unctad proposals may be worthwhile, but developing states are deluding themselves if they think that implementation of the proposals will necessarily insulate them from intervention by rich nations.

V. Conclusion

The preceding discussion focused on three major topics: (1) the links between aid and influence, (2) the links between particular types of aid and intervention, and (3) the links between trade and intervention. The section on aid and influence was devoted to highlighting some of the less obvious aspects of the relationship and to noting a variety of analytical problems that confront the student of foreign aid. The examination of several types of aid revealed that all were likely to involve significant amounts of intervention in the developing states. The third section held out some hope, but not much, for minimizing intervention by the functional equivalent of special trading arrangements.

We did not discuss the question of whether certain types of intervention are desirable—by whatever standard. The preceding analysis will seem to have isolationist policy implications only for those who refuse to recognize that the doctrine of nonintervention was "fashioned for a world in which nations were set apart in space and did not interact significantly; a world in which there were no countries so much more powerful than others that they 'intervened' simply by

[64] On this point, see Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945).

[65] *Ibid.*, 34-35. See also Pincus, 44.

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being and acting . . . a world that has ceased to exist."[66] To increase economic well-being and to ensure world peace, some types of intervention are probably useful, even necessary. We live in a highly interdependent world and might as well make the best of it. As a Syracuse University study pointed out several years ago: "We cannot undertake any significant action without becoming involved in some nation's internal affairs, either in technical assistance, in economic planning, or in military training. . . . The appropriate attitude toward this new role of ours is acceptance of involvement, or joint participation, as a permanent part of our international life and on this basis to participate as intelligently and usefully as we can."[67]

[66] Scott, 23.
[67] Maxwell Graduate School, *The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy*, 17.

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Review Articles

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Perspectives from the Indian Experience

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Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967, 306 pp. $8.75.

Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967, 509 pp. $12.50.

INDIA presents a formidable challenge to the inventiveness of political theorists. She stands virtually alone among the new nations in preserving a stable system of parliamentary government for more than two decades after Independence. Yet it would be difficult to find many new states in Asia that rank lower on major indices of economic development. Probably no other nation, old or new, is beset by such sharp internal cleavages. Within India's boundaries are three distinct geographical regions, each having its own separate history; fourteen major linguistic groupings, each claiming a unique cultural heritage; a large Muslim religious minority (in addition to smaller sects of Christians, Buddhists, Parsis, Jains, and Sikhs); scores of virtually autonomous tribal communities; and—at the core of the social structure—over three thousand endogamous caste groups.

It is only natural, therefore, that the most common interpretation of India's political stability should stress idiosyncratic historical advantages, particularly the dual heritage from the colonial period of the oldest and best-organized political party in Asia, the Indian National Congress, and the renowned "steel frame" of British imperial administration, the Indian Civil Service. In fact, India was triply fortunate: during the first fifteen years of Independence she could look to the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, a nationalist hero and dedicated democrat who combined outstanding intellectual abilities with the rare quality of charismatic appeal for the peasant masses.

Theorists are, however, necessarily dissatisfied with explanations that emphasize chance factors. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph and Myron

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Weiner have undertaken a rigorous examination of key elements in the Indian political system (caste associations and the Congress party), and come up with an alternative hypothesis. India's political stability, the Rudolphs argue, rests on the capacity of political parties, especially the Indian National Congress, to provide "those who represent natural associations with conditions and incentives that enable them to foster the interests of their groups in ways and contexts that also lead to modernity" (p. 66). Weiner's conclusion is strikingly similar. He attributes the continuation of stable government in India to the role of the Congress party in "permitting cadres to further their own ambitions and interests within the party in such a way that what they do at the same time facilitates the electoral triumph of Congress and furthers the Congress government's development programs" (p. 496).

The Congress, the authors suggest, is virtually unique among the political parties of new states in adopting an instrumental approach to the problems of nation-building. It has not tried to destroy or control parochial loyalties and structures in the name of abstract "nationalist" or "socialist" ideologies; instead, it has attempted to generate spontaneous popular support by adopting pragmatic policies that appeal to traditional sentiments and interests. The result is an adaptive interaction between modernity and tradition that fuses parochial and universal elements. If the modernizing aims of the national leadership sometimes suffer, there are significant compensations. Weiner suggests, for example, that "membership in the Congress party itself transforms individuals. . . . Congressmen are more likely than most Indians to be national-minded, concerned with development, secular in outlook, activist, and perhaps equalitarian" (p. 490). More important, party appeals to religious, linguistic, caste, and factional groups must ultimately undermine traditional hierarchical structures and values by increasing participation. The new participants soon acquire an interest in the continuation of democratic political processes and institutions, which strengthens the bonds of consensus as well as the legitimacy of the parliamentary system. In sum, the Rudolphs and Weiner agree, the Indian experience demonstrates that an accommodative attitude toward parochial interests can actually accelerate national integration, enhance the legitimacy of the political system, and maximize the possibility of peaceful adjustment of social conflicts that arise during the modernization process.

The authors concede that accommodative politics may initially slow down the rate of economic growth by limiting the sacrifices that

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can be imposed on the population. Nevertheless, they insist that long-term prospects for economic development are actually improved through the establishment of strong political institutions enjoying the confidence and loyalty of the population. Indeed, the Rudolphs go further than Weiner in using the Indian political experience as a point of departure for a theory of modernization that stresses the importance of adaptive rather than systemic change.

I

The Modernity of Tradition is essentially an extended illustration of the Rudolphs' central proposition: that "latent, deviant, or minority" tendencies in traditional structures and norms can be transformed into effective vehicles of modernization in response to changing economic and political circumstances. The authors argue that "if tradition and modernity are seen as . . . dialectically rather than dichotomously related, and if internal variations are attended to and taken seriously, then those sectors of traditional society that contain or express potentialities for change from dominant norms and structures become critical for understanding the nature and processes of modernization" (p. 10).

According to this formulation, prior systemic changes, which either dissolve or supersede ascriptive, corporate structures by class and other secular groupings based on the individual, are not necessary conditions for the emergence of political democracy.[1] In fact, the Rudolphs impute strong parochial biases to most contemporary scholars of comparative politics who "tend to see the objective conditions of modernity—critical levels of industrialization, urbanization, per capita income, and education—as requisites for the conduct of modern democratic politics" (p. 17). By contrast, the authors urge, the Indian case opens up "a rather different view of historical processes, sequences, and end products than many comparative analyses of modernization. . . . Although certain historical reiterations and coincidences are surely to be expected, there are compelling reasons to believe that different processes, sequences, and relationships are probable. . . . The environment of change and innovation in the mid-twentieth century is radically different from that of the eighteenth: many historical processes and sequences have been telescoped or eliminated. Some have also

[1] Conceptual ambiguities abound in the Rudolphs' analysis and should be mentioned. Political modernity is assumed to be the same as government "basing itself on participation, consent, and public accountability," i.e., democracy (p. 4). The single term "modernity" is also used interchangeably for "modern society" and "political development," even though the meanings of both terms, especially of the second, continue to provoke lively controversy among scholars.

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been reversed. What was in one context a culmination may in another be a cause" (pp. 12-14).

Political development in India, the Rudolphs assert, shows that democracy can be achieved through a fusion of traditional and modern elements that move the political system "imperceptibly" from traditional (i.e., ascriptive) to modern (i.e., voluntary) forms of corporatism without "so marked an intervening individualist phase as the West is said to have experienced" (p. 23). They insist that the introduction of Western ideas and institutions mobilized "latent horizontal solidarities and interests" in the traditional Hindu caste structure that helped turn the political system in the direction of democracy even though the "social requisites" of democracy—as abstracted from the Western experience—did not widely develop. Caste was not superseded by associational groupings: it was transformed. In its transformed and "transvalued" state, it has contributed to both social equality and representative government. The greater portion of their book is devoted to an analysis of the dynamics of this "fusion" process.

The structural and cultural transformation of caste is traced by the authors to the organization, after World War I, of the first district- and province-wide caste associations. The initial goal of the caste associations was traditional, i.e., to raise the ranking of lower caste groups within the existing stratification system. For this purpose, they adopted the time-honored technique of "Sanskritization"—the process through which lower castes could attempt to establish a claim to higher ritual standing by assimilating the social and cultural practices of "twice-born" (ritually pure) Brahmin, Ksatriya, and Vaisha castes. The tactics adopted by the caste associations were, however, also conditioned by the "modern" elements in their environment. Improved means of communication provided the first opportunity for effective organization beyond the narrow boundaries of the *jati*—the endogamous local subcastes of neighboring villages. The decennial census—another British innovation—provided an ideal target for coordinated action. Caste associations could buttress the local credibility of their claims by winning State recognition of their right to be counted in the census under a new caste name signifying twice-born status.

However, the decisive transformation of traditional caste structures into "paracommunities" (associations fusing traditional and modern elements) began, according to the Rudolphs, with the limited introduction of the franchise and competitive party politics in the 1930's; it

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solidified with the adoption of universal suffrage and fully representative government after Independence. Caste associations adapted to the changing political environment by shifting their priorities from sacred to secular goals; and by creating—in the image of Western associational interest groups—specialized structures, permanent staffs, and regular procedures for the formulation of specific, general, and instrumental demands. The caste associations did not abandon their interest in achieving twice-born standing; they simply directed their primary efforts to bargaining with political parties and government for a larger share of power, opportunity, and resources—presumably on the theory that traditional ranking systems would ultimately reflect actual changes in wealth and influence.[2]

The Rudolphs point out that there are still important differences between caste associations, or paracommunities, and associational interest groups. Individuals are qualified only by birth to become members of the former. The caste association also encourages an intense and exclusive loyalty that inhibits the development of overlapping memberships and crosscutting pressures. Nevertheless, the authors find that on balance the caste associations have "contributed significantly to the success of political democracy" in India (p. 64).

This estimate ultimately rests on the proposition that paracommunities have actually transformed the functional meaning of caste for Indian society as a whole. They have "become a means to level the old order's inequalities by helping to destroy its moral basis and social structure" (p. 19). The Rudolphs argue that caste associations have eroded the legitimacy of ascriptively based hierarchies and contributed to greater real equality by encouraging lower castes to adopt the cultural practices and claim the social privileges of the twice-born. Further, they assert, horizontal mobilization of previously isolated, but essentially comparable, *jatis* (sub-castes) has provided the organizational base for a serious challenge to vertical patterns of political mobilization by local notables who have historically exploited "rank, mutual dependence, and the legitimacy of traditional authority" (p. 24). The caste associations, by contrast, are the specialized vehicles for mass participation in politics. Through them, the Rudolphs say, "illit-

[2] There is some basis in social experience for this assumption. Except for the Brahmins at the apex and untouchables at the bottom, ritual rank tends roughly to coincide with economic position in the village community. Thus, when an obvious disparity begins to develop between economic and ritual standing in the middle ranges of the caste structure, the ranking system generally proves flexible enough to incorporate these changes. See F. G. Bailey, *Caste and Economic Frontier* (New York 1957), 264-275.

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erate peasants [have learned] how to participate meaningfully and effectively in politics. Lower castes, whose large numbers give them an advantage in competitive democratic politics, have in many areas gained influence, access, and power in state and society. With these at their command, they can change in their favor the allocation of resources, privileges, and honors" (p. 64). Thus, far from being an obstacle to the emergence of a stable, democratic order, caste now functions to attach the peasants to "the idea, processes, and institutions of political democracy" (p. 19). As a result, the caste associations have actually paved the way for a reversal of the major sequences in modernization experienced in the West. By promoting the stability and legitimacy of the democratic political system, they have enhanced the capability of the regime to mobilize mass support for the great tasks of national integration and economic development.

Finally, the Rudolphs suggest, as modernization gains momentum, ascriptive identities and parochial loyalties will weaken. Internal cleavages based on class and interest will appear. Members of caste associations will cease to have uniform political affiliations; instead, they will become available for "differential mobilization" by competitive political parties. Caste associations will, in effect, emerge as the Indian counterpart of the ethnic, racial, and religious organizations that survive even in "modern" Western democracies. We therefore come full circle to the Rudolphs' initial proposition that modernity and tradition are dialectically related—modernity also incorporates tradition. Paracommunities are not "merely a transitional phenomena but a persistent feature of modernity" (p. 12).

This is a very provocative thesis. But little evidence appears in this book to demonstrate its validity. The extended case studies of horizontal mobilization are mainly focused on efforts by the Shanan and Palli castes to achieve twice-born standing through the traditional method of Sanskritization, and through official recognition of new Ksatriya caste names (Nadar and Vanniyar Kula Ksatriyas respectively) in the 1921 Madras Census. That these efforts were ultimately successful hardly indicates serious erosion of a caste-based hierarchy; only local ranking systems were at stake. Moreover, even this modest success required some one hundred years of bloody agitation to accomplish, and during this time opposition from upper castes was so fierce that in some periods the "burning, looting, and killing" amounted to "civil war" (p. 44). When we consider the social context in which these victories were won, the potentialities of caste associations as *instru-*

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ments of egalitarian change appear even more limited. In both cases, higher ritual ranking simply validated changes in economic standing that had previously occurred in response to new commercial opportunities opened by British rule. Even more limiting, in the two cases cited by the Rudolphs, only a small minority of prosperous traders, businessmen, and landowners took an active part in the working of the caste associations. In the case of the Shanans, the ultimate outcome, for all practical purposes, was to establish a separate subcaste of Nadars, the elite group of Shanans, who had succeeded in changing their occupation (from toddy-tapping to trade and agriculture) and who, in most cases, had moved out of the villages into the towns. According to a recent estimate by the Nadar caste association, the Nadar Mahajana Sangam (which the authors cite in a footnote), some 90 percent of Shanans are still backward; many follow the traditional occupations, are known by their original caste name, and are treated as ritual inferiors (pp. 47-48).

Finally, the Rudolphs themselves concede that India's untouchables —about 20 percent of the total population—cannot effectively use the caste association to cross the pollution barrier, even *after* making striking gains in economic status. Their only hope of escape from the disabilities of outcast status, is physically to leave the village setting. Once again, modernization, in the shape of new opportunities for economic and spatial mobility, seems to be prerequisite to the achievement of egalitarian change.

It is therefore misleading to suggest, as the Rudolphs do, that caste associations have either significantly eroded the traditional ascriptive hierarchy or made a substantial contribution to the growth of equality. Similarly, there is little justification for the claim that paracommunities are a vehicle for mass (peasant) participation in politics. Apart from the problem that the term "peasant" is used indiscriminately throughout to signify "rural" Indians, without regard for wide variations in economic status among large landowners, subsistence farmers, tenant-cultivators, and landless laborers, this conclusion is largely tautological; it is contained in the prior assumption that caste associations are indeed comprehensive "popular" bodies.

Yet the Rudolphs do follow the political activities of the Vanniyar Kula Ksatriya Sangam after Independence. In 1952, "the modern, cosmopolitan" elements took the lead in forming two Vanniyar political parties—the Tamilnad Toilers in South Arcot District and the Commonweal party in North Arcot district. Both parties were so

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successful in mobilizing Vanniyar votes in the villages that by 1955 the Congress party government of Madras was willing to accommodate two Vanniyars in the State Cabinet, reserve five out of twenty civil service positions for Vanniyars, increase the number of places for Vanniyars in the universities, and allocate a fitting number of nominations for Vanniyars on Congress tickets. Simultaneously, the Sangam's two political parties obligingly dissolved themselves and joined the Congress party. But it would be a mistake to accept the authors' interpretation of these events as acts of "meaningful" and "effective" mass participation in politics. On the contrary, the advanced sections of the Vanniyar community, as represented by the Sangam's leadership, proved successful in gaining political support for their parties only because they were able to mobilize traditional ascriptive loyalties. As a result, the small Vanniyar elites were able to maximize their own *personal* power in Madras State; and the concessions they gained for the Vanniyar Kula Ksatriyas as a group were, in fact, most easily exploitable by (and therefore most useful to) the small, upwardly mobile element. In 1952, for example, only some .01 percent of the community had even a high-school education! Thus, during the period of which the Rudolphs write—through the early 1960's—only an infinitesimal minority of the Vanniyar Kula Ksatriyas could reasonably be characterized as active participants in the political process; the great majority continued to perform in their customary subject roles.

One fact, however, is demonstrated beyond question by the Rudolphs' study. That is the enormous proliferation of district, state, and regional caste associations and the extent to which they now act as pressure groups in local and state politics. The consequences of this trend for the continuation of stable democracy in India are by no means necessarily beneficial. In fact, it is possible to imagine serious destabilizing outcomes. The legitimacy of the political system may actually decline, if poorer peasants become alienated from a regime that permits only a few of their caste-fellows to forge ahead. Similarly, the tasks of national integration and economic development may magnify in difficulty, as more and more caste associations enter the political arena and conceive of themselves solely as lobbyists for parochial interests.

In any case, it is impossible to evaluate the effect of caste and other communal groupings on political development in India without examining the relationship between these structures and political parties. Indeed, the Rudolphs attribute the positive impact of caste

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associations on India's politics to the pattern of their interaction with parties, "particularly with that now venerable structure, the Indian National Congress" (p. 24).

II

Myron Weiner's *Party Building in a New Nation* is clearly labeled a study of "how Congress succeeds." It focuses on five District Congress Committees[3] to explain how they perform the three key functions Weiner suggests are necessary to providing stable government: (1) recruitment and training of personnel; (2) mobilization of money and votes; and (3) maintenance of internal cohesion. The result is the most penetrating and illuminating account of grassroots politics in India (at least as of 1962, when this field research was completed) that has yet appeared. At the same time, Weiner's analysis shares the principal shortcoming of *The Modernity of Tradition*: the data presented in the case studies do not substantiate the central thesis that India has been successful in fusing traditional and modern elements to achieve national goals. On the contrary, Weiner's data suggest that concessions to the traditional order have critically undermined the modernizing aims of the national leadership.

The five districts under investigation were deliberately selected to reflect a wide diversity of economic, social, and political conditions; they include three rural districts from three different regions of the country (Kaira, Gujerat; Guntur, Andhra Pradesh; and Belgaum, Mysore) and two cities, the small industrial town of Madurai in Madras and the major urban metropolis of Calcutta in West Bengal. Despite these large differences in background, Weiner reports "some remarkable similarities in all the districts" that explain "why Congress succeeds." The burden of his findings is that "in its efforts to win, Congress adapts itself to the local power structures. It recruits from among those who have local power and influence. It trains its cadres to perform political roles similar to those performed in the traditional society before there was party politics. It manipulates factional, caste,

[3] The district, with a population of two to three million, is the basic unit of local administration in India. It is also the major operating unit of the Congress party. The District Congress Committees (D.C.C.'s) are the communications link between the Pradesh (State) Congress Committees (P.C.C.'s) and the smaller *taluka* and *mandal* committees within their jurisdiction. They often raise their own funds for party work and are responsible for organizing elections in constituencies that fall within district boundaries. They also have a strong voice in the selection of candidates for State Assembly and Parliamentary seats, although the Congress Constitution vests final responsibility for decision in the P.C.C. Election Committee and the Central Election Committee.

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and linguistic disputes, and uses its influence within administration to win and maintain electoral and financial support. It utilizes traditional methods of dispute settlement to maintain cohesion within the party" (p. 15).

These conclusions are painstakingly documented in the case studies. The data show that, at least until 1962, the dimensions of increased participation in Congress were extremely narrow. The advent of universal suffrage did displace the tiny class of English-educated, upper-caste, urban professionals from key positions in the party organization. Yet, in the rural constituencies, the major beneficiaries of this change were the most prosperous sections of the dominant landowning castes, individuals who could exploit a wide network of traditional caste, kinship, rank, and economic ties to organize a large personal following. The relationship between the dominant caste leadership and the Congress party politicians was often asymmetrical: the authority of the former was largely independent of party identification; in many cases, the power of the latter depended on the support of rural elites. Moreover, not all members of the local power structure could be persuaded to join Congress. Two dominant agricultural castes might be in competition for political supremacy; or the dominant caste might be divided by internal factional rivalries. Each major faction was primarily concerned with triumphing over its traditional rival. Factional leaders were therefore interested in contracting political alliances that promised the greatest advantages in the *local* competition for votes from uncommitted individuals and lower castes—usually access to money, jobs, or services. (In some cases, local notables were so invulnerable to any challenge that they eschewed all formal party affiliation and entered politics as Independents.)

As a result, district and State party organizations were generally coalitions of multi-caste alliances, but they were led at the local level by shopkeepers, businessmen, and influential members of the dominant agricultural castes. The rate of politicization of low-caste members was very low. They did not act independently in making demands on the political system; rather, they related to the political process only through the dominant caste leadership. The same pattern of hierarchical mobilization prevailed in the cities, where Congress leadership also came from the "prominent figures in their own localities"—merchants, contractors, and factory owners.

It would be hard to say that membership in the Congress party made local politicians more national-minded and secular in outlook.

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Weiner reports that the majority of Congressmen retained a primary loyalty to their factions (or, if the faction dissolved, to the caste and kinship groupings at their core), rather than to the party. In some instances, Congress politicians secretly collaborated with opposition parties in the same district to exchange support for their respective candidates to State Assembly and/or parliamentary seats in order to protect the prospects of the factional leader. Indeed, local elites were attracted to Congress precisely because it was the government party and could assure influential constituents preferential treatment in the award of loans, grants, contracts, licenses, and supplies. "The active party membership," writes Weiner, "increasingly viewed Congress as a means of obtaining jobs for friends and relatives and of gaining access to the many services and material benefits which government at all levels can bestow. . . . After Independence, Congress increasingly took on the qualities of a political machine" (p. 34).

Neither is there any evidence that Congressmen were particularly concerned with development. On the contrary, the party organization not only co-opted traditional elites in order to win elections, but it also adopted traditional roles. Just as local notables always protected their power and prestige by acting as intermediaries for their followers in dealings with the administration, settling disputes within their faction, and engaging in philanthropical activity, so Congress workers spent most of their time in "expediting" requests to the administration on behalf of important constituents, arbitrating factional disputes, and setting up social-welfare projects. But while rural elites were enthusiastic about the expansion of government-financed development activities at the local level, they showed singularly little interest in national plans that called for higher local contributions (in manpower or taxes) to government development programs. Accordingly, Congressmen could not play an effective development role. Weiner found active party workers much less concerned with investment than "with distributive measures" (p. 176).

Finally, the lure of patronage, while strong, was still not sufficient to ensure party cohesion. On the contrary, it often provoked bitter internal disputes. Factional alliances frequently broke down. There were constant rivalries for control over the party machinery, particularly of the Pradesh Election Committees, which nominated candidates. Dissident elements were also active in the State Legislative Assemblies, using the lure of lucrative ministerial posts to induce Members to "cross over" to their ranks and topple the existing Cabinet. Through-

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out this period, maintaining party cohesion was a full-time job. General Secretaries of the national party in New Delhi, as well as district and Pradesh secretaries, devoted a good deal of their time to arbitrating factional disputes. Their approach was the traditional one of compromise and accommodation: as far as possible the peace was kept by sharing out available resources, status, and power among the rival groups.

It is, of course, extremely hazardous to generalize from the working of five District Congress Committees to the impact of the Congress party on national integration and legitimacy. In so far as we might attempt such a leap, the data appear negative. Speaking of Madurai town (but citing a general phenomenon), Weiner reports that after fifteen years of Independence the Congress party was still winning elections "less because of the effectiveness of its organization than because of the independent power and influence of its candidates" (p. 450). Most Congressmen were neither ideologically nor emotionally attached to the party; they supported it because access to government patronage made it profitable to do so. Moreover, it is clear that during this period, the interests of the majority of the population were not effectively expressed. Indeed, scarce public resources were often siphoned off by projects and schemes that benefited the local elites only, while they in turn were unwilling to make any significant contributions to government development programs or social policies designed to benefit the poor. Simultaneously, standards of honest, efficient administration precipitously declined and local bureaucrats became increasingly susceptible to corruption. It is therefore hard to accept the proposition that the majority of voters—who depend for some improvement in their condition on rational development programs, the expansion of government services, and effective implementation of land reforms—could actually have become more attached to the democratic process during this period. Weiner himself describes the reaction of the middle classes of Calcutta who experienced steady deterioration in public facilities and a relative decline in their own economic standing during fifteen years of Congress rule dedicated to "servicing" the businessmen. He comments, "More coercion is exercised by the police in Calcutta than is common elsewhere in India. The use of the Preventive Detention Act and Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which prohibits public meetings) is commonplace. . . . The ordinary processes of government are thus not exercised by the bulk of the politically active middle classes, and the effort to establish a popular sense of

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legitimacy and efficacy toward government, which has been so successful in much of India, has been less successful among the middle classes of Calcutta" (p. 369).

It does not take much foresight to imagine that as patterns of hierarchical authority erode in the countryside, and as depressed groups develop the political consciousness to make separate demands on the political system, existing party mechanisms for conflict management will prove completely inadequate. In fact, Weiner does cite a "participation crisis" in Kaira district that is suggestive of such a trend. In 1961, the leaders of the low-caste, predominantly tenant-cultivator community of Bariyas—accounting for some 40 percent of the population—deserted the dominant landowning Patidar leadership of the Congress party, and forged an alliance with twice-born Rajputs to gain independent access to the status, resources, and power of the local government. For the first time since Independence, the Congress party was defeated at the polls. In 1967, the Kaira Congress leadership was able to recoup its fortunes by offering tickets, i.e., independent political influence within the party, to several Bariya leaders. It is doubtful that this is a stable solution. As the political consciousness of the majority of Bariyas grows, they will be in a position not only to swamp the minority Patidars within the Congress organization but to demand concessions, by virtue of their numbers, that no foreseeable expansion in the power or resources of local government could actually provide.

III

We are left with something of a paradox: two extremely useful empirical investigations of Indian politics, whose broad generalizations about the processes of political development in India—and by extension, about political development theory—do not appear to be supported by the actual data presented. The major problem appears to lie in the analytical design of both studies: i.e., caste associations and the Congress party are abstracted from the total political system in which they operate. An implicit functional orientation seems to have prompted this approach. The authors are primarily concerned with the key *input* functions of *interest articulation* and *interest aggregation*. They focus their empirical research on the structures and processes that constitute the performance of these functions. As a result, neither the Rudolphs nor Weiner give independent consideration to the consequences of these patterns of action for the Indian political system as a whole. Rather, the outcomes appear to be extrapolated from the political systems that provided the original model for the *input* categories,

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i.e., the modern Western democracies.[4] While the authors conscientiously strive to avoid Western biases—by arguing that varying historical sequences and combinations of events can bring about modern democratic structures and norms—they inexplicably assume that, once established, these processes will generate the same kind of adaptive responses to social pressures on the political system of India—a country in the early stages of modernization—as they did in the West. Moreover, it is the American political model that exerts the major influence on these extrapolations.

The Rudolphs are quite certain that the prospects for stable democracy are increased whenever the major sources of cleavage concern conflicts over the distribution of "values, status, and resources." It is on this assumption that they welcome the proliferation of "para-communities" with their secular, specific, and instrumental demands. In fact, they see the key to India's success in the interaction between the "program and patronage demands of castes . . . [that are] more akin to that of interest and ethnic groups in American politics than to other natural associations in India," and the "brokering" response of the Congress party (p. 68). Indeed, the Rudolphs go even further: they suggest that caste pluralism in many states satisfies the Madisonian conditions for the emergence of republican liberty. There are too many diverse interests for the establishment of a permanent majority; therefore, minorities will have to compromise in order to achieve power.

The best indication of Weiner's conceptual orientation is the actual definition of the scope of his study. Quite clearly, his initial premise is that the key condition for the continuation of stable government in

[4] The "functional approach to comparative politics" is most closely associated with the work of Gabriel Almond and his collaborators. Since the new conceptual scheme was specifically designed to compare modern Western political systems with transitional and traditional societies, Almond tells us that particular functional categories "were derived in a very simple way. . . . We derived our functional categories from the political systems in which structural specialization and functional differentiation have taken place to the greatest extent"; i.e., the Anglo-American democracies. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 16. In a later formulation, Almond and Powell suggest a six-fold classification: three universal *input* functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and communication (abstracted from the roles of associational interest groups, political parties, and the mass media); and three universal *output* functions of legislation, administration, and adjudication (adapted from the separation-of-powers among the three formal branches of government). Together, these functions constitute the *conversion processes* of the political system, transforming an inflow of *demands* and *supports* into an outflow of authoritative policies for the whole society. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966), 27-29.

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India is the maintenance of bargaining structures and procedures to aggregate new claims on the political system. Consequently, he focuses exclusively on the performance of essential maintenance roles by the Congress party organization: recruiting workers, resolving internal conflict, and winning voter support. In fact, the Congress party is judged "successful" precisely because it performs these roles efficiently. Weiner explicitly excludes from his evaluation any other criteria, such as the "integrity and moral worth of the individuals who make up Congress" or "the quality of the government that Congress has provided" (p. 460). Like the Rudolphs, he assumes that it is easier to resolve disputes that center on patronage rather than on ideology; and that the very "multiplicity of factional and parochial groupings in the party . . . increases the possibility of coalitions. In India as elsewhere, if there are many groups but none had a clear majority, even the largest group must compromise to win power" (p. 478).

Yet Weiner is ultimately confronted with a logical dilemma that demonstrates the pitfalls of applying the American model to Indian conditions. On the one hand, he recognizes that the rate of economic growth has been very modest; on the other, he attributes Congress' success to its aggregative capabilities. He is therefore forced to argue that economic performance, i.e., the rate of growth, is less important to political stability than is governmental performance, i.e., the rate of expansion in government functions and payrolls. But since it is manifestly unfeasible to separate government's capacity to increase activities and employment from its ability to raise additional resources—which, in turn, seems to require rather substantial increments in economic growth—Weiner's final explanation of India's political stability rests heavily on an additional thesis: Indians are more concerned about the relative share of their own group in what is available than with the overall rate of economic development. In fact, he asserts as a general proposition that "it is more relevant for purposes of political analysis to look at the economic share which each group receives rather than at the country's economic growth rates" (p. 465).

This generalization may have some merit with respect to the modernized capitalist democracies of the West, where the major domestic issue often concerns marginal adjustments in the distribution of national income. It could hardly be more irrelevant to a new nation like India where the number, kind, and complexity of problems are of an entirely different order.[5] And it is precisely when we restore Indian

[5] One immediate and vital difference, of course, is that the distribution issue is being raised *before* problems of increasing productivity have been solved. Moreover, the new

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politics to its proper context that the bargaining style of paracommunities and the brokering techniques of the Congress party appear dysfunctional for the performance goals of the Indian political system.

It is true that the politics of patronage provided stability and a modicum of economic advance until the early 1960's. This outcome, however, was largely fortuitous, the product of favorable—and inherently transitory—factors in the Indian political environment. Probably the most important of these factors were the low level of articulation of interest among backward and untouchable castes and the continuing strength of traditional patterns of vertical political mobilization. It was only in such circumstances that the Congress party, as the heritor of the British governmental and administrative apparatus, could buy continuing political support at a tolerable public price by funneling patronage through rather narrow (if socially diverse) local elites in return for a guaranteed vote of client groups. Moreover, under Nehru's leadership, the Congress party itself controlled the largest single bloc of voter support. Opposition groups—though they always commanded a majority of the total vote among them—were too internally fragmented and disunited to mount a coordinated attack on the ruling party. Many would-be defectors decided against risking their political futures by leaving the party, and carried on their struggle for power within the Congress organization. Whatever success party trouble shooters enjoyed in conciliating rival factions was due, in large measure, to such pragmatic calculations. At the same time, conciliation procedures did manage to achieve some degree of legitimacy from the presence of national leaders—notably Nehru himself—whose personal power was sufficiently independent of intra-party factional support to make them acceptable as impartial arbiters. All of these conditions together—the narrow interest base, popular support for Congress under Nehru's leadership, a fragmented opposition, and the presence of national leaders "above politics"—permitted the party organization to maintain internal cohesion, win elections, and form stable governments. They even allowed the national government some modest leverage over the most extreme parochial demands to mobilize small surpluses for investment in economic development.

Even before Nehru's death in 1963, however, these advantages began to fade. Centrifugal forces sharply increased. The decision to divide India into linguistic provinces in 1956 (the first major political "accom-

nations are simultaneously confronted by crises of national identity, political integration, governmental legitimacy, and popular participation, all of which had been more or less resolved in the Anglo-American democracies when the distribution crisis arose.

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modation" to traditional sentiments) heightened linguistic nationalism, stimulated new demands for communal (Sikh) and tribal (Naga, Mizo) states, and even generated strong separatist movements in the South and in the northern hill areas. At the same time, the introduction of *panchayat raj* (popularly elected village, block, and district government bodies vested with administrative responsibility for local development programs) increased the autonomy of District Congress Committees, providing them with independent sources of patronage. Perhaps most destabilizing, lower-caste groups finally began to realize the power of numbers in contesting elections to the new local government bodies. Backward and untouchable castes began to organize themselves into caste associations that suddenly made separate demands on the political system. Participation crises like that in Kaira occurred in Congress party organizations all over India. Moreover, the increased burden on the aggregative capabilities of the Congress party came at a time when the amount of power in the Indian political system (i.e., the expansion of political offices and of functions of state and local governments) had reached a plateau, and when earlier concessions to local and sectional elites had already lowered the rate of economic advance to levels that barely kept pace with population growth.

Weiner is undoubtedly right in suggesting that the primary concern of parochial groups is with their relative shares of available resources, not with the overall level of development. But he is mistaken in assuming that such priorities can have an integrative effect in an economy of scarcity where national commitments are extremely weak. In India, increasing demands and static resources simply placed an even higher premium on corruption. By the early 1960's, officers in the police, the judiciary, the state and local administrations, and even the vaunted Indian Administrative Service were all engaged in selling influence (often at fixed prices and graded fees) to individuals ranging from industrialists, contractors and suppliers, traders, and large agriculturists to the Chief Ministers and the Ministers of the state and central governments.[6]

With Nehru's death, the disintegrative tendencies of the political system noticeably accelerated. His successors could no longer claim an independent base of power in popular support; they were themselves creatures of coalitions of factional alliances within the state party organizations.[7] Much of the prestige and power of the national leaders

[6] See John B. Monteiro, *Corruption* (Bombay 1966).

[7] The role of state party leaders in the selection of both Lal Bahadur Sastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi as successors to Mr. Nehru is described in great detail in Michael Brecher, *Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India* (New York 1966).

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—along with their credentials as party arbiters—disappeared. The balance of political power shifted decisively toward the States.

Yet, at the same time, the State parties found themselves in severe political difficulties. Without Nehru as a shield, Congress ideology lost its last remaining power to legitimize the continuation of the ruling party in power. In fact, Congress became the object of unceasing vilification by opposition parties of all shades of opinion; the party organization was branded as a cynical alliance of landlords, industrialists, and profiteers to whom "bribery and corruption, inefficiency and favoritism have become a way of life."[8] Dissident elements inside Congress, as well as opposition groups, began to see the first real opportunity since Independence of defeating the Congress party at the polls.

On the eve of the Fourth General Elections, in 1967, there were unprecedented defections from the Congress organization. Large dissident groups in five states (Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala, Rajasthan, and Mysore) withdrew to form rival parties. Also, for the first time opposition groups succeeded in arranging a series of electoral alliances (including the Congress defectors) that allowed them to present a united front at the polls. Their appeals to the electorate were not subtle. Apart from bringing the ubiquitous charges of corruption, the United Fronts promised to abolish land revenue, lower all other taxes, raise prices for agricultural produce, increase dearness allowances for government employees, and establish a minimum wage for workers. Regional and communal parties liberally embellished these economic blandishments with assurances of greater protection for linguistic and religious interests. The outcome was a staggering defeat for the Congress party in the States. It is true that the total vote polled by the Congress party for State Assemblies in 1967 declined by little more than three percentage points over 1962 (40.07 percent compared to 43.42 percent); but Opposition alliances converted this loss to United Front victories in nine out of sixteen Indian States. Congress managed to retain the majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, but by a reduced margin.[9]

[8] R. Chandidas, Ward Morehouse, Leon Clark, Richard Fontera, eds., *India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections* (New York 1968). *Swatantra Party Manifesto*, 1967, p. 11. Similar statements are contained in the manifestos of all major political parties.

[9] A comparative analysis of all four general elections has been published by the Indian National Congress, *The Fourth General Elections: A Statistical Analysis* (New Delhi 1967). The Indian Institute of Public Opinion, which evaluated the voting data shortly after the Fourth Election, concluded that Congress had lost strength not only among minority communities (Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs) but among the

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It is not too much to say that the ever-expanding arena of political competition since 1966 has been disastrous to the nation-building goals of the Congress party. By 1968, virtually all political parties—not merely those with a narrow regional or communal base—were reported as "wooing the [religious, linguistic, and sub-regional] minorities with vigor and . . . changing the emphasis of their policies to improve their appeal to them."[10] Plans to introduce Hindi as the national language were abandoned after the new DMK government in Madras lent tacit support to student-led rioters agitating for Tamil.[11] Over forty of India's sixty-seven universities have already introduced degree programs in the regional languages, and, beginning in 1969, the Union Public Services Commission will offer candidates the option of answering most examination questions in any one of India's fourteen major languages.

But perhaps the greatest casualty has been India's economic-development effort. Nineteen sixty-six and sixty-seven saw the first decrease in public sector development outlay over a previous year since 1951.[12] States that were already dangerously indebted to the central government recklessly adopted record deficit budgets to buy popular support. The United Front governments variously abolished or reduced land revenue taxes, increased the dearness allowance of government employees, granted subsidies on the price of food grains, and waived recovery on state loans. Finally, at the National Development Council's meeting in December, 1967, the Chief Ministers of the States flatly declared that they had reached the "saturation point" in levying new taxes.[13] Any increase in public investment for development would henceforth have to come from central revenues. The Central Government, faced by rising defense costs, declining levels of foreign aid,

majority Hindu community, particularly "the 21-35 [age] group, the lower literates and again, the lower income groups." *The Statesman*, March 9, 1967.

[10] *The Statesman*, June 14, 1968. The most striking example of this was the 1968 alliance between the Shiv Sena and two all-India parties, the Praja Socialist Party and the Swatantra Party in the Bombay municipal elections. The Shiv Sena, a strongly communal organization, seeks to exclude all Tamilian (or southern) workers from Bombay in order to provide more jobs for native Marathi-speaking people. The Shiv Sena, with the help of its allies, won a sweeping victory in the election. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Indian People's Party) has also been suspected of stepping up its customary anti-Muslim propaganda; and the number of Hindu-Muslim clashes has actually increased from 133 in 1966 to 209 in 1967. See *The Economist*, June 22, 1968.

[11] The Dravida Munnetra Kazakham (Dravidian Progressive Federation) defeated the Congress party in Madras State in 1966 on a platform pledged to the "protection of the Tamil language" against inroads from Hindi, and efforts to "give first priority to plans meant for uplift of the poor." R. Chandidas and others, pp. 100-101.

[12] India, Finance Ministry, *Economic Survey, 1966-67* (New Delhi 1967), 24.

[13] *The Statesman*, December 2, 1967.

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strict limits on the feasibility of deficit financing (in view of serious inflation), and the virtual exhaustion of new possibilities for taxing personal income in the small organized industrial sector, was stymied. The Fourth Five Year Plan, already one year behind schedule, had to be further delayed. Budgeted outlays for development actually declined in 1967-68 and 1968-69.[14] The Planning Commission's "Approach" document for the Fourth Plan, now scheduled to begin in 1969-70, envisages sufficient public funds only to complete industrial projects already under way;[15] it provides no additional investment for new capital projects. At the same time, it proposes a profusion of new incentives to the private sector in an attempt to shift the greatest responsibility for economic modernization to the large agriculturalists, businessmen, and industrialists. But even if this strategy should succeed in accelerating economic growth, it is bound to increase social disparities and aggravate the serious crisis of legitimacy that now confronts the Congress party.

Most alarming, events since 1966 have brought the entire political system into increasing public contempt. Disputes over the division of the spoils of political office among constituent parties of United Front governments (complicated as they are by divergent ideological orientations and conflicting bases of caste and class support) have prevented any agreement on substantive issues and brought even ordinary administration to a standstill in some states. *Ad hoc* arrangements for the distribution of scarce resources have repeatedly broken down as parties ceaselessly conspire to gain the maximum temporary advantage over rival groups. Political disputes that previously took place within the Congress party and resulted in nothing more serious than a redistribution of Cabinet portfolios now occur among parties and lead to the overthrow of governments. During 1967, Congress governments in three states (Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh) collapsed when Congress legislators went over to the opposition and joined new United Front governments. At the same time, Congress politicians were equally busy offering money, as well as the promise of ministerial office, to members of parties in United Front governments who would "cross over" to Congress. In West Bengal, Bihar, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh, where Congress efforts were concentrated, chronic uncertainty about the actual strength of coalitions claiming majorities in

[14] *The Statesman*, March 1, 1968.

[15] The Planning Commission's "Approach to the Fourth Plan" is summarized in *Economic and Political Weekly*, III (May 18, 1968).

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the State Assemblies finally led to the imposition of President's Rule.[16]

It is hard to see in any of these events the kind of social pluralism that leads to Madisonian democracy. In an underdeveloped country where parochial loyalties far outweigh national commitment, where economic conflict is superimposed on traditional regional, linguistic, and caste rivalries, where there is no firm consensus on acceptable rules of competition, and where economic surpluses are either static or growing much more slowly than are demands, "extending the sphere . . . [and] taking in a greater number of parties and interests" is more likely to lead to deadlock than to the rational adjustment of disputes. Minority groups do not *have* to compromise their claims; they can equally well stand their ground even as the ground gives way beneath them. One thing is certain. The politics of patronage has long since ceased to be functional for the Indian political system—if, indeed, it ever was. Its continuation under present circumstances can end only in the complete breakdown of the parliamentary system of government.

[16] According to a report in the *New York Times*, May 17, 1968, the Home Ministry has calculated that there were 438 defections in the various State Assemblies during the first twelve months after the general elections. In Haryana and Bihar, the same individuals crossed back and forth between parties several times. Of 125 defectors from the Congress party in Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, 52 were made either Chief Ministers or Ministers in non-Congress governments. Similarly, 64 of the 95 defectors from United Front coalitions in Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan, and West Bengal became Ministers in new Congress-supported governments. In May 1968, new elections in Haryana returned the Congress party to power with virtually the same margin it had won in 1966. But dissensions within the Haryana Pradesh Congress Committee (which had precipitated the original defections) were so bitter that the party was not able to hold new organizational elections until December, and the defeated group once again organized defections from the Congress Legislature Party that placed the government's majority in doubt.

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POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

By PETER H. MERKL

Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, editors, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, New York, Free Press, 1967, 518 pp. $9.95.

Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, editors, *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology, Transactions of the Westermarck Society, vol. x, Helsinki, Academic Bookstore, 1964, 463 pp. $8.75.

Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 358 pp. $8.50.

THE field of the comparative study of political party systems has been particularly fortunate to have been the focus of quite a number of substantial scholarly team efforts in recent years. Individual case studies are still appearing that follow Robert A. Dahl's model of the "patterns of opposition."[1] Terms such as "crisis of participation" or Sartori's "extreme pluralism," from the book edited by Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner,[2] are widely used in the description of party systems. Even the study of one-party systems and of national integration in developing areas is beginning to settle down to a common terminology that will increasingly allow comparison with the better-explored systems.[3] The three books under consideration here add further sophistication to this area in their various ways, although it is important to note at the outset that the comparative study of party systems could easily absorb several more dozens of individual or collaborative efforts without being over-researched. Traditionally one of the most demanding challenges to outstanding political scientists and sociologists, with a long honor roll of great names ranging from Ostrogorski and Robert Michels to Sigmund Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, the comparative study of party systems has so many questions still to be resolved that there is merit now in pinpointing

[1] *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven 1966) chs. 2, 11-13. A panel with many papers was devoted to this topic at the Grenoble Round Table of the International Political Science Association in 1965. See also the paper by Robert H. Dix on "Oppositions and Development in Latin America" delivered at the 1967 APSA meeting, and the new quarterly, *Government and Opposition*, London.

[2] *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton 1966).

[3] See, for example, the tables in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley 1966), 5 and 657.

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some of the areas that need to be investigated further in order to advance it. This limited task is what we shall attempt in this review.

The first complex of questions to be discussed by way of reviewing the works under consideration is the concept of political cleavages and, by implication, of consensus at various levels. It is the cleavage structures that are said to be the primary cause of the particular configuration of various party systems. Our second point will be precisely the manner in which the cleavages have been translated into actual systems. And third, we will look into functional approaches to party systems that are in existence.

I

The chief emphasis of the volume edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan is on "conflicts and their translation into party systems" or "alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic" (p. 5). This is particularly true of the brilliant introductory essay by the editors, which discusses the different kinds and the timing of politically relevant cleavages. It suggests how a "stable cleavage system" develops, how it aggregates interests (or fails to), and how it may be facilitated or inhibited by legal or administrative controls on suffage. More specifically, the essay attempts to shed some light upon the initial developments toward competitive politics and mass participation following upon the granting of mass suffrage.[4] Thus it seeks to explain current political alignments by pointing to the historically inherited packages of ideologies and outlooks of antagonistic groups whose earlier cleavage systems "froze" into party systems, as nationwide competition integrated the conflicts cross-locally into national patterns of institutionalized conflict.

To systematize this commendable undertaking, Lipset and Rokkan resort to some extraordinary diagramming and model-building. Evidently following Talcott Parsons' writings on the "theory of action," they chart the Parsonsian paradigm of societal interchanges and undertake to explore his "*I* quadrant," the integrative subsystem, beyond anything Parsons ever did with it. Two coordinates within the quadrant measure the dimensions of political cleavage, a territorial axis between "oppositions within the national established elite" at the center and "local-regional oppositions" at the periphery, and a functional axis

[4] Stein Rokkan has already been at work exploring party systems from this angle for many years. See, for example, his illuminating table 3 in "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes Toward a Perspective on Current Research," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana, Illinois 1962), 75.

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between "interest-specific oppositions" and "ideological oppositions" (p. 10). The two coordinates further cut quadrant *I* into subquadrants juxtaposing an external-internal and a consummatory-instrumental dichotomy. The resulting model of how certain cleavages will arise almost inevitably in the process of nation-building is conceptually clear but not beyond critical challenge. The diagram, for example, sorts out territorial and cultural as well as interest-specific and ideological oppositions in a way that presupposes all kinds of definitions that should have been spelled out at length so that they could have been considered on their merits. The juxtaposition of internal-external and instrumental-consummatory criteria also can hardly escape the charge of excessive simplification. A simple axis between center and periphery, to be specific, is a rather simplistic tool for measuring the great variety of possible combinations and conflicts. It borders on obscurantism to speak of "the typical reactions" of minorities, culturally threatened populations, and peripheral regions, as witness any country with minority problems, beginning with the United States. These reactions obviously depend on the local cleavages, especially in poly-communal societies, and on the policies of the central government at least as much as on the "peripheral position" of a group. By the same token, it is rather doubtful that *all* interest-specific oppositions tend to be amenable to rational bargaining and compromise, and that *all* ideological or religious oppositions are not. Attitudes toward conflict and violence are rather independent variables that can range over a wide spectrum within either kind of group, as the histories of church-state or of labor relations bear out. And these attitudes again depend on factors of central government policy and of the socialization of "extremists," interest-specific or ideological, as the case may be. The same doubts apply to the allegedly "orthodox-fundamentalist beliefs" of rural, peasant, and small-town populations in the early phases of nation-building (p. 12), as Barrington Moore, Jr., and indeed some of the contributors to the Lipset-Rokkan book clearly show. French peasants and Italian tenant-farmers today, as well as the revolutionary peasant and artisan masses of Lenin, Mao, and Gramsci, and of the historic revolutions, are cases in point.

The discussion of the nature of political cleavages by Lipset and Rokkan proceeds to more solid ground with the consideration of the cleavage patterns of "national" and industrial revolutions and their subpatterns of conflict between church and state, and between subject and dominant cultures, as well as between primary and secondary economy,

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and between workers and employers or owners. Some of the complexity noted as missing earlier is readmitted here in the examples of the effect of central government policies on the hardening or softening of cleavages. The authors further distinguish these enumerated cleavages, which are all "movements of protest against the *established* national elite," from new cleavages of fully mobilized nation-states, such as Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, Poujadism in France, and the radical Right in the United States. There follows another Lipsetian theory of comparative fascism that is as strikingly original as it sounds wrong and unhistoric. All these movements, it is asserted, "venerate the historically given nation and its culture," (p. 23), a point highly questionable with all four examples, depending on one's understanding of national identity, since the sense of "national identities" of each of the four movements has differed substantially from that of nonmembers in these countries. Basing an economic interpretation of German National Socialism as the revolt of the "kleine Mann" against the financial interests, corporations, trade unions, cooperatives, and—oddly in this company—organized Catholicism on aggregate data from the 1930, 1932, and 1933 German parliamentary elections is not very persuasive and really fails to "show beyond doubt" (p. 25) the petit-bourgeois nature of the Nazi landslide. What can aggregate data tell us about voter motivation, and especially about the extent of anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic prejudice in Weimar Germany? The authors may have a point in their economic interpretation of Austrian National Socialism or Poujadism. But they fail to account for the role of what Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner so perceptively called the "specialists of violence" in Italian and German fascism,[5] especially the war veterans and professional military men. And the American Right is likewise hardly dominated by the little man in the street.

Lipset and Rokkan also suggest that these protest movements in fully mobilized polities focus on the "rising network of new elites" governing the new large bureaucracies of industry and government, the communications industry, the mass organizations, and socially advancing minority groups. After decades of fairly well-documented charges of bureaucratic and entrepreneurial collusion with Hitler and Mussolini, such an analysis of these two movements comes as a surprise

[5] See their *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 252ff. The point here is, of course, what was more significant about these protest movements—their economic interest or other motivations. It was not whether many of them could be classified as lower middle-class.

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although the anti-bureaucratic affect, at least, fits the American Right and both anti-capitalism and anti-bureaucratic feeling may fit Poujadism. As for the rest of the "new elites," the point seems well taken though perhaps no more applicable to their leaders than to journalists, trade unionists, and minority-group members in general. The "anti-system" affect and authoritarianism of the protest against the "new elites and the institutions which foster them," rather than against the "traditional central culture" is also poorly explained. While acknowledging the lack of interest in "interest-specific" protest, to speak with the authors, they fail to mention the ideological, consummatory, even salvational bent of these movements, and curiously, omit also the triggering effect of Socialist and Communist movements in Italy or Germany, and of anti-Communism and anti-Socialism in the United States.

A quick glance at the many distinguished contributions to the Lipset-Rokkan book shows the extent to which the concept of political cleavages in the editors' sense—or any other—has been utilized. There is, for example, Robert R. Alford's familiar discussion of "class voting in Anglo-American political systems"—with little updating and still quite innocent of any definition of "class" or "class interest"—which deals with differences of income, education, and occupation in relation to voting. Alford demonstrates with aggregate data and polls that Great Britain and Australia, both with trade-union-based Labour Parties, have more "class voting" than do Canada and the United States. Alan D. Robinson applies similar questions to New Zealand, adding sophisticated surveys of voter attitudes, though he too addresses himself to the concept of cleavage only by suggesting that the Labour Party of New Zealand forced its opponents into similar "class-based" unity. Robert T. McKenzie and Allan Silver, on the other hand, examine the concept from many angles in their discussion of the working-class Tories of England, a subject calling for the separation of class cleavages from party cleavages, and an analysis of time- and age-differences, and of the range of deferential attitudes. Mattei Dogan's superb and painstaking investigation of the patterns of social stratification and voting in France and Italy shows once more that he is, next to Stein Rokkan, one of the leading social scientists in continental Europe. His analysis of political cleavages skillfully pits the multiple social divisions of the two countries against their numerous parties, and comes up with such patterns as their "conservative workers" and "red peasants," the "city-dwelling farmers," the political

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patterns of Italian mass organizations, and no fewer than nine social classes in France, all of which distribute their votes over several parties (p. 157). Dogan concludes tellingly that in France and Italy, political cleavages must be observed in their regional contexts, because the parties and their ideologies are polymorphous in character. There are an industrial and an agrarian communism, similar varieties of socialism, a left and a right Christian Democracy, two Gaullisms, and two kinds of extreme Right.

Dogan also makes a half-hearted attempt to trace political cleavages in French history. Juan J. Linz, in his discussion of the past and future party systems of Spain, can hardly help dwelling heavily on the pre-republican and republican past and making appropriate comparisons with Italy. Of all the contributors, Linz comes closest to describing various opposition movements that could be placed on Lipset and Rokkan's territorial and functional coordinates, pre-Franco Spain having experienced almost every opposition pattern conceivable, although his discussion of fascism is certainly too sophisticated for the model. By and large, and except for his conjectures about a future Spanish party system, Linz speaks only of partisan cleavages. In a second essay, however, which happily resurrects the author's 1959 dissertation on the "social bases" of West German party politics, Linz discusses social divisions and their correlation with West German voting in the early fifties. This was, unfortunately, the only detailed, although obviously very limited, analysis of cleavage-ridden German history the editors saw fit to include. On the basis of his data, the author gives the SPD, for example, a relatively low working-class profile as compared to the British and Scandinavian Socialist parties, though far more class character than its *Volkspartei* opponent, the CDU. Joji Watanuki focuses his discussion of Japanese voting behavior especially on the white-collar vote in comparison to that of other social classes. In his discussion of Brazil, G.A.D. Soares barely speaks of cleavages. This is less true of Immanuel Wallerstein on West Africa, who discusses distinct social groups and political elites, although he believes that true party systems must await further socio-economic development and the articulation of distinct group interests.

The book *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, edited by Allardt and Littunen, is in many ways a predecessor and supplement to that of Lipset and Rokkan, both of whom are represented in it. Lipset's lengthy contribution on political cleavages in developed and emerging polities is, in part, quite similar to his famous essay on the

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changing European class structure.[6] The evolving major social classes give birth in turn to liberal, conservative, and Socialist movements, and with regard to the last the rapidity of industrialization is a major contributor to labor extremism. "Cleavage structures" such as those in France are discussed here somewhat in the same way as Duverger presents his roster of issues that makes multipartism inevitable.[7] The effect of proportional representation in encouraging and perpetuating multiparty systems is also mentioned. The sources of party cleavage, the author argues, are largely aspects of stratification—of differences in status, income, or power—or of religious-cultural differences (p. 35), the latter being more typical of developing societies while the former, as in the Lipset-Rokkan model, are more typical of developed societies. Age, education, and sex can also give rise to significant cleavages, as Lipset's examples from around the world appear to bear out.

Erik Allardt, in an essay on class consciousness and conflict in Finnish politics, wrestles with the concepts of class and cleavages in explaining the persistence since the civil war of 1918 of a large Communist party in Finland. Using Alford's distinction between manual- and nonmanual-occupation voters for Left parties, he demonstrates significant and intergenerational differences among the four Scandinavian countries and concludes that as applied to Finland this distinction is particularly significant because of the "isolation of manual occupations" there (pp. 101-5). As Ralf Dahrendorf has stressed, the Marxist idea of two antagonistic classes is most meaningful only when many cleavage lines, such as divisions of occupation, wealth, ethnicity, etc., merge into one, rather than crosscutting each other.[8] But a poorly crystallized status, at least in some societies, may also lead to dissatisfaction, withdrawal, and extremism. Allardt shows with 1958 interview data that highly crystallized working-class status is better correlated with voting Communist while poorly crystallized working- or middle-class status correlates more with voting for the Social Democratic Party (p. 107). The author adds other dimensions of cleavage as well, when he remarks on the roll-call patterns in the Finnish Parliament, which divide chiefly along Left-Right, urban-rural, and Communist–non-Communist lines; or when he mentions the fact that most Finnish workers read the bourgeois press; or in his discussion of voter attitudes on issues or on other parties, and of in-

[6] "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," *Daedalus* (Winter 1964), 271-303. The Allardt and Littunen book even cites Lipset-Rokkan as a book in press scheduled to appear in 1965, which shows how close the two were in time.

[7] See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London 1954), 231-32.

[8] See his *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959), 213-38.

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come and regional variations in the factors of increasing Communist strength.

These examples from the two books will suffice, perhaps, to show the muddled definitions of political cleavages in all but a few of the contributions to the literature. Nearly everyone acknowledges their vital significance to an understanding of party systems, but few indeed are the attempts at conceptual clarification. Pertti Pesonen in his essay with Allardt in the Lipset-Rokkan book refreshingly prefaces his remarks with a few clarifying distinctions such as that between social-structural and nonstructural political cleavages, for example, a line of disagreement about foreign policy. He stresses the fact that "all cleavages presuppose some kinds of groupings" (p. 325) that may or may not possess solidarity and cohesion on nonpolitical grounds. And it is hardly a matter of indifference whether a structural cleavage separates Finns from the Swedish-speaking minority or one social class from another (pp. 325-6), or whether a nonstructural cleavage has opened up over Finland's relationship to Russia, over the form of central institutions and decision-making processes, or over particular governmental personnel.

Before we can meaningfully analyze political cleavages, it would appear, we shall have to draw some vital analytical distinctions about the levels and nature of cleavages. At the lowest societal level, for example, geographic, ethnic, or religious divisions may be *capable* of developing into political cleavages, depending on their saliency and the direction of social mobilization processes that could just as easily dissolve these groupings as make them the source of cleavages. The economic, occupational, and educational differences at the same level are in most populations distributed along normal curves—which makes it a matter of controversy to impose a "class line" at any one point of the curve, without outside confirmation. Subjective self-identification with a class or hostile perception of another class, as shown in interviews, but not just surmised from aggregate data, could indeed confirm the presence of a major cleavage between antagonistic classes. At the level of non-political organizations such as churches, ethnic associations, or organized agriculture or labor, a *prima facie* case for the presence of a solidary, cohesive group can be made, but there need not be a political cleavage unless there is evidence of hostility among the organized groups. Not infrequently, the leadership of such non-political organizations may even be anxious to reduce such intergroup tension as may arise from the prejudices of their members.

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At the level or party membership and "gladiatorial activity," in Lester Milbrath's phrase, we are dealing with a political cleavage based on a solidary group engaged in competition with other parties, although its significance to the political system varies according to its size and strategic position. It is certainly conceivable that parties and especially the party leadership—on yet another cleavage level—create political cleavages in the voting public that would not exist otherwise. The party voters also vary greatly in the degree to which they could be called the solidary-group basis of a political cleavage. The party leadership and the rank and file within any one party, of course, could even generate a new political cleavage and split the party and its following throughout the country. In the governmental structure, finally, there are cleavages of sorts at different governmental levels, from local to regional and national. Some are cleavages between governments and oppositions that may or may not be related to supporting solidary groups in the voting public. Others are policy cleavages that can divide voters, legislators, and even administrators or judges, as well as solidary groupings of society. The upshot of all this complexity of the cleavage structure and its many possible combinations is that nothing less than building a complex model and developing some reliable way of accounting for the congruence or crosscutting of cleavages can protect us against charges of impressionistic dilettantism. Even in political settings of extreme polarization, not all significant cleavages will coincide. Ways of measuring the degrees of their significance and congruence, however, could establish a comparative tool superior to much of our loose talk about different kinds of opposition.

II

The second vantage point from which the literature at hand might be considered is that of the investigation of the link between cleavages and party systems. For, except for the cleavages among the parties themselves, cleavages in society and at the organizational, communications, and governmental levels are not necessarily determinants of the party system. The Conservative-Liberal two-party systems of the nineteenth century, for example, preferred to ignore sharp class antagonisms and other cleavages and were said, at least in Great Britain, to be drawn from a fairly homogeneous social basis as compared to the heterogeneous societies they served.

On this point Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen in the Allardt-Lit-

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tunen book (pp. 162 ff.) show the way to the theories advanced in Lipset and Rokkan's essay in discussing "five dimensions of conflict" in the evolution of the Norwegian system of "cleavages and alignments within the national polity" since 1882. Although the authors' main concern here is with regional contrasts, the theory moves along lines by now familiar from the Lipset-Rokkan essay. First comes the territorial opposition between the center and the periphery, the provinces, which produces a struggle for parliamentary supremacy between Left and Right. Second is a social-cultural conflict between the educated urban officials and patricians and the peasants; a third cleavage between secular liberalism and religious fundamentalism splits the Left and adds another party, the Moderates. The fourth conflict is that between the primary and the secondary economy, and the fifth is between labor and management. The broadening of suffrage, the question of union with Sweden, industrialization, the growth of the working class, and eventually the enfranchisement of women all helped to realign the party system, which soon included six to nine different parties. Rokkan repeats this main theme in his article, "Geography, Religion, and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics," in the Lipset-Rokkan book (pp. 389-403), and concludes that the shift from the territorial-cultural to the functional-economic dimension has been the essence of the nation-building process in Norway (pp. 436-8), the resulting party system having in the end integrated all elements in the nation.

For their comparative model, Lipset and Rokkan add to this basic matrix an ingenious theory of "thresholds" for the "expression of protest and the representation of interests in each society."[9] The first threshold deals with the *legitimation* of opposition as such, or its outlawing as conspiratorial. The second is the threshold of *incorporation*, involving the voting rights of opposition. The third threshold, *representation*, raises the question whether a new movement must join existing parties or whether it can gain representation in its own right. The fourth threshold is that against unrestrained *majority rule*. The exploration of the range of known variations from autocracies with high thresholds on all four counts to some of the European proportional representation systems, especially that of the Weimar Republic, shows a continuous development at the higher threshold-levels, but no common end. Some polities, for example, left the last two thresholds high or medium, resulting in systems such as that of the United

[9] See also n. 4, above.

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States, France, and Great Britain. The authors are careful to point to the significance of the "rules of central decision-making" and to the "costs and pay-offs of mergers, alliances, and coalitions" to explain, for instance, the peculiar nature of the American and Canadian systems. But they make no mention of the post-1945 reaction in Europe to the earlier experimentation with lower *representation* and *majority* thresholds.[10] In fact, they show no concern about the intricate questions inherent in the problem of minority representation versus political stability, which was the ruin of the Weimar Republic.

Putting together the cleavages of the "national" and "industrial" revolutions with the threshold theory, Lipset and Rokkan develop their model of the translation of cleavage systems into party systems. First, they still point out that the "constitutive contrasts in the national system of party constellations" manifest themselves *before* any thresholds are lowered and that party formations take place at the early stage of competitive politics, no later than "on the very eve" of the mobilization of the newly enfranchised masses. The high threshold of *representation* severely tested and then entrenched new movements in the alignments. The later lowering of that threshold, with proportional representation, only preserved their separate existence, adding perhaps a few splinters. The national revolution had rather different effects on the formation of religiously motivated movements in Protestant countries than it did in mixed or Catholic countries. And the industrial revolution also produced varied effects of the conflict between primary and secondary economy, though everywhere more or less splintered working-class movements sprang up.

Lipset and Rokkan propose to start their analysis with the consideration of the possible coalitions of the nation-building elite (N) of a country with a national church (C), the Roman Catholic church (R), religious dissidents (D), landowners (L), or an urban commercial or industrial elite (U), against the possible coalitions of a movement of resistance at the periphery (P) with these elements (pp. 36-7). N has several options, both on the religious and on the economic front, and its choices naturally restrict those of P and, where C is dominant but R forms a strong minority, may even split it in two P alliance groups. An eightfold typology of "basic political oppositions" ensues in which, for example, the German and Prussian "nation-building

[10] See, for example, Arnold Zurcher, ed., *Constitutions and Constitutional Trends since World War II* (New York 1955), 13-35, 191-224. The extensive Western literature on the merits of two-party as compared to multi-party systems could also be cited here in favor of not lowering the last two thresholds.

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elite" on the eve of the breakthrough to democratization and mass mobilization is said to be the Conservatives in league with *C* and *L*—presumably the Protestant Church and the Junkers against a split opposition of secular-urban Liberals and the Catholic Center and "the Bavarians," presumably the Bavarian Patriots of 1870. No year is given and there is no indication of a split Liberal movement, unless the National Liberals are simply counted with the nation-building Conservatives. Some Prussian Conservatives, of course, were in opposition to the new *Reich* and so were some other regional and ethnic minorities. But such quibbling is not to deny the model considerable merit and explanatory power as a comparative method. As the authors point out, they merely sought to reduce the bewildering variety of empirical party systems to a "set of ordered consequences of decisions and developments" at three critical historical junctures: the Reformation struggle for ecclesiastical control, the conflict over the control of mass education in the mobilizing nation-states after 1789, and the struggle between landed and industrial interests. Thus the fateful division of Europe between Reformation and Counter-reformation is also understood in terms of its profound effect upon the formation of current party systems, differentiating Northwest and Northern Europe from Southern and Central Europe and explaining the problems of mixed patterns in the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland. The comparison of Italy with France, or Switzerland with the Netherlands, also shows the result of late and incomplete national unification.

Rokkan and Lipset also come to grips with the problem of "parties for territorial defense," cases of coinciding rather than crosscutting cleavages in any well defined territory of a country. They grapple valiantly with the even more difficult problem of what set of circumstances produces agrarian parties and suggest (1) weak industrial-urban centers at the time of suffrage extension, (2) dominant family-size farms or legally protected lease-holding, (3) cultural and economic barriers between countryside and cities, and (4) insignificance of Catholicism as a set applying not only to the Nordic countries but also to such parts of Austria and Switzerland as witnessed the rise of agrarian parties after 1919. It is a good try but somewhat unconvincing to a person familiar with the complexities of peasant organization, for example, in Imperial and Weimar Germany or, for that matter, in contemporary Italy. A more promising theory, it would appear, would have to begin with the rise of the different agricultural associations and their hostile or friendly relations with existing polit-

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ical parties. Thus the timing of peasant mobilizations could be placed in the context of their options of action within existing parties, Protestant or Catholic, or as a broad new protest movement against existing parties or governments. The leaders of German agricultural movements since the 1890's, for example, have hardly ever found it necessary to function as parties and have generally considered the formation of agrarian parties such as the *Bayerischer Bauernbund* a wasteful exercise. In spite of their many ideological divisions and of this reluctance to form a party, however, they (and contemporary Italian or French farm organizations) were very influential in getting their way on many farm issues—in fact, far more so than an agrarian opposition party could have hoped to be. The question has to be raised, then, whether an analytical model should always concentrate its efforts only on explaining the genesis of formal party formations. With smaller interest-specific cleavages, should it not examine instead why a given public becomes mobilized and organized, and how it achieves the satisfaction of its demands at all? Where agrarian parties did split off from larger parties, then, it would be interesting to know whether they did so because of conflicts among the interest-specific groups or other conflicts within the mother party, or because of dynamic processes going on in the agrarian group or among its constituents.

The final touch to the Lipset-Rokkan model adds an explanation for the strength and solidarity of working-class parties in the different countries. The Protestant countries with the smoothest nation-building experience—Britain, Denmark, and Sweden—produced the most cohesive and also most "domesticable" Socialist parties, while the Catholic countries with recent or difficult national revolution—the Latin South—have deeply divided and alienated working-class movements. The countries in between, however, present further factors yet to be accounted for, such as whether the "nation-builders" (*N*) were friendly with the Catholic Church during the period of mass education and mobilization, as in Austria, Ireland, and Belgium, in contrast to the Latin South. The lateness and incomplete nature of national development with the German *Reich* or with Finland, Norway, and Iceland, the authors suggest further, increased the effect of the Russian Revolution in splitting the labor movement, as compared to the Protestant North. Considering that Lipset and Rokkan pay little attention to the impact of defeat in World War I, to the disturbances following it in some countries, and to the physical proximity

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of the Russian upheaval to Finland, to mention just three points, it is astounding indeed how well they have succeeded in bringing some intelligent order into the mass of inchoate data. There can be no question that their model goes a long way toward explaining the essential outlines of European party systems in the 1920's even if it cannot predict every little *Bauernbund*.

The authors conclude, perhaps too easily, that the current European party systems, with some exceptions, reflect the survival of the "cleavage structures" of the 1920's in spite of the onslaught of Fascism and National Socialism and World War II. This is typical, they say, of competitive politics in an age of high mass consumption. They even supply such glaring examples of discontinuity as Germany, Italy, Spain, and France, though without fully acknowledging the depth of the changes implied by Fascist mass mobilization and landslides and the appearance of new parties such as the UNR, or dramatic shifts such as those between the Italian Socialists and Communists. Neither is there any detailed acknowledgment of what the remark about the age of mass consumption implies and what still requires demonstration: There can be little doubt that the chief economic and social-class issues behind the cleavage lines of the 1920's have undergone substantial change and perhaps even a considerable reduction in the European countries under discussion. At the same time, there may be new protest movements outside the parties. Are the continuities of the party systems in the face of changing cleavages a reflection of depolitization and de-ideologization, of voter indifference, or of an absence of mobilizing drives in the age of mass consumption?[11] The authors do not say. They only mention the need for comparative study of local party entrenchment and ecological data archives in historical depth in order to study the "freezing of political alternatives" (pp. 53-4). It needs to be determined first, however, whether frozen political alternatives imply a freezing of the cleavage structure at all levels or just of the cleavages among the parties.

III

Sociocultural or economic cleavages are not the only way to explain party systems, however much they may have to do with their genesis. Another important approach sees the full-fledged party system as a functional part of a competitive political system, a mechanism that can turn potentially destructive conflict over policies or leadership into

[11] See also Yrjö Littunen, "Social Restraints and Ideological Pluralism," in Allardt and Littunen, 70-77.

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peaceful competition and conflict resolution.[12] It is from this latter point of view that we shall consider Leon D. Epstein's *Political Parties in Western Democracies* as a counterpoint of sorts to the cleavage-oriented other two books under discussion.

Epstein's book is a major contribution to the continuing debate among scholars like Maurice Duverger, Elmer Schattschneider, Sigmund Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer over the nature and functional role of contemporary political parties in the United States and other Western democracies. Its basic reasoning restores the balance in the judgment of most of his predecessors, about the uncohesiveness of American parties as contrasted to their ideal of the well-disciplined European-style mass-membership party that is said to make possible "responsible party government" and true majority rule. Epstein points out three differing conceptions of democracy—majority rule, pluralism, and individualism—and relates them to differing party functions within a political system. Thus "party government" and strong, cohesive major parties are *eufunctional* to majority rule. The cohesive European mass-membership party, and also the American big-city machine, according to the author, are actually responses to a relatively early stage of democratization, when newly mobilized lower-class people are indeed in need of "parties of social integration" (Neumann), or of personal services and patronage (pp. 105-6, 134-5). The mirage of two-party competition, moreover, has consistently eluded the actual political practice in most Western countries and, even where it is said to exist, is riddled with exceptions such as one-party areas or additional parties. The example of the British parties has proved to be unique and unexportable to larger and more heterogeneous settings. And even among the Socialist parties of the Continent, once the paragons of mass-membership cohesion, there has been a distinct trend away from both cohesion and membership orientation since the early fifties, and they have turned instead to the pursuit of ballots above all.

The author suggests that a pluralist conception of democracy is in better accord with American-style cadre parties rather than with cohesive parties united over a large range of issues, as an oppressed class might be. Lacking class-consciousness and hostility to the existing social order, and with a broker type of leadership uncommitted to programs, they have been able to respond to diverse electoral needs and demands. The often criticized political passivity of the ordinary

[12] See, for example, Szymon Chodak, "The Societal Functions of Party Systems in Subsaharan Africa," in Allardt-Littunen, 256-61.

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American citizen, manifested in low voting turnout and low participation in partisan activity, according to Epstein, is only a small and less significant aspect of the broader patterns of political participation in associational and nonpartisan community activity, in which the United States compares favorably with all other Western democracies.

Having disposed of the two-party mirage, the author states flatly that if any kind of party system is the norm among the twenty or so Western democracies, it is a multi-partisan kind, to which indeed fourteen of them adhere. In fact, multi-partism is "natural" and, at least for small nations, not in conflict with a working democratic system. Epstein seems to agree with Sartori that in the larger countries five or more parties are indeed "associated with failure" (p. 71). The "absence of alternation in power" may characterize multi-party systems but this alone is not necessarily a disadvantage, since it increases continuity and encourages compromise at the center. Nor need early control of pressure groups be a major concern, unless one has strong feelings about them. Parliamentary multi-party governments, finally, need not suffer from any lack of cohesion in the government or the opposition. Or at least the individual parties, except in pre-Gaullist France, can be and are cohesive (pp. 333-40).

At this point, it may be well to depart from Epstein's line of reasoning. As the analysis of cleavage structures demonstrated earlier, for a given country to have a certain kind of party system is hardly a matter of choice and, speaking generally, cannot be changed[18] as a people may change certain institutions or even their entire constitution. And frequently party systems and their inherently dysfunctional nature can be a major curse upon the democratic development of a nation. It may well be true that two-party systems are convenient only for contented people and are not made for the expression of intense and varied convictions (p. 60). But what if such forces of conviction explode in a multi-party system such as those of the Weimar Republic or of contemporary Italy where extremist movements, outbidding everyone, reduce the margin of consensus to the point where parliamentary minority governments may have to ride out every storm? Is the absence of alternation in multi-party systems really so harmless that governments can muddle on "in continuity," (p. 72) while the frustrated voters despair of being able to effect change in a crisis and turn to extreme solutions instead of to alternatives within the

[18] For a good example of complex cleavage structure, see Roger Girod, "Geography of the Swiss Party System," in Allardt-Littunen, 132-61.

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system? And what good is the cohesion of individual parties in the coalition government and in the opposition, if their internal cohesion is precisely the reason why the coalition government cannot last and the opposition cannot take its place?

Last but not least important, the American political parties and the party system today seem hardly the best of all possible worlds regardless of what theory of democracy is cited to legitimize them. It may well be true that the mass-membership party is no panacea for the United States even though a little party responsibility could hardly hurt a system as notable for its built-in irresponsibility and unresponsiveness as the American party system of 1968. As for the comparative weakness of the national parties, however, the author clearly understates their almost total eclipse and also the low popular regard for elective politics that has long been evident from the study of recruitment patterns. However *modern* American parties may seem in some respects, the American pattern is scarcely the wave of the future for all democratic party systems, nor is it particularly desirable.

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PROFESSOR RUSSETT: INDUSTRIOUS TAILOR TO A NAKED EMPEROR

By ORAN R. YOUNG

Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 252 pp. $8.50.

PROFESSOR Bruce Russett has recently produced a book that purports to demonstrate the potentialities of the new "science" of international relations.[1] A careful reading of *International Regions and the International System*, however, makes it difficult to avoid being impressed by the essential futility of the exercise and, therefore, to escape the conclusion that the book does *not* direct our attention toward an important new source of knowledge and insight in the field of international relations.

This work is interesting, however, because it provides clear examples of several of the most important weaknesses of contemporary political science. To put the problem in capsule form, Russett has become so preoccupied with the intricacies of various techniques for the manipulation of data that he has seriously neglected a number of critical and antecedent problems of epistemology and theory.[2] The result is an elaborate presentation of data whose purposes are unclear and whose utility is undermined by the absence of an adequate conceptual foundation.

Broadly speaking, there are two quite distinguishable levels at which it is possible to criticize works of this kind. In the first place, it is possible (and easy) to formulate detailed criticisms of various judgments involved in the utilization of specific techniques for the manipulation of data. And the present case is no exception. To what extent, for example, is it reasonable to suppose that voting patterns in the United Nations and membership in formal intergovernmental organizations constitute accurate indicators or reflections of political attitudes and alignments in the world?[3] Or again, why should all organizations (e.g., the European Common Market and the International Institute of Refrigeration) be regarded as equally important

[1] For Russett's views on the nature of "science" see, especially, the Preface and p. 217.

[2] For a general discussion of these problems consult Oran R. Young, *Systems of Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968), chap. 7.

[3] The problem of locating sound operational indicators of political phenomena is an especially difficult one in most branches of political science. Specifically, it seems to raise considerably more serious difficulties than the analogous problem in a field such as economics.

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indicators of the extent or strength of ties among states? And is it not courting serious biases to select the year 1954 as a point of comparison just because it "was the first relatively 'normal' year of economic activity experienced by most of the world in more than a decade and a half" (p. 144)?[4] Criticism at this level, however, is ultimately neither satisfying nor very persuasive. In short, such arguments: (1) can be launched against most empirical studies, (2) generally do not cut to the core of the analytic enterprise, and (3) are apt to lead to bickering about essentially trivial matters.

On the other hand, it is possible to take a hard look at the epistemological and theoretical bases upon which the elaborate infrastructure of empirical data rests. Criticisms of this kind are far more important in the sense that they go to the heart of the analysis and are much more apt to illustrate the fundamental problems referred to above. Accordingly, this review of Russett's work focuses primarily on a series of issues concerning the epistemological and theoretical bases of the study.

I

Considering the fact that Russett devotes a substantial portion of his first chapter to the problem of defining the concept "region,"[5] we might suppose that with respect to basic definitions, at least, he is on solid ground. However, this is not the case. Several definitional problems plague the author's efforts to achieve analytic insights and clarity of presentation throughout the book.

To begin with, the use of the concept "region" to refer to areas whose component units are not necessarily physically contiguous leads to several forms of confusion. First, this practice involves a definition that contradicts the lexical usage of the term "region," a development whose confusing consequences should always be taken seriously in any effort to communicate with others.[6] Second, a conception of region that abandons the notion of physical contiguity as a necessary characteristic opens up the possibility that any entities related to each other with respect to one or more attributes will meet the re-

[4] This judgment raises particularly serious problems. First, many relationships can be "demonstrated" if one is careful enough to select just the right points of comparison. Second, the notion of normality is a rather peculiar one if "normal" activities seldom occur in empirical terms. Third, taking Russett's statement at face value, we must assume that the economic autarky of the era of depression in the thirties was a "normal" development.

[5] Especially 1-7.

[6] For example, a typical dictionary definition of region is "any more or less extensive, continuous part of a surface or space." *The American College Dictionary*, 1962, 1020.

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quirements for consideration as a region. This leads to a situation in which the term "region" is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless. Although he does not say so explicitly, Russett himself seems doubtful about accepting the logical implications of such an open-ended definition of this concept.[7] Yet he fails to come to grips with the conceptual implications of limiting the applicability of the concept "region" on some basis other than the notion of physical contiguity.[8]

Next, as the discussion in Chapter 1 clearly indicates, the search for a satisfactory "essential" definition of the term region is bound to fail. In fact, there are infinite criteria that could be incorported in the definition of region, and there is no *a priori* reason to select some rather than others as the essentialists and neo-Platonists would have us do.[9] The path of nominalism is the only way out of this predicament for purposes of theoretical analysis. That is, it is important to point out clearly in any given analysis that the concept "region" will be defined in terms of *X*, *Y*, and *Z*, and to proceed with the construction of hypotheses involving the phenomenon of regionalism on this basis.[10] Russett, however, gets tangled up in this issue. While he obviously is aware of the dangers of essentialism, he is ultimately unwilling to adopt the path of nominalism. The result is a kind of agnosticism that eschews the formulation of any clear definition of the term "region" until a "suitable" amount of data has been collected.[11] This "wait-and-see" attitude, however, leads inevitably to both confusion and failure. It transforms the bulk of the book into a search for an ontologically correct definition at the expense of efforts to construct theoretical statements about regions. It leads to the conclusion that a region is any area of congruence among an arbitrarily selected

[7] The discussion of various definitional criteria used by other scholars in chap. 1 (see pp. 2-7) indicates concern with the dangers of leaving the definition of region fully open-ended. It does not, however, lead to the formulation of an alternative to existing lexical notions involving the necessity of physical contiguity.

[8] It is true that chap. 1 contains a list of the factors to be explored empirically in the substantive sections of the book (see p. 11). This list of factors, however, is not offered as a formal definition of the concept "region." Nor is it accompanied by a discussion of the conceptual implications involved in the selection of this list of factors rather than some other list.

[9] Russett ultimately decides, on a *de facto* basis, to define regions in terms of sociocultural homogeneity, United Nations voting, membership in intergovernmental organizations, trade, and geographical proximity. There would appear, however, to be no *a priori* reason to select this particular collection of variables from the infinite universe of possibilities.

[10] For a classic statement of the distinction between essentialism and nominalism see Karl R. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York 1964), 26-34.

[11] The term "suitable" is here in quotation marks since the threshold of suitability must ultimately be designated arbitrarily.

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collection of variables. If regions are related to religious affiliations, United Nations voting, and trade patterns, why should they not also be thought of in terms of density of hippies and tastes in music? In other words, unless one has a theory that says *X* is related to *Y* in a specified fashion, all variables seem equally reasonable for the delineation of regions. Finally, Russett's agnosticism fails to produce a viable solution even in empirical terms. As he himself points out, "There is *no* region or aggregate of national units that can in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system" (p. 191). And this is the case despite several built-in biases favoring the discovery of regions—such as the selection of a short time-period and the selection of defining variables (from the infinite supply) on a rather restrictive basis.

At this point, it seems relevant to ask the question, "Why bother anyway?" about the procedure of defining regions in terms of congruence in the empirical arrays formed by the distributions of a number of variables. In fact, such a procedure harbors some serious shortcomings. First, it becomes nothing but a circuitous and time-consuming exercise in description if it does not lead to statements in the form of "if regionalism increases, then *X* will occur" or vice versa. Second, subsuming all of these variables within a single definition cuts off many interesting channels of analysis by making it impossible to consider the possibilities of explaining some of them in terms of others. Third, Russett's emphasis on the idea of developing an aggregative definition of the concept "region" obscures the more feasible goal of employing a number of these variables *separately* as independent variables in the effort to explain a variety of other phenomena such as political integration or the stability of the international system. In brief, therefore, Russett's decision to devote the bulk of his book to the blind alley of pinning down an aggregative definition in empirical terms constitutes a large barrier to the analysis of the interesting problems that can be conceptualized in terms of the phenomenon of regionalism.

II

Important as they are, however, these problems of definition do not constitute the fundamental problem exemplified by *International Regions and the International System*. This is the fallacy of puristic induction: the collection of empirical materials *as an end in itself* and without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria

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of selection.[12] It is of course true that inductive procedures are critical to the task of matching abstract hypotheses with empirical realities and, therefore, to the process of substantiating theoretical statements. And puristic induction may even assist on occasion in the development of interesting empirical premises on which to base subsequent theoretical formulations.[13] In its extreme forms, however, puristic induction is one of the most wasteful and debilitating, as well as pervasive, diseases of contemporary political science.

That Russett's study exemplifies the problems of puristic induction is not difficult to demonstrate. It appears that his basic procedure was to collect and array all the data he could think of that might conceivably be relevant to the phenomenon of regionalism, without previously specifying his analytic purposes in anything but the vaguest terms. As a result, we are confronted in the first eleven chapters of the book with an extensive and increasingly impenetrable thicket of data without any clear notions of what we are searching for and without any precise specification of what it is the author is trying to prove or disprove. True, we are informed (p. 191) that the author always assumed that the factors he was measuring "had something to do with the political behavior of countries toward each other."[14] But, in view of the vagueness of the term "something" and the absence of any clear definition of politics,[15] this statement doesn't narrow our focus much.

The fallacy of puristic induction is often invoked as a weapon of criticism in vague terms. The precise nature of the problems engendered by puristic induction from the point of view of theory-building, however, is less often spelled out. It may therefore be useful to delineate these problems with some care in the context of this discussion of *International Regions and the International System*. First, even when empirical data are carefully arrayed to display any statistical regu-

[12] For a discussion of many of these problems couched in different terms see Marion J. Levy, Jr., " 'Does it Matter if He's Naked?' Bawled the Child," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton 1969).

[13] The discovery of fruitful empirical premises is one of the creative aspects of scientific analysis. Although relatively little is known about this form of creativity, it is clear that premises are often derived from many disparate sources. A process of correlating many variables with each other may, of course, produce interesting regularities about which to hypothesize. Because of the work involved and the vagaries of simple correlations, however, this often turns out to be a rather inefficient process of searching for potentially interesting links.

[14] He evidently made this assumption because the "conventional wisdom of international relations" suggests such relationships.

[15] Because of the striking absence of consensus in the discipline of political science on definitions of politics and the political, it is of considerable importance to specify the definitions to be employed in any given study.

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larities in their relationships (and Russett seldom does this), there are the dangers of proceeding in a backward fashion. Treated as an end in itself and without careful incorporation into one or more theoretical formulations, the identification of empirical regularities does little to facilitate the *explanation* of interrelationships among the variables involved. This is so even though empirical generalizations can sometimes provide a basis for cautious predictions (or, more precisely, projections) about the phenomena in question. It is always possible to think of a reason why any given empirical relationship should occur on an *ex post facto* basis. But unfortunately it is generally possible to think of numerous "explanations" on this basis, and there is no logical reason to favor any one of them over the others. The use of various statistical procedures sometimes permits certain checks concerning the prospects that an empirical regularity is actually a spurious correlation. Given the possibility of an unlimited number of intervening factors, however, such procedures are not likely to produce persuasive results unless they are carefully employed in conjunction with an exercise in deductive explanation.[16] Treated as an end in itself, therefore, the search for empirical generalizations does not offer a rewarding prospect from the point of view of theory-building, whatever the utility of such procedures for other purposes. Moreover, to make matters worse, the problems discussed in this paragraph are only intensified in most areas of political science (and here too Russett's study provides a good example) by the fact that the universe of cases for most political phenomena is so small that empirical regularities are tenuous links at best.[17]

A second weakness of puristic induction arises from the likelihood that in any given case it will constitute an extremely wasteful and expensive procedure for the development of theory. Though one might indeed uncover interesting (or significant) hunches to be used as analytic premises through this process, the *probabilities* of doing so are actually likely to be small. In fact, there is good reason to suppose that the well prepared mind is at least as likely to come up with creative ideas for these purposes by reading interesting novels or even by

[16] For a sophisticated discussion of the uses of statistical procedures in such situations that, however, fails to demonstrate a greater role for such procedures than suggested here see Hayward Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York 1965), chap. 6.

[17] In some situations, the identification of empirical regularities allows for useful projections (not predictions in the formal sense) of future developments. The universe-of-cases problem referred to here, however, is apt to make projections of this kind quite unreliable in the analysis of political phenomena.

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dreaming.[18] Russett's best ideas, for example, bear virtually no relationship to the data so laboriously compiled throughout the first part of his book. At the same time, the procedure of puristic induction is apt to leave the analyst with both too much *and* too little data when it comes to matching abstract hypotheses with empirical realities. Russett appears, for example, to be interested in analyzing the links between regional phenomena on the one hand and political integration and peaceful change in the international system on the other. However, as he himself recognizes, the study does not include the data necessary for empirical evaluation of hypotheses about these links.[19] But the study does, nevertheless, include page after page of data that Russett is unable to employ for any purpose other than the pursuit of a sort of definitional scholasticism.

These problems resulting from puristic induction lead, in turn, to a third problem: the tendency of such studies to degenerate into extended descriptive exercises with little explanatory power. The collection of empirical data is an essential condition for theoretical work, not an end in itself.[20] Although it is certainly desirable to have a clear and accurate picture of the way things really are, description does not go to the core of the intellectual problem of determining why things are as they are. When the collection of empirical materials becomes an end in itself and when it subsequently turns out that we do not have the data necessary to evaluate interesting hypotheses in an area, little is left but an elaborate and superficially impressive collection of descriptions. This problem is well illustrated by *International Regions and the International System*. In the absence of hypotheses utilizing the data presented and in the light of Russett's confessions about his inability to find indicators for such critical matters as political integration,[21] a large part of the book can be viewed only as straightforward description. The elaborateness is often deceptive and though it is pos-

[18] For a brief but clear exposition of the philosophic arguments leading to the conclusion that puristic induction does not constitute an efficient procedure for the discovery of empirical premises see May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," 363-98 in May Brodbeck ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York 1968). For a more general discussion of these aspects of the phenomenon of scientific creativity in terms of the notion of "pattern perception" consult Gordon Tullock, *The Organization of Inquiry* (Durham, N.C. 1966), chap. 5.

[19] For explicit statements along these lines see, for example, pp. 191, 201, 210, and 212.

[20] All intrinsically empirical disciplines (unlike logic or mathematics) must engage in a process of matching their abstract formulations with empirical realities. Under the circumstances, the collection of data is necessary to the development of theory though it is not especially interesting as an end in itself.

[21] See p. 191 and especially the statement that "we have produced no *measures* of integration that might be matched against the attributes which are supposed to affect it."

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sible that this work might prove valuable to some hypothetical scholar of the future, there is no escaping the fact that in its present form it is nothing but description.

Despite its serious consequences, it is not difficult to understand why puristic induction so often becomes a trap. Collection of empirical data on this basis is a substitute for the production of creative ideas—a substitution that appears to be psychologically gratifying to many analysts. And the new toy of social science, the computer, presents an invitation to become preoccupied with puristic induction. None of this, however, amounts to an acceptable excuse for falling into this trap. In short, it is time for us all to stop being fascinated with numbers for their own sake and to get on with the job of explaining important political phenomena.

III

Russett's entanglement in the fallacy of puristic induction makes it important to consider questions of purpose. Why should we want to study international regions in the first place? Presumably such a study will help us understand various aspects of international relations. But Russett is not very explicit on why or how this is so, except to say that he assumes that regional phenomena have "something to do with the political behavior of countries toward each other." In general, however, it is possible to regard regionalism either as an independent variable(s) in terms of which to construct explanations of other international phenomena or as a dependent variable(s) to be explained in terms of other international phenomena. And of course it would be perfectly consistent to think of regionalism in both ways at different times and for different purposes.

If we consider regionalism first as an independent variable, it appears that we are closing in on the focus of Russett's interests. Both in the Preface and in the later chapters of the book he indicates that his interest in analyzing regionalism is strongly related to a desire to find explanations for *political* integration and for the stability or instability of the overall international system (or, more explicitly, the prospects of peaceful change).[22] Accordingly, we would expect the body of the book to demonstrate the relevance of his data to the explanation of these phenomena. In these terms, however, the text is a disappointment.

Russett obviously regards the problem of political integration as one of his primary interests. He introduces this problem in discussing the

[22] For examples see *ibid.*, pp. vii and 94-99 as well as Chaps. 12 and 14.

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purposes of the book, he is at some pains to present his own verbal definition of political integration (p. 96),[23] and he returns to the subject repeatedly in the course of the essay. Nevertheless, he falls into several traps with respect to the question of integration. In the first place, at no point in the book does he match hypotheses concerning the links between regionalism and political integration with empirical data. This is partly because he fails to offer any hypotheses on the subject to which his data on regionalism are fully relevant.[24] Even more critical, however, is the fact that, given his definition of political integration, he is unable to find any operational indicators with which to measure political integration (p. 191).[25] As a result, he never presents any data concerning levels of political integration, a fact that clearly makes it impossible to explore systematically any hypotheses linking increases or decreases in his regional variables with increases or decreases in political integration. Russett acknowledges explicitly that this is the case (p. 191). But this acknowledgment does not prevent him from maintaining that the study of political integration is one of his major purposes or from presenting a number of speculative ideas about integration to which his data cannot be made relevant.

Another pitfall in the study of integration is the danger of circular reasoning. Since political integration is often defined in such a way as to include some of the items Russett includes in his definition of the term "region," there is a temptation for him to slide from his original independent definition of political integration into an equation of regions with integration. This doesn't become serious so long as Russett remains clear on his original definition of political integration in terms of responsiveness. But when in the final chapters he begins to project the prospects for integration in various areas of the world, his analysis becomes questionable. Since he has not demonstrated any theoretical links between regionalism and integration (or even any empirical correlations), his use of the data on regionalism to evaluate the prospects for integration is clearly unwarranted on

[23] See especially the statement "it is a relationship or pattern of behavior, the ability to work out . . . conflict with a minimum of violence and without one party always making important concessions, that marks the *condition* of successful political integration."

[24] One or two possible exceptions such as the link between regional ties and war are discussed in a later section of this essay. In general, however, the statement in the text seems accurate.

[25] See especially the argument that "Responsiveness is a difficult phenomenon to measure reliably at the level of international politics. . . ." And then, "Accordingly, I have not attempted to do so for the macro-analysis of this volume."

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theoretical grounds.[26] We can only conclude, therefore, that his projections stem either from an unwarranted tendency to smudge the definitions of regionalism and political integration together or from sheer speculation.

Russett's problems in trying to explain world order, peaceful change, and so forth on the basis of regional phenomena are comparably intractable. Here the tendency toward puristic induction is almost polar since he scarcely mentions the problems of world order between the Preface and the final chapters of the book and since there is no indication that he selected the variables underlying regionalism with an eye toward analyzing such questions in the long run. Moreover, we are again confronted with the problem of having no operational indicator for our dependent variable, so that the whole idea of matching abstract hypotheses against empirical realities fails to get even to first base. In fact—as is not the case in his discussion of the question of political integration—Russett appears not even to have arrived at verbal definitions of the various phenomena that can be subsumed under the vague heading of world order (pp. 227-33). The result is a loose and unsupported collection of speculations that are unrelated to the empirical data supplied in the first part of the book.[27] For example, Russett has the idea (to put it simply) that the growth of regionalism causes political integration; that this integration reduces the extensiveness of cross-pressures in world politics; and that their reduction, in turn, reduces the prospects for peaceful change (or world order?) in the international system (pp. 228-30). Since he offers no operational definition of integration and no definitions of any kind for the other terms in the explanation, however, it is impossible to proceed further with the idea.

Many of the phenomena that fall under the heading of world order also engender an additional trap for the analyst approaching them as Russett does. Since a phenomenon such as the stability of an international system is a systemwide property rather than a phenomenon that is iterative within a given international system, analyses of the subject should focus on several systems (or classes of system) or, at least, a number of readings for the same system over a considerable period. Russett, however, does not deal with these problems. Not only does he fail to define the relevant dependent variables with any

[26] For examples of this fallacy see pp. 200-201 and 224-226.

[27] Given the present state of the field of political science, highly speculative work concerning political phenomena is often justifiable. In a work that purports to be conceptually rigorous and empirically systematic, however, a drift toward loose and unsupported speculations constitutes a serious deficiency.

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precision, he has neither delineated any systemic boundaries or classes of system nor considered whether the postwar years should be regarded as a single system, a part of a longer-term system, or several distinct systems.[28]

Alternatively, one could study international regionalism as a dependent variable and consider the possibilities of explaining it in terms of some other set of factors. In fact, however, a reading of *International Regions and the International System* indicates that this was not the author's primary intention.[29] And, because of the way the study is organized, this is just as well since any effort to employ the framework of the study for such purposes would quickly run into several difficulties. Above all, such an endeavor would reveal the consequences of including too much in a set of definitions. If too many factors are lumped into the definition of dependent variables, there is apt to be nothing left to use as independent variables. In using such procedures, the analyst will ultimately define his project out of existence. And this is exactly the tendency of Russett's use of aggregative definitions.

This procedure also makes it impossible to formulate some of the more interesting questions about the phenomenon of regionalism without doing violence to the original definitions. That is, one interesting approach to the study of regions would be to inquire whether some of the variables examined by Russett can be explained in theoretical terms by reference to others.[30] Unfortunately, however, Russett's study is poorly organized to deal with these questions. His principal thrust (which reaches its height in Chapter 11) is toward the delineation of regions in terms of the congruence among variables rather than toward the explanation of some in terms of others. His basic definitions make it difficult to conceptualize these questions without disregarding the definitional apparatus of the early chapters. And, once again, he offers no theoretical formulations concerning the links *among* the variables subsumed under the concept of region. When he does take notice of the empirical links among these variables, therefore, the results are predictably disappointing. His comments are exceedingly brief (pp. 206-14); we are left with nothing but simple

[28] For an extended examination of these problems see Oran R. Young, "A Systemic Approach to International Politics," *Research Monograph No. 33*, Princeton Center of International Studies, 1968.

[29] For example, this possibility is not mentioned in the discussion of purposes in Russett's Preface.

[30] For a discussion emphasizing possibilities of this kind see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," *International Organization*, XXII (Autumn 1968), 855-80.

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correlations and a statement that the direction of the links is obscure,[31] and the discussion concludes with the statement that "we do not have enough information for different points in time to verify"[32] hypotheses about such links (p. 212). In other words, the commitment to puristic induction has again led to a situation in which the data required for interesting analyses are missing.

IV

Much has been made in the preceding pages of the fallacy of puristic induction and the problems of failing to formulate hypotheses prior to the collection of large quantities of data. This does not, however, mean that Russett fails to produce any hypotheses at all. He does occasionally (especially toward the end) offer a statement in the form of an hypothesis. It is difficult, however, to escape the conclusion that these hypotheses were added as an afterthought and do not reflect the care devoted to the technical procedures of the earlier chapters of the book. As a result, the study provides an excellent illustration of a major corollary of the fallacy of puristic induction: hypotheses tacked on to such efforts tend to start with ambiguous epistemology and end with underdeveloped theory. An examination of several specific cases from Russett's study will illustrate the resultant problems.

The hypothesis to which Russett devotes most space in this study has to do with the relationship between regionalism and war (chap. 12). Specifically, he sets out to investigate the idea that violent conflict among states will decrease as regional ties among states increase.[33] This apparently simple idea turns out to be surprisingly complex. First, there is the problem of conceptualizing the dependent variable: violent conflict. Like Singer, Russett decides that the thing that really counts is "new starts," thereby washing out (by definition) such factors as the duration of war and (within gross limits) the intensity of war.[34] Even if true, therefore, the hypothesis is much more restricted

[31] For a discussion that essentially acknowledges this weakness see pp. 207-10.

[32] This statement refers explicitly to the idea that similarity of political orientations is a prerequisite for the growth of formal organizational ties among states. The conclusion, however, applies equally well to other relationships.

[33] The hypothesis is never stated explicitly but this is the clear implication of the discussion (pp. 191-93).

[34] On the question of "new starts" vs. duration or intensity see the conceptualization (pp. 196-98). The same problem characterizes Singer's recent study of the relationships between war and alliances. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968). For a telling critique of Singer (much of which is relevant to the present discussion) see Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytic Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research* (No. 3, 1967), 270-88.

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than it seems at first. Second, the links between regionalism and war are subject to a variety of radically disparate interpretations. Even should the hypothesized relationship hold, it is easy to think of a number of third factors that might account for a correlation along these lines. Some of these Russett himself suggests (p. 192). But there are others that may be even more important. For example, the absence of violent conflict among European states in recent years may be the result of the nuclearization of international politics in this arena,[35] or of any of a number of peculiarities of the post-1945 period.[36] Third, and related to the previous point, simple correlations do not tell us much when we are faced with a large number of alternative explanations for the relationship in question. The best we can say, in Russett's words, is that the factors in question are "somehow associated" (p. 201).[37] And given the multiplicity of variables that might account for the link, this is hardly a favorable basis on which to make simple predictions, let alone causal explanations. Fourth, even a strong link in the hypothesized direction would tell us virtually nothing about the connection between political integration and violent conflict. To demonstrate this latter connection it would first be necessary to pin down the point that an increase in regionalism leads to an increase in political integration. And, as shown in the preceding paragraphs, this is precisely what Russett fails to do throughout his book. Finally, even the links between regionalism and "new starts" with respect to war turn out in fact to be empirically tenuous and relatively uninteresting. Geographical proximity is positively related to war (but this is scarcely an earthshaking conclusion) and, in any case, may only operate to generate opportunities for war rather than actually to precipitate war.[38] Then, trade may be somehow *positively* associated with war, but the data are insufficient to explain this relationship, which goes against

[35] The idea that overt violence (in contrast to coercion) has been inhibited by the growing impact of perceptions concerning the potential destructiveness of nuclear war has been discussed frequently in recent years. And, of course, the impact of such perceptions has been especially great in the European arena in contrast to other parts of the world. For one interesting example see Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* (Princeton 1966).

[36] It would be interesting, for example, to make a similar study of the connections between regional ties and violent conflict in eighteenth-century Europe. While that era's Europeanism and cosmopolitanism are frequently commented upon, it was certainly not a period noted for the relative absence of wars.

[37] This statement refers explicitly to the links between trade and violent conflict. With respect to some of the other variables in question it is not clear that we can even say this much.

[38] Russett himself suggests the ambiguity introduced by the distinction between opportunities and precipitating factors (p. 200). Ambiguities of this kind, of course, reflect the limitations of correlational procedures in the absence of theory.

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what we might expect from the original hypothesis. And to cap it all, the number of cases of war is sufficiently small (41) and the universe of cases is sufficiently diverse internally that it is impossible to have any real confidence in predictions, let alone explanations, based on this analysis.

Other hypotheses included in the study lead to similar muddles even though none is so fully developed and assessed as the one discussed in the preceding paragraph. For example, Russett appears (he never states the case explicitly) to be interested in an hypothesis to the effect that an increase in formal institutional ties among states will, in turn, lead to an increase in political integration (pp. 96-99). But here too the problems quickly become insurmountable. In this case the independent variable is underdeveloped. Does an increase in institutional ties mean an increase in their scope, intensity, or durability? After some hesitation, Russett seems to suggest that only scope, or extensiveness, matters. Then, we are again faced with the fact that it is easy to proliferate alternative explanations that might well account for any link discovered between institutional ties and political integration.[39] Here too, therefore, we are thrown back on correlations unbuttressed by theory. In this case, however, even correlations are impossible since Russett is unable to supply us with an operational indicator for political integration, thus vitiating the whole exercise. Thus, another move in the direction of formulating hypotheses degenerates into verbal speculation.

Finally, let us consider the links between United Nations voting and the relative influence of various internal and external factors on the formation of foreign policy by states in the international system. Because voting alignments in the United Nations remained strikingly stable between 1952 and 1963, even while various internal changes were occurring, Russett asks us to believe that systemic factors are more important as determinants of foreign policy than are various internal factors such as personality of political leaders, or governmental institutions.[40] This relationship, however, is built on several assumptions that are so crude as to cast serious doubt on the whole enterprise. First, it requires the assumption that United Nations voting is an accurate reflection of a state's overall performance in world politics. But what evidence is there to support this view? Detailed studies of foreign offices more often suggest a certain compartmentalization of

[39] Russett himself does the job in this case. Consider the various explanations suggested (pp. 97-98).

[40] For Russett's own statement of this argument see pp. 92-93.

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VOL. IX JULIO-SEPTIEMBRE, 1968 NÚM. 1

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United Nations activities as well as considerable dissonance between bureaux dealing with international organization affairs and bureaux dealing with other matters (witness the American case among others). Moreover, it may well be that many states regard their participation in the United Nations as sufficiently peripheral not to matter much one way or the other. Second, the evidence for the proposed link covers only a brief time-span in the longer vistas of world politics. And while our contemporaneous perspective induces us to emphasize numerous domestic discontinuities between 1952 and 1963, in the longer sweep of history this period is apt to seem much more uniform. Under the circumstances, it would seem desirable to take a somewhat cautious and skeptical view of the conclusions suggested by Russett (pages 92 and 93). Third, since this link is not supported by any theoretical arguments, we are thrown back on more statistical correlations. It is perfectly possible, under the circumstances, that the continuity in United Nations voting patterns between 1952 and 1963 requires *explanation* in terms of factors altogether different from Rosenau's five, which Russett discusses.[41] And it would be equally reasonable to suggest that the continuity in each state's voting was the result of offsetting changes in a number of diverse factors rather than the unchanging quality of one or two. The idea of analyzing the determinants of foreign policy in terms of United Nations voting patterns, therefore, is interesting as far as it goes. But it doesn't lead to very satisfying explanations and it hardly seems like a sound basis for predictions of the future.

This list of examples is not exhaustive. If these examples are biased in any direction, however, it is in favor of the author, since they are among his most explicitly and extensively developed hypotheses. Indeed, a number of other hypotheses that appear in the final chapters of the book bear no relation at all to the data set forth in the earlier chapters, and are (so far as one can determine) little more than vague and imprecisely formulated speculations.[42] The corollary of puristic induction concerning the underdeveloped nature of hypotheses, therefore, holds extremely well with respect to the study under discussion.

V

There are several subsidiary problems posed by *International Regions and the International System* that the main argument of this essay

[41] For Rosenau's own formulation see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill. 1966).

[42] For examples of statements of this kind see pp. 227-33.

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has not emphasized. For example, it would be possible to set forth systematically evidence concerning the stringent limitations on the usefulness of correlational procedures in the absence of prior theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, the principal argument of this essay is complete. Rather than consider subsidiary weaknesses, therefore, it seems desirable to balance this criticism with some comments on the utility of Russett's study, before formulating the conclusions to be drawn from this discussion.

Despite the fact that the shortcomings of this study are so basic as to impair if not to destroy its utility as a contribution to the construction of theory in the field of international relations, the book is not without merit in other respects. First, description itself is a useful enterprise, especially when it brings into clear focus phenomena that have previously been neglected or distorted. Thus, Russett's attention to non-geographic factors in the discussion of international subsystems is interesting even though the overall descriptive conclusions of the study (summarized in Chapter 11) fail to carry us much beyond the broad outlines suggested by commonsense. Second, the book contains some data that are suggestive (though not conclusive) in casting doubt on assumptions and propositions sometimes accepted uncritically. The most striking case concerns the connection between regional ties and violent conflict. While the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that political integration doesn't reduce the *frequency* of wars,[43] it does indicate quite strongly that the mere growth of interdependencies among states is not always enough to bring violent conflict under control. Third, the essay provides yet another affirmation of the point that prediction (or projection) is sometimes easier to achieve than is explanation, at least for limited purposes. As Russett points out, the patterns of United Nations voting for 1952 allow for quite good predictions of the 1963 patterns and the patterns of institutional memberships for 1951 allow for rather good predictions of the 1962 patterns (pp. 88 and 120). Predictions of this kind, however, should be treated very cautiously. In the absence of theoretical explanations, continuities of this kind may be essentially fortuitous or caused by factors subject to substantial but unknown patterns of change. And the time-span is so short (unlike that of long-term population projections, for example) that there is little basis for confidence that these correlations tap fundamental con-

[43] Once again, this is because we have been given no indicators for political integration and, therefore, the links between regional ties and integration have not been established.

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tinuities that will prove unchanging over a longer time-span. Fourth, toward the end of his book Russett introduces several speculative ideas that are of considerable interest though they bear no relationship to the empirical data set forth throughout the first part of the volume. This is true in particular of his references to ideas such as cognitive dissonance and social conflict in connection with the problem of political integration and his discussion of cross-pressures as determinants of stability in the overall international system (pp. 214-17 and 227-33). Here we could wish that he had spent less time manipulating data in the absence of explicit theory and more time developing these references into precise ideas and, ultimately, into theoretical statements. His references would have been more helpful, for example, if he had dealt with the problems of transferring insights from systems in which the human individual is the fundamental unit to international systems, and if he had discussed in detail some of the criticisms of hypotheses linking the presence of cross-pressures and the prospects of peaceful change in world politics.[44]

VI

In recent years, studies such as *International Regions and the International System* have tended to enjoy an immunity from searching criticism. There seem to be several reasons for this. First, the authors of such studies have been extraordinarily diligent in flourishing the superficial attributes of "science," in particular the use of quantitative data. And since "science" (or scientism) is currently the dominant fad in the social sciences, it is difficult to buck the trend by criticizing such popular enterprises. Second, careful criticism of works of this kind requires hard and frequently unrewarding work. Precisely because the technical details of the procedures employed are so complex and so unrelated to theory (unlike the simplicity and elegance of genuine scientific achievements) it is apt to take a good deal of time to identify the central fallacies so commonly embedded in them.

It is time, however, to call a spade a spade. Works such as Russett's are *not* important contributions to a genuine science of international relations.[45] On the contrary, they retard progress in that direction both

[44] For good illustrations of these criticisms consult the essays by Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar System," *Daedalus* (Summer 1964), 881-909, and "International Structure, National Force, and the balance of World Power," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXI (No. 2, 1967), 215-31.

[45] It is important to stress this point because of Russett's pretensions about the "science" of international politics that has been burgeoning in recent years. On this subject see the Preface, especially p. viii.

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by distorting the basic relationships among the intellectual tasks involved in the construction of theory and by draining off intellectual (and fiscal) resources into essentially secondary activities. For analysts to become preoccupied with the technical problems of manipulating data at the expense of creative thinking about the antecedent problems of epistemology and theory, and in such a way as to encourage the fallacy of puristic induction, constitutes one of the most serious diseases of the social sciences in general and of political science in particular.

What then is the alternative for scholars interested in exploring the possibilities of constructing theory in the field of international relations? Certainly it is not a retreat to the familiar comforts of intuition based on an impressionistic reading of historical sources.[46] And the present discussion is not an attack on the use of quantitative data *when such data are employed in the interest of developing theory rather than as a substitute for creative theory-building*. Under the circumstances, the development of theory (to the extent it may prove possible) in this field appears to depend on three conditions. First, we need to develop greater familiarity with the basic rules of scientific endeavor, as practised in all those disciplines in which substantial theoretical progress is discernible.[47] Second, we need to pay much more attention to fundamental problems of epistemology in this field.[48] As matters stand, we spend too much time entangled in the confusions caused by definitional inconsistencies and conceptual ambiguities. And third, there is emphatically *no substitute for good ideas*.

[46] For a clear statement of the disadvantages of this course consult Levy.

[47] For an exceptionally forceful and succinct statement of these rules see *ibid.* Russett himself seems to have moved toward agreement with this argument in the period since the publication of *International Regions and the International System*. See, for example, his Introduction to his excellent collection of essays dealing with economic models that may prove useful in the analysis of international phenomena: Bruce M. Russett ed., *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago 1968).

[48] For an extended treatment of the relevance of various epistemological problems see Young, *Systems of Political Science*, especially chap. 7.

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